


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INVITED TALKS

CONCEPTUAL AMELIORATION: EPISTEMIC AND SEMANTIC PROJECTS

Sally Haslanger, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

In response to oppression or injustice, we must (collectively) change the existing social structures; this requires more than thinking differently. However, cultural change is also necessary. Ideological oppression is at least partly sustained by a cultural technē, specifically the conceptual and symbolic tools it affords. Recently I've argued that one form of conceptual amelioration is epistemic, another is semantic. Today I will review this distinction and elaborate it by developing an externalist account of concepts. I will then argue that one form of semantic amelioration often thought impossible – change of content without change of concept – is coherent and sometimes valuable.

VAGUE BELIEFS AND VAGUELY BELIEVING

Rosanna Keefe, University of Sheffield

Belief ascription can be a vague matter. There are all sorts of clear cases of belief and clear non-cases; but there can be borderline cases too. Putative borderline beliefs can arise from a number of different sources and in this paper I explore some of these and the significant epistemological and semantic issues they interact with, offering a rough sketch of relations between vague beliefs and fine-grained degreed states. A first potential source of borderline beliefs arises in (not uncommon) situations where the subject has high, but perhaps not sufficiently high, confidence in the content. Second – especially for 3rd-person ascriptions – there are cases where there are conflicting features of the subject's dispositions that speak both for and against ascribing the belief, such as when a subject sincerely endorses one view but exhibits implicit bias that appears to reveal the opposite commitment. Third, we can consider the subject's attitude to "a is F" when a is borderline F.

Considering the first of these scenarios requires us to consider the relation between so-called "all-or-nothing" or binary/categorical beliefs and credences or degrees of belief. A central focus will be the merits of and challenges for the Lockean thesis which, roughly summarised, identifies binary beliefs with credences above some threshold (a threshold which may or may not be vague and/or context-dependent). Among other issues, I will consider a role for beliefs that, according to influential arguments from Buchak, demonstrates a divergence between beliefs and credences that looks incompatible with both the Lockean thesis and the picture of vague beliefs that I sketch. I will argue that this helps show how aspects of credences, as traditionally conceived, make them unsuitable for the degreed elements of the vague belief picture sketched.

Before that, though, I will consider and reject some reasons to think that "believes" is *not* a vague predicate, including some arguments from a recent paper in *Philosophical Studies* entitled "Why 'believes' is not a vague predicate", which considers, in particular, the second of the above types of putative borderline beliefs. The paper will finish by briefly considering the story about vague beliefs in the light of different theories of vagueness and also the third putative source of borderline cases listed above involving beliefs with vague contents.

BEYOND AUTOMATICITY: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL COMPLEXITY OF SKILLED ACTION

Elisabeth Pacherie, Institut Jean Nicod, CNRS, PSL University, Paris

Acquiring a skill requires practice. Practice leads to an improvement is the ability to select appropriate actions, to select them rapidly and to execute the selected actions accurately, while at the same time leading to a reduction of the cognitive load required to perform the action. These properties are not unique to skill learning, however. They are also characteristic of the formation of (good) habits. What is it then that sets apart skilled from merely habitual action?

It is common to draw the contrast between skills and habits in terms of intentional, goal-directed vs. automatic, stimulus-driven actions. Intentional actions, however, are not intentional through and through. They typically involve an interplay of automatic and intentional processes. What form does this interplay take in the case of highly skilled or expert action? The classical view of the interplay of automatic and intentional processes in intentional action is hierarchical. It is thought that the cognitive architecture underpinning intentional action involves a hierarchy of representations and processes that specify and control the action in a more and more fine-grained way and that processes at higher levels present most of the marks of intentionality, while the more we go down the hierarchy, the more automatic the processes become.

I will argue that in the case of highly skilled action, the intentionality-automaticity gradient is not necessarily aligned with the action hierarchy. Rather we have a more flexible interplay of automatic and intentional processes. I will further argue that this flexible interplay depends on the acquisition of detailed and well-structured action representations and internal models and on the concomitant development of metacontrol processes that can be used to shape and balance it.

BIASES AND VICES

Josefa Toribio, ICREA-UB

Beliefs formed on the basis of implicit biases pose a problem for accessibilism, since implicit biases are consciously inaccessible, yet they are relevant to epistemic justification. Recent empirical results suggest, however, that we are more aware of the content of our implicit biases than we had previously assumed. I here discuss the notion of accessibility vis-à-vis these empirical results and argue that accessibilism can meet the challenge posed by implicit biases in two different ways. The accessibilist can enrich the supervenience base for justification by including in such base facts that the subject is in a position to know. Alternatively, the accessibilist can appeal to a distinction between first- and second-order facts and argue that, while the former may be inaccessible, the latter need not. Ultimately both strategies fail, but the way in which they do, I conclude, reveals something general and important about our epistemic obligations and our epistemic vices.

SYMPOSIA

OPACITY AND SELF-KNOWLEDGE

Marta Cabrera, University of Valencia; Josep E. Corbí, University of Valencia; Carlos Moya, University of Valencia; Chon Tejedor, University of Valencia

Descartes' skeptical arguments regarding the external world favor an image of the mind as an inner theater. On this basis, one might think that a first-person access to one's psychological condition is inextricably bound to what might be transparent to one's mind's eye and, therefore, immune to error; on the contrary, a third party access to an agent's mental states will essentially depend on gathering uncertain evidence. Whenever the agent herself might be involved in this sort of investigation, her access to her own mind would not be *strictly* first-personal, but exposed to the same degree of opacity and vulnerability to error as a third party. Hence, it sounds as if *a strictly first-personal perspective constitutively involves self-transparency while opacity will emerge as a constitutive feature of the third-person perspective*. This a common assumption in the current debate about self-knowledge, regardless of the particular way in which the transparency of a strictly first-personal perspective might be elucidated. *In this symposium, we intend to explore various ways in which this assumption could be challenged or, at least, qualified.*

More specifically, Carlos Moya will dispute Peter Carruthers' argument to the effect that there is no strictly first-person perspective, since an agent accesses her own psychological attitudes roughly the same way as she might access those of a third party. Moya will argue that this approach implies an intolerable degree of self-opacity, since it seems that an agent could always be wrong about her own mental states and this seems to be inconsistent with her capacity to act intentionally. So, it will follow that a strictly first-person perspective imposes some limits to self-opacity. Marta Cabrera, Josep Corbí and Chon Tejedor will examine, however, various ways in which self-opacity is constitutive of our agency and, more specifically, of a strictly first-person perspective.

Cabrera will consider two dimensions in which the rationality of our emotional response can be assessed and insist on the idea that some such responses, even though inappropriate, reveal an aspect of the agent's character that needs to be taken into consideration in order to elaborate a suitable response to the situation. The way in which the agent relates to this aspect will emerge as alien to that of a third party. Corbí will challenge the skeptical interpretation of situationist experiments concerning the explanatory relevance of an agent's character; for this purpose, she will study the importance of a character's psychological profile concerning the ability of a narrative to create a fictional world. She will as a result distinguish between agential and explanatory character. The former is strictly first-personal and conveys the sense of struggle that sounds most attractive in narratives and, needless to say, part of this struggle lies in the idea of opacity, that is, on the character's capacity to discern what the situation demands from her and whether she would be able to honor such demands. Along similar lines, Tejedor will stress the inescapability of opacity in determining one's moral responsibility once we acknowledge that the latter may depend not only on our own intentions or decisions but on the conditions themselves that we confront.

1. IN DEFENSE OF ASYMMETRY BETWEEN FIRST- AND THIRD-PERSON MENTAL ATTRIBUTIONS

Carlos Moya, University of Valencia

Many philosophers have defended the existence of an asymmetry between first- and third-person attributions of propositional attitudes. Many first-person attributions of attitudes are apparently made in a direct, non-inferential way, without relying on observation of one's own behavior or other empirical evidence, and, in this sense, a priori. Moreover, those attributions enjoy a special presumption of truth. However, these traits are absent when we attribute attitudes to other people. Though asymmetry has been assumed in many views of self-knowledge, not everybody shares this assumption. The first clear negation of asymmetry was Gilbert Ryle's. But in recent times a position akin to Ryle's has been vigorously defended by other thinkers, especially Peter Carruthers.

Carruthers assumes that we introspect our phenomenal attitudes, but not our propositional attitudes. Concerning the latter, our access to them goes in roughly the same way as to those of other people, by turning our "mindreading" abilities onto ourselves. I agree with Carruthers that we sometimes ascribe attitudes to ourselves in roughly the way we ascribe them to others. Moreover, in my view, adopting an objective, third person perspective is an important tool for gaining self-knowledge. However, at the basis of self-ascription of mental attitudes through interpretation of our own behavior, we find attitudes that are not the result of interpretation, which we can be immediately conscious of and express directly. These expressions are akin to what Burge has called "cogito-like judgments". To hold that all self-ascriptions of propositional attitudes result from an interpretative stance leads to unacceptable consequences. Let me argue for this by reflecting on purposeful action.

In the case of other people, overt behavior is often a more reliable criterion of their intentions than their statements. Can we apply this to ourselves? This would threaten the possibility of acting purposefully, in order to fulfil prior intentions or desires, for a person can start acting with a certain intention or desire and be led to discover, by observing her own behavior, that in fact she doesn't have that desire or intention, but some other, quite different ones. And the latter could equally be subject to revision because of new empirical evidence, and so on. This also implies that a person can never be sure that her desires have been satisfied or that her intentions have been realized, because she can never be sure what desires or intentions she had to begin with. This may well be incompatible with rational agency and control over our actions.

An important argument in Carruthers' hands are experiments designed to uncover the phenomenon of confabulation. I argue, however, that the weight of that experimental work as an argument against asymmetry is quite dubious, to say the less. I conclude that the denial of first- and third-person asymmetry is a shaky and very problematic position.

2. EMOTIONS, REASONS, AND THE SELF

Marta Cabrera, Universitat de València

In the last four decades there has been a big shift in philosophy of emotions from the view that emotions have an irrational effect on our choices and behaviour to the intuition that emotions may have a fundamental role in our decisions about what to do and how to live. Philosophers of emotion, however, struggle to understand the ways in which emotions might

contribute to our making rational and good decisions and to explaining our actions. In this paper, I (i) question the idea that the rational role of emotions in action is to reinforce the reasons that an agent has for doing something *only in the case in which her emotions are representing their objects correctly* (Greenspan 2011, Tappolet 2016 and Carman 2018) and (ii) introduce the distinction between what emotions *represent* and what they *reveal* in order to show that an emotion that misrepresents a situation may still carry practically relevant information for an agent about herself and provide her with reasons for action.

My aim is to introduce a reflection on the epistemology of incorrect emotions that captures the special role they perform as a source of self-knowledge that can guide the actions of the agent that experiences them. Through an emotional experience, an agent can gain access to a particular kind of *evidence about herself* which has the normative force to inform her reasons for action insofar as it makes intelligible the kind of action that counts as addressing her emotion regardless, in some minimal sense, of the correctness of the emotion. We will see that this kind of evidence is in many cases unavailable to her as long as she does not feel an emotion that brings it to the forefront of her experience. I will argue that the particular way in which an agent relates to this evidence about herself, and hence the special role that incorrect emotions play in action, is *alien to that of a third party*.

It will be important for my discussion that we bear in mind that we are talking about emotions and self-knowledge in the context of action and practical deliberation – a context in which the agent must make up her mind about what to do and how to live. In so doing, I will defend, the agent is not observing herself from a third-person perspective and choosing the path that would be best for her given the available possible courses of action made intelligible by the incorrect emotion. This would leave no room for the intimacy that seems to characterise the relationship we have with our own emotions and decisions (in contrast to the one we have with the emotions and decisions of others). Rather, as Moran (2001) and Corbí (2010) have pointed out, when an agent decides what course of action to follow – which is *informed by the evidence* provided by her emotions about how she is – she is, at the same time, *shaping who and how she is*.

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3. NARRATIVITY, OPACITY AND A STRICTLY FIRST-PERSON PERSPECTIVE

Josep E. Corbí, University of Valencia

In *Narrative and Narrators* (OUP, 2010), Gregory Currie examines what makes a narrative high in narrativity. The degree of narrativity is proportional to its capacity to engage the reader or the viewer, that is, to immerse her in a fictional world. We may thus say that a proper analysis of narrativity might help us to elucidate the cement of fictional worlds, to adapt John Mackie’s famous phrase. Currie stresses the importance of Character -with an initial capital letter to distinguish it from the characters in a narrative- in narratives. He

underlines how much Character contributes to enhance the narrativity of a story and also how narratives contribute to increasing the role of Character in our lives. He fears, however, that situationist experiments like Milgram's and the Good Samaritan's may challenge our well-entrenched conviction that each agent has a specific Character and that it is the traits of her Character that mainly account for the way she responds to any given situation; moreover, Currie is convinced that this skeptical conclusion will have a rather negative impact on the literary value of some narratives. I will sketch, however, an analysis of our identity as subjects that will favor a non-skeptical interpretation of the impact situationist experiments on the role of Character both in narrative and in our lives.

For this purpose, I will firstly distinguish between trivial facts about oneself and facts that form a part of one's identity. Williams is thus approaching the idea of Character from a first-person, agential perspective (A-Character, hereafter) as opposed to the third-person, explanatory perspective (E-Character, hereafter) that inspires situationist experiments. Having a Character from a first-person, agential perspective is not a fact that one could take for granted but an achievement on the agent's side. Complementarily, I will argue that having a Character when examined from a third-person, explanatory perspective (E-Character, hereafter) tends to be the product of an iterative process of subordination. For this purpose, I will explore not only Williams' approach to practical necessity but Judith Butler's analysis of gender and Richard Wollheim's view of guilt as well. And I will conclude: (1) that there is no subject without identification and (2) that there is no identification without subordination to the powerful. Hence, it seems that what situationist experiments reveal is not the irrelevance of Character, but the prevalence of subordination to authority as the primary mechanism by which the subject is formed and her pattern of response to the world -and, therefore, her E-Character- established.

Currie could quite reasonably object to my previous line of reasoning that one common assumption about Character is that it varies from one to another individual, while my approach proposes a rather uniform account of Character, which is what situationist experiments seem to confirm. Still, as Butler, Williams and Wollheim repeatedly stress, there is always room for various kinds of resistance and for attempts to rearticulate one's position with regard to the regulatory ideal. The effort a character may make to discern her way or to be faithful to the fate that a given situation has imposed upon her, that is the sort of dynamics we are fascinated by when reading a novel or watching a film. Of course, success or failure in this kind of endeavor is a rather personal and uneven matter, which is the feature that Currie presented as constitutive of Character.

4. OPACITY, MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND SELF-KNOWLEDGE

Chon Tejedor, University of Valencia

In this paper, I argue that moral responsibility can arise directly from the structural conditions in which one finds oneself operating. I call this Conditioned Responsibility.

I motivate the Conditioned Responsibility view by looking at situations where there is a strong case for ascribing moral responsibility, but where such responsibility cannot be cashed out in terms either of intentions or of the consequences of individual actions. The situations I have in mind typically satisfy three criteria: firstly, the combined actions of numerous individuals cause significant harm; secondly, the actions of any one such

individual, in isolation, do not cause harm; and thirdly, individuals do not intend the resulting combined harm, even though they may anticipate or expect it.

Often the harm in question is merely the cumulative effect of these actions, such as in the case of human generated climate change (Broome, 2012). I call this aggregated harm. At other times, the harm results, not simply from the cumulation of individual actions, but from the way in which such actions dynamically interact with each other given the cultural, social, economic or legal norms in place. I call this dynamic harm. The proliferation of sweatshops (cf. Young 2010) is, in my view, a case of dynamic harm: the cumulation of individual purchasing actions would not give rise to sweatshops if the required labour laws were enforced everywhere.

I argue that, in situations meeting the three above mentioned criteria, moral responsibility can arise directly out of the conditions in which one finds oneself operating, irrespective of one's intentions or of the consequences (actual or expected) of one's actions. This, in turn, poses a problem. For these conditions are often unclear to the agent and, even when they are not unclear, the agent may be unable to understand why they should give rise to responsibility in her case, given that her intentions and the consequences of her actions are not being called into question. I call this the Opacity Problem of Conditioned Responsibility. The Opacity Problem is sometimes epistemological, i.e. resulting from a lack of knowledge on the part of agents, but is also, most fundamentally, *hermeneutical*: agents lack the concepts capable of rendering their individual responsibility intelligible to themselves and others (cf. Fricker 2007).

My paper is divided into two sections. In the first, I defend the Conditioned Responsibility view. In so doing, I argue against Iris Marion Young's claim that only political responsibility – not moral one – can arise out of conditions (Young, 2010) and for an alternative proposed but insufficiently articulated by Hannah Arendt (Arendt 1987, Arendt 2005, Arendt 1963). In section two, I address the Opacity Problem. I argue that a static, fact-like understanding of *conditions* and of their relation to responsibility makes the hermeneutical problem in particular look more intractable than it actually is. When the notion of condition is understood in normative and relational terms, individual conditioned responsibility reveals itself as a matter of our *positioning* with respect to others and to ourselves.

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METAPHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES IN CONCEPTUAL ENGINEERING (MICE)

Manuel Gustavo Isaac, University of Barcelona; Sarah Sawyer, University of Sussex;
Manolo Martínez, University of Barcelona

Conceptual engineering is a new exciting movement in analytic philosophy that promotes a renewed approach to philosophical methodology conceived as the study of concepts. One key feature of this renewed approach lies in its normativity, meaning that conceptual engineering aims to prescribe what concepts we should have, instead of merely describing the concepts we do have as a matter of fact.

Although there is no common framework unifying conceptual engineering as research program, current work in conceptual engineering shares a number of core commitments. First, concepts are usually taken to be representational devices serving cognitive purposes. Second, it is basically assumed that the quality of one's concepts determines the quality of one's correlated cognitive activity. And third, in current work on conceptual engineering, conceptual engineering itself is commonly construed as the method to assess and improve the quality of one's conceptual apparatus, that is, for the identification conceptual deficiencies and the elaboration of ameliorative strategies, namely, for fixing the identified deficiencies.

There are two main directions of research in current work on conceptual engineering: Case study research that focuses on specific conceptual deficiencies and then advocates for specific conceptual ameliorations (e.g. Haslanger 2000 on WOMAN; Scharp 2013 on TRUTH); Metaphilosophical research that mostly deals with the theoretical foundations of conceptual engineering (e.g. what are concepts for conceptual engineering? how does conceptual engineering fit in an overall theory of mind and language? what is the relation of conceptual engineering to similar methodological frameworks? etc.), its practical application (e.g. how, why, and when to implement conceptual engineering? does conceptual engineering work in the same way across different conceptual domains? etc.), and its methodological framework (e.g. what are the criteria for the quality of concepts? how can a conceptual deficiency be ameliorated? etc.) (cf. Cappelen 2018).

The MICE Symposium is about the metaphilosophical issues in conceptual engineering. It will be divided into 3x40min. talks (including 10min. Q&A). The first talk will address the issue of how to best construe the subject matter of conceptual engineering. The second talk will take up the challenge of topic preservation through semantic change in instances of conceptual engineering. And the third one will deal with the issue of devising a (formal) methodological tool that suits the normative purposes of conceptual engineering. The main goal of the symposium is thereby to contribute to a better understanding of what conceptual engineering is all about, and its expected outcome is then to improve the prospect for conceptual engineering to be an actionable method.

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1. WHAT SHOULD CONCEPTUAL ENGINEERING BE ALL ABOUT?

Manuel Gustavo Isaac, University of Barcelona

Conceptual engineering aims to be the method to assess and improve the quality of our representational apparatuses working as cognitive devices. But conceptual engineering still lacks, to date, an explicit account of how to construe the representational apparatuses that form its very subject matter. And without such prior understanding of its subject matter, or so it is claimed here, conceptual engineering is bound to remain a useless, piecemeal method, with no overall grip over its target domain (Isaac forthcoming). My purpose in this talk is to contribute overcoming this foundational gap by providing some guidelines for developing the theory of representational apparatuses that would be the most conducive for the research program of conceptual engineering. With this in mind, I will proceed in three steps, progressively specifying what conceptual engineering should be all about.

In the first part of the talk, I will address the issue of whether conceptual engineering should be about concepts. To tackle this issue, I will categorize the several different positions that have been taken so far on the subject matter of conceptual engineering — whether in favor, against, or indifferent to conceptual engineering being about concepts. And I will then argue that the representational apparatuses that form the subject matter of conceptual engineering should be construed as concepts on pain of conceptual engineering being inconsistent otherwise.

In the second part of the talk, I will address the issue of how to best conceive concepts for the purposes of conceptual engineering. To tackle this issue, I will draw upon a widely acknowledged distinction between two frameworks for theorizing about concepts — namely, the philosophical and the psychological ones. And I will then argue that, in order to ensure the strongest impact for the method of conceptual engineering on our cognitive life, concepts should be psychologically conceived in the theoretical framework of conceptual engineering (cf. Machery 2017).

In the third and last part of the talk, I will address the issue of how to develop a psychological conception of concepts that is the most conducive for the purposes of conceptual engineering. To tackle this issue, I will present a pretty consensual psychological characterization of concepts along with a now commonly received distinction between three different basic kinds of concepts thus characterized — namely, exemplars, prototypes, and theories. And drawing upon some radical versions of conceptual pluralism (Machery 2009, Weiskopf 2009), I will then argue that, in order to ensure the broadest scope and the highest flexibility for the method of conceptual engineering on our conceptual apparatuses, concepts psychologically conceived should be taken as multiply realizable functional kinds.

In the conclusion of the talk, I will recap my proposal for what conceptual engineering should be all about in the claim that conceptual engineering should be: (i) About concepts, (ii) psychologically conceived, (iii) as multiply realizable functional kinds. I will further develop why and how I thereby expect to theoretically secure and justify the maximum impact, scope, and flexibility for the method of conceptual engineering on conceptual apparatuses in our whole cognitive life. And I will eventually defend my proposal against several possible objections.

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2. TRUTH AND OBJECTIVITY IN CONCEPTUAL ENGINEERING

Sarah Sawyer, University of Sussex

I characterize conceptual engineering in the broad sense as a form of theorizing that involves a proposed change in linguistic practice. Sometimes this can take the form of a proposal to eliminate the use of a term on the grounds that it is defective in some way (e.g. 'phlogiston', 'élan vital'); sometimes it can take the form of a proposal to introduce a new term on the grounds that it is required for explanatory purposes that have not hitherto been recognized (e.g. 'antimatter', 'epistemic entitlement'); and sometimes it can take the form of a proposal to keep a term that is currently in use, but to revise the current use on the grounds that this would constitute some kind of improvement, whether theoretical, practical or normative (e.g. 'belief', 'woman'). But the paradigms of conceptual engineering fall into this last category, involving the revised use of a term. These are instances of conceptual engineering in the narrow sense; they essentially involve topic preservation through semantic change, and the challenge is to explain how this is possible.

I argue that conceptual engineering in the narrow sense is to be explained by appeal to the externalist distinction between concepts and conceptions: concepts are determined by non-conceptual relations to objective properties rather than by associated communal conceptions, and this is what makes topic preservation through semantic change possible. I go on to argue that the requisite level of objectivity is exhibited not only by natural kinds, but also by a wide range of philosophical kinds, social kinds and artefactual kinds. Finally, I argue that the alternative externalist metasemantic frameworks given respectively by Cappelen (2018) and Ball (forthcoming) undermine the objectivity of the properties of concern to conceptual engineers, and unwittingly return to a descriptive theory of reference that we ought to reject. The arguments of this paper build on my previous work in this area (cf. Sawyer 2018, forthcoming [a], forthcoming [b]).

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3. AN INFORMATION-THEORETIC INVESTIGATION OF CONCEPTUAL AMELIORATION Manolo Martínez, University of Barcelona

The project variously called *conceptual engineering* (Cappelen 2018) or *conceptual amelioration* (Haslanger 2000) aims at identifying ways in which language (or conceptual repertoires) can be improved so as to better fulfil whatever roles we have tasked them with: e.g., categorizing entities, or carrying out inductive inference, in ways that respect socially important desiderata.

In this paper I present a formal model of concept possession and use it to identify constraints that cognitively plausible processes of conceptual amelioration must typically meet. In the model, the main idea is that concepts are to be thought of as lossily compressed encodings of the state of the world: They say a lot, but not everything, about the world that is relevant to the thinking subject, in an economic way. The right way to reason about these encodings is by using *rate-distortion theory* (Cover & Thomas 2006: chap. 10; Shannon 1959). The kinds of constructs that psychology has identified concepts with (e.g., prototypes, exemplars and theories) arise naturally as an answer to the following question: Given the available rate in a certain channel (say, from perception to higher cognition), how should signals encode the world so as to minimize errors in the picture that the thinking subject forms of it? It turns out that optimal solutions to this compression problem, in ecologically realistic contexts, rely on encoding-decoding strategies that fit the bill of what psychologists call ‘concepts’.

Now, the application to the amelioration program comes from noticing that lossy compression requires the formulation of *distortion criteria*, which measure the “closeness or fidelity of a reconstructed source sequence to the original” (Sayood 2017: 224). An amelioration program can be formally reconstructed as stemming from the perception that *the compression scheme embodied by the currently available conceptual repertoire is suboptimal, as judged by a certain distortion criterion*.

With this formal redescription at hand, I discuss several (soft) constraints an amelioration program should observe:

First, it might be that the optimal conceptual repertoire for a certain domain + distortion criterion be extremely different from the repertoire currently in use. This introduces a cognitive burden on the change, that can be formally measured as the computational complexity of implementing the new repertoire, given an implementation of the old one. I will argue that conceptual amelioration must trade off this cognitive burden with fitness for purpose.

Second, fitness for purpose (i.e., fidelity in compression) always improves with the size and complexity of the conceptual repertoire (in the limit of *lossless compression*, distortion will be zero if the conceptual repertoire has the same entropy as the extramental domain being conceptualized [Cover and Thomas 2006]). I will argue that there is a second trade off between repertoire size and fitness for purpose.

Conceptual amelioration should therefore be seen as a kind of multiobjective optimization problem. Different weights given to the different optimization objectives (which might occur naturally, e.g., as we change focus from the linguistic to the mental domain) will inform what is feasible or desirable.

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CINE Y FILOSOFÍA: ARGUMENTANDO SIN PIEDAD

José Alhambra Delgado, UAM; Antonio Blanco Salgueiro, UCM; Antonio Duarte Calvo, UCM; Marcia Martínez García, UCM; Saleta de Salvador Agra, UCM; Ángeles Jiménez Perona, UCM; Javier Vilanova Arias UCM.

El uso del cine como instrumento para la reflexión filosófica ha sido algo común desde el nacimiento del séptimo arte (valga como ejemplo la propuesta de Deleuze 1999 de usar el cine como medio alternativo al discurso filosófico estándar, o la puesta en práctica de la idea por Sartre en su guion cinematográfico "El Engranaje"). Sin embargo, ha sido mucho menor en el ámbito de la Filosofía Analítica que en el de otras escuelas. Las excepciones han venido en el pasado desde autores más bien heterodoxos como Feyerabend 1993 (donde propone una superioridad del discurso cinematográfico sobre el pensamiento) o Cavell 1999 (donde como había hecho con escritores como Beckett o Shakespeare desarrolla aquí su exploración filosófica a través de una serie de comedias de Hollywood) y 2008 (donde promueve un uso "terapéutico" del cine), si bien más recientemente podemos encontrar algo más de atención en autores más ortodoxos y con un tratamiento más académico como Hansom 2006, Carroll 2006 o Wartenberg 2007.

En tiempos recientes se puede apreciar un vuelco de atención e interés hacia el fenómeno cinematográfico en el panorama filosófico anglosajón. Valgan como ejemplo la revista de Edimburgh U. P., *Film-Philosophy*, o el congreso que se celebró en verano del 2019 en Brighton con el mismo nombre. En España hay varias propuestas muy visibles del uso pedagógico del cine para la enseñanza y divulgación de la Filosofía (Rivera 2003, García 2007), pero no es fácil encontrar un uso más teórico, especialmente en el ámbito analítico. Es por ello que los autores consideran que la inclusión de eventos como este simposio en el contexto de congresos académicos como el de la SEFA no solo puede servir como un

soplo de aire fresco, sino como un acicate de la siempre obligada renovación y actualización de sus modos y medios.

En este simposio se exploraran las relaciones entre filosofía y cine a través de un caso práctico. Tomando como referente la película *12 Angry Man* (1958) de Sydney Lumet, cada uno discutirá un problema filosófico reconocible como propio de la Filosofía del Lenguaje, la Teoría de la Argumentación o la Epistemología.

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1. ARGUMENTACIÓN Y AGENTES SOCIALES: EL CASO DE 12 HOMBRES SIN PIEDAD José Alhambra Delgado. Universidad Complutense de Madrid

Una de las características distintivas de los estudios contemporáneos sobre argumentación es la incorporación de cuestiones de orden pragmático en el análisis del argumento. En este ámbito, la interpretación y evaluación de las razones presentadas para una conclusión no es sólo una cuestión formal, sino que depende de factores como el tipo de interacción, la información de fondo o los compromisos adquiridos por el individuo. Ahora bien, desde el momento en que consideramos la argumentación como una práctica surge la siguiente cuestión: ¿qué papel desempeña la figura del agente en este contexto? El tema suele abordarse desde dos ángulos distintos: por un lado, el dialéctico, que diferencia entre protagonista y antagonista y aborda cuestiones como la carga de la prueba o el orden de intervención en la discusión, y, por otro, el retórico, que distingue entre argumentador y auditorio y concibe la interacción como un medio de persuasión. El objetivo de mi exposición será introducir un tercer nivel: el social o socio-institucional; en concreto, analizaré el papel de los denominados estigmas sociales en la argumentación pública y lo haré basándome en el film *12 Hombres sin Piedad*. Esta película es una buena muestra de cómo el estatus de un sujeto interviene en la argumentación, ya sea a través de los estereotipos que dan forma a los personajes o mediante los recursos argumentativos que despliegan. Así, pues, servirá a la vez como objeto de estudio y como contrapunto a la intervención.

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2. EL PORTENTOSO ACTO DE HABLA DE 12 IRACUNDOS (REFLEXIÓN SOBRE EL UPTAKE AUSTINIANO)

Antonio Blanco Salgueiro, UCM

Un acto de habla protagoniza la película: una declaración para la que se exige el acuerdo unánime de doce miembros de un jurado, ejercido a través de un portavoz que usará un realizativo en plural: “Declaramos culpable / inocente al acusado”.

El caso parece anómalo, incluso portentoso. Pocos actos de habla necesitan un portavoz que hable por un grupo. Lo extraordinario parece residir en que el acto no es unilateral, depende de la coordinación entre agentes, está sujeto a negociación. Además, la negociación requiere otras ilocuciones interconectadas de los partícipes. En la tradición “griceana”, según la cual las ilocuciones dependen de intenciones individuales, estaríamos ante un caso atípico. Otra razón por la que el acto sería periférico para esta tradición es que depende de instituciones extralingüísticas (un sistema legal).

Sin embargo, dentro del marco austiniano el acto está en continuidad con otros. Un ejemplo de Austin es apostar. Si digo “Apuesto 5 euros a que el Celta gana la liga”, no habré apostado hasta que el otro conteste “Acepto” (o algo así), momento en el que también él habrá apostado (5 euros a que no gana la liga).

El tema se conecta con una noción que Austin deja en el aire: el uptake (que suele traducirse como “aprehensión” o “comprensión”). Cabe adoptar una interpretación débil, según la cual se trata simplemente de que para que un acto de habla se produzca es necesario que sea tomado como tal por aquellos a quienes se dirige. Si digo “Prometo ir a tu fiesta” de espaldas y en un tono inaudible no habré prometido, con independencia de mis intenciones. En este sentido, prácticamente todos los actos de habla comparten con la declaración de los iracundos su carácter intersubjetivo, no unilateral.

Una lectura más interesante tiene que ver con asumir el acto de habla del emisor. La importancia del fenómeno queda oscurecida por el hecho de que, excepto en casos especiales, el acuerdo es implícito. El otro no necesita decir “Acepto tu promesa” o “Acepto tu advertencia”, aunque no se excluye la posibilidad (decir: “Gracias por tu consejo” es aceptarlo). Un modo de comprobar cuándo se exige la corroboración por parte de otros es preguntar si estos pueden desactivar la ilocución. En el caso de prometer, pueden decir “¡Guárdate tus promesas!”, lo que anula el compromiso (luego no podrán reprochar incumplimiento). El mismo fenómeno se da para las aserciones. Si dices: “Te informo de que p”, y contesto: “No me fío de ti, mentiroso”, si luego actúo a partir del presupuesto de que p es el caso y eso me perjudica, no podré hacerte un reproche por impartir información

errónea. Es decir, los efectos deónticos de los actos de habla dependen esencialmente de que otros los hayan asumido, y dado que esos efectos son parte constitutiva de ilocuciones prototípicas, estas serán prototípicamente actos en los que participan varios agentes.

Nuestro portentoso acto de habla no resulta, después de todo, tan extraordinario.

3. ARGUMENTOS ABDUCTIVOS EN 12 HOMBRES SIN PIEDAD

Antonio Duarte Calvo, UCM

En esta contribución abordaremos los argumentos abductivos dentro del contexto del presente simposio. Siguiendo la formulación de Peirce, la abducción, en sentido amplio, sería un argumento cuya conclusión es una hipótesis, siendo, por tanto, el único tipo de argumento capaz de introducir una nueva idea no contenida en las premisas. En los últimos años, diversas propuestas han sido desarrolladas donde se utilizan el marco y los conceptos propios de la teoría de la argumentación para analizar las características y la justificación de los argumentos abductivos.

Resulta clarificador el análisis de los argumentos abductivos que se presentan en un marco comunicativo cotidiano como el que se muestra en Doce hombres sin piedad para descubrir el carácter eminentemente dialógico de la abducción. La abducción se presenta generalmente como un continuo diálogo entre dos agentes (ya sea explícito o implícito) y respondería a esta comunicación necesaria para conectar los “contextos paralelos” que se dan en esta forma de argumento.

Veamos lo que ocurre, por ejemplo, alrededor del minuto 40 de la película que nos ocupa. Ahí se comienza a discutir la posibilidad de que el testimonio que el anciano del piso de abajo ha presentado no sea veraz. Ante la presentación de evidencias, los miembros del jurado han de enfrentarse con lo que sería un hecho sorprendente en ese contexto: el señor del piso de abajo ha mentido. El jurado número nueve, presenta una hipótesis que explica el porqué: el anciano buscaba algo de atención. Lo que proporciona una explicación del contexto del argumento, y a la vez nos remite a un contexto paralelo donde se proporciona una teoría sobre el carácter del anciano. Veamos, primero, la forma del argumento abductivo, según la formulación Peirce:

1. Se observa que el anciano ha mentido en su testimonio.

2. Pero si fuera cierto que lo que buscaba con su testimonio era tan solo llamar la atención, no sería extraño que el anciano mintiera.

Por lo tanto, hay razones para sospechar que lo que pretendía era atraer la atención.

La hipótesis trata de normalizar lo que sería una observación anómala o que no cuadra en un contexto dado. La hipótesis de que el anciano trata de llamar la atención (segundo contexto) “normaliza” el primer contexto, el hecho de que mienta. Si la hipótesis se confirmara, ya no resultaría extraño que el anciano esté mintiendo. El carácter dialógico viene dado debido a que la conclusión a la que se llega con este tipo de argumento es altamente falible, provisional y sujeta a nuevos descubrimientos. El diálogo se establecerá con la búsqueda de nuevos datos que conecten (o no) los contextos paralelos que surgen en la abducción. Este diálogo será clave para, o bien desechar la hipótesis, o bien aportar mayor plausibilidad a la misma.

La abducción, por tanto, se desarrolla y justifica si se añade la exigencia de mantener una comunicación siempre abierta entre ambos contextos, dotando, así, a la abducción de un marcado carácter dialógico.

4. NOTAS SOBRE “DOCE HOMBRES SIN PIEDAD” (12 ANGRY MEN). DELIBERACIÓN Y VULNERABILIDAD COGNITIVA

Ángeles Jiménez Perona, UCM

Por el contexto geo-político donde transcurre, la película (EEUU) sería un ejemplo de deliberación democrática. Cumple con ciertas características que así lo indican: (1) votan varias veces para tomar decisiones y se comprometen con el resultado. (2) Se rigen por una igualdad de oportunidades para participar. (3) Emplean la justificación argumentativa. (4) Manejan una idea de bien común: aplicar la ley para hacer justicia en beneficio de toda la sociedad estadounidense del momento. (5) Se respetan bastante mutuamente. (6) Hacen contribuciones constructivas. (7) Aunque los participantes están despersonalizados, realizan un uso discursivo de historias y testimonios personales. (8) El elenco de participantes es variado en su identidad, pero eso no los invalida como participantes en la deliberación.

Pero, la película es también un ejemplo de algunas de las insuficiencias que puede sufrir este tipo de deliberación: (i) exclusión de amplios sectores de participantes afectados: en principio los afectados son todos los miembros de esa sociedad, pero no hay ni mujeres, ni negros, ni indígenas... Por entonces no eran ciudadanos plenos ni de iure ni de facto, lo cual vulneraba el principio de igualdad recogido en el ideario de aquella democracia.

Por ello, el modelo de agencia colectiva que muestra la película está sesgado por los prejuicios que laten en la exclusión de los grupos sociales mencionados.

La situación cae bajo lo que Fricker denominó “injusticia epistémica”: la que sufre alguien en su capacidad de sujeto de conocimiento/acción.

La injusticia epistémica pone de manifiesto no sólo la vulneración de las normas de la deliberación pública democrática, sino la condición de vulnerabilidad de toda interacción deliberativa racional. Es un indicio de la vulnerabilidad como una condición de la racionalidad humana.

Las críticas falibilistas al fundamentismo evidenciaron la contingencia de las normas de la racionalidad. También han ofrecido modelos alternativos de racionalidad en los que el error y la duda no quedan fuera del ámbito de las actividades racionales. Modelos en los que la fijación de creencias, decisiones y vías de acción dependen de dar, pedir y recibir razones.

Cada falibilismo ha extraído consecuencias sobre los límites de las actividades racionales, sobre las posibilidades de acierto y de error, sobre la fiabilidad de nuestras interacciones racionales o, dicho de modo general, sobre el alcance de nuestra vulnerabilidad cognitiva.

Con vulnerabilidad cognitiva me refiero a una manera de tener presente los límites de nuestras interacciones cognitivas. Incluye la falibilidad, pero también alude a cuestiones como: ¿cuáles son las condiciones que permiten la atribución de credibilidad y fiabilidad a unos sujetos y no a otros?; o ¿cuáles son las condiciones que permiten contar (o no) con infraestructuras materiales para las interacciones racionales como interacciones deliberativas?

Cuando las condiciones de este tipo se cumplen tal y como se refleja en la película, la vulnerabilidad potencial se distribuye de manera desigual entre los grupos implicados. Así se abre el camino para que se produzca el resultado contrario al que este tipo de deliberación busca: hacer justicia en relación con una idea de bien común máximamente inclusiva.

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5. EN TORNO AL USO DE LOS CALIFICADORES MODALES EN LA PRÁCTICA ARGUMENTATIVA: A TRAVÉS DE 12 HOMBRES SIN PIEDAD

Marcia Martínez García, Universidad Complutense de Madrid

Partiendo del marco teórico de la Teoría de la Argumentación y la Teoría de los actos de habla trataré de exponer el papel pragmático que cumplen los calificadores modales (tales como *necesario, posible, probable...*) o, en general, los modalizadores epistémicos (tales como *estar seguro de, considerar probable algo etc.*) en la práctica argumentativa real; para destacar dos roles fundamentales del uso de dichos modalizadores: por un lado, el carácter compromisivo que estos implican y generan y, por otro, su importancia en tanto explicitación o gestión de los criterios de relevancia discursiva.

Para ello se empleará como objeto de análisis el proceso deliberativo que tiene lugar en la película *12 hombre sin piedad*, ya que este permite ilustrar adecuadamente dichos roles. La elección responde a dos motivos:

1. Su utilidad; al tratarse de una ilustración permanente y accesible a la que todos podemos referirnos con facilidad para contrastar nuestras interpretaciones.
2. Su carácter ilustrativo; derivado del hecho de que lo que se representa es un proceso deliberativo en un marco judicial -marco ideal para mostrar el giro pragmático acontecido en la Filosofía de la Lógica del pasado siglo, una de cuyas claves (al estilo toulminiano) fue la sustitución de la *analogía matemática* por la *analogía jurídica* como marco orientador para el estudio de los procesos argumentativos.

De este cambio de analogía general se derivan ciertas consecuencias no triviales para el tema a tratar. Por ejemplo, la comprensión toulminiana de los calificadores modales como poseyendo, ante todo, una función compromisiva, surge como crítica a la interpretación de dichos calificadores desde la perspectiva lógica hegemónica en su tiempo, esto es, como expresiones del vínculo lógico existente entre las premisas y la conclusión de un argumento. Desde la perspectiva toulminiana se abandona el análisis focalizado en la corrección formal en vistas a un análisis centrado en cómo los términos modales son muestra de distintos grados de compromiso con respecto al "salto deductivo" que nos lleva a la conclusión de un argumento (explicitando, ante todo, "qué hacemos" cuando los empleamos en nuestras prácticas discursivas). Es fácil rastrear distintos ejemplos en el filme en cuestión que permiten ilustrar lo que hacemos cuando empleamos calificadores modales (y que expondremos brevemente):

Por un lado, muchos de ellos parecen apoyar la tesis de Palmer según la cual la modalidad epistémica es la expresión lingüística del grado de compromiso que el hablante asume respecto a la factualidad de los enunciados que profiere.

Por otro, permiten explicitar el hecho de que los calificadores modales resultan ser una herramienta fundamental a la hora estipular lo que se habría de incluir y lo que se habría de

excluir en el proceso argumentativo; sirviendo para determinar qué resulta relevante para el diálogo en cuestión y qué debería dejarse de lado por su irrelevancia. Y, por ello, se los puede entender (siguiendo también a Toulmin a este respecto) como medios a través de los cuales se ejecutan ciertos movimientos discursivos (como “estipular que una hipótesis a de ser tomada en consideración”, “excluir una hipótesis”...).

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6. SILENCIO EN LA SALA (COMO NO HACER COSAS CON PALABRAS)

Saleta de Salvador Agra, UCM

Desde los años noventa del pasado siglo, varias filósofas feministas del lenguaje (Langton, Hornsby, Saul, Wyatt, Kukla, entre otras) han centrado sus esfuerzos en conceptualizar el silencio, más en concreto, se han preguntado sobre el silenciamiento en términos de la teoría de los actos de habla o, dicho de otro modo, se han interrogado sobre las condiciones del “no hacer cosas con palabras” (Wyatt, 2009). Concentradas en aquellos casos donde la pertenencia a determinados grupos sociales impide realizar cosas con sus palabras, han analizado como un tipo de injusticia de corte lingüístico el hecho de que el sistema sexo-género condicione y moldee la propia pragmática del discurso. Esto es, se han centrado en aquellos casos en que la identidad personal socava la capacidad locutiva, ilocutiva y perlocutiva del acto de habla. Desde la clásica tríada austiniana se han detenido en diferenciar en el habla silenciada las nociones de “deshabilitación locutiva”, “silenciamiento ilocutivo” y “frustración perlocutiva”. A partir de dicha distinción, y con la finalidad de analizar los aportes feministas a la conceptualización del silenciamiento, tomaremos como punto de partida la película *Doce hombres sin piedad* como ejemplo paradigmático de un evidente contexto de enmudecimiento femenino.

La inhabilitación locutiva de las mujeres como miembros de un jurado popular, las palabras, en boca de los doce hombres, de la única mujer cuyo testimonio muestra la película serán el marco desde el cual interrogarse sobre el silenciamiento, esto es, cuando tienen lugar los llamados “actos indecibles” (Langton, 1993) o cuando las palabras no pueden tener los efectos esperados. Igualmente para analizar aquello que impide a las mujeres hacer todo el rango de cosas que se pueden hacer con las palabras nos detendremos en el lugar central que juegan los estereotipos. La mención a una profesora, el gran plano general del inicio de la película donde encontramos la única referencia visual a una mujer, el protagonismo de las palabras indirectas de la anciana o el contradictorio cartel del baño de mujeres que las nombra en un espacio en el que están ausentes, constituyen el corpus de análisis que nos permitirá reflexionar sobre la función que estas imágenes juegan en los fallos de credibilidad lingüística y del consecuente silenciamiento. Así, para ahondar en la teorización sobre el habla silenciada, por último, echaremos mano de la función que los estereotipos tienen en lo que Fricker (2007) ha denominado la “injusticia testimonial” y su distinción de los dos tipos de silencio, lo que nos permitirá completar, desde una

perspectiva epistémica y política, el análisis de la no presencia del discurso directo de mujeres sin piedad.

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7. EL VALOR DE LOS EJEMPLOS CINEMATOGRAFICOS PARA LOS ENFOQUES PRAGMATICOS EN FILOSOFIA

Javier Vilanova Arias, UCM

En esta comunicación se defiende la relevancia de los referentes cinematográficos para los enfoques pragmáticos en filosofía. Por enfoque pragmático entendemos toda propuesta filosófica que considere que los únicos objetos de reflexión filosófica son los fenómenos concretos que tienen lugar en el seno de prácticas y comunidades humanas reales, de lo que se sigue:

- (1) que la reflexión filosófica solo puede producirse a través del examen de casos reales, o que al menos podrían ser reales (no siendo relevantes casos meramente posibles, hipotéticos, abstractos...),
- (2) que los casos o ejemplos de estudio (sean de proposición, argumento, conocimiento, justificación...) son inseparables del contexto o la situación en que aparecen.

Esto supone un doble problema para el filósofo que opera desde el enfoque pragmático, pues por un lado no puede introducir un ejemplo por el simple expediente de reproducir un texto en su discurso (se pierde el contexto), y por otro lado se encuentra limitado a la hora de obtener los ejemplos que precisa (recuérdese la necesidad de producir "casos intermedios" que lleva a Wittgenstein a imaginar a juegos de lenguaje ficticios o directamente fantásticos, o la necesidad de contar con diferentes ejemplos de infortunios o anomalías que obliga a Austin a inventar historias ficticias en ocasiones de marcado corte humorístico). En esta comunicación se defenderá la capacidad y pertinencia del cine para producir esta "base de datos". Para ello, se presentarán cuatro tesis de ambición creciente:

- 1) El repertorio cinematográfico es una excelente fuente de ejemplos (que se añade a los ejemplos reales tomados de mass media, foros institucionales, obras filosóficas..., y otros ejemplos ficticios tomados de la literatura, la mitología...).
- 2) Los ejemplos ofrecidos por el repertorio cinematográfico son a la vez más fáciles de entender y más susceptibles de ser analizados teóricamente que la mayoría de los casos reales.
- 3) Al menos algunos ejemplos ofrecidos por el repertorio cinematográfico tienen una naturaleza a medio camino entre la práctica real y la reflexión filosófica.
- 4) El cine, junto con otros medios culturales "populares", puede y debe ser uno de los puntos de partida de la investigación filosófica. El cine es actualmente el producto

cultural más extendido en nuestras comunidades, y por su propia intención de tener un carácter público y una audiencia mayoritaria, las ideas que se postulan indirectamente en él son reconocibles como propias por el hablante o ciudadano corriente, y los problemas planteados son los problemas compartidos por la comunidad de referencia. De ahí, que sea no solo una fuente de genuinos problemas filosóficos (que, recordemos, tanto para Austin como Wittgenstein como Toulmin son los del hablante y el argumentador común), sino una fuente de evidencias filosóficas imprescindible.

Se discutirán estas tesis a través de un ejemplo: la moderna Teoría de la Argumentación (TA) por un lado, y la película 12 Angry Man (12AM) por el otro.

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PERSPECTIVISM IN SEMANTICS

David Rey, University of Barcelona; Dan Zeman, Slovak Academy of Sciences; Max Kölbel, University of Vienna

Natural languages contain a large number of expressions for the interpretation of which appeal to perspectives (or points of view, or subjects etc.) seems to be needed. On one hand, there are expressions that "locate" subjects in the world – temporal expressions like "now", "three years ago", "in the future", tenses; locational expressions like "here", "in Paris"; modal adverbs like "possibly", "actually" etc. On the other hand, there are expressions that involve standards of some kind - predicates of taste like "tasty", "disgusting"; aesthetic adjectives like "beautiful", "balanced"; moral terms like "good", "bad", "ought to"; epistemic modals like "might", "must" etc. In a broad sense of "perspective", all such expressions can be said to be perspectival.

Perspectivism in contemporary semantics is a thread that takes the idea that the aforementioned expressions are perspectival at face value and attempts to account for this trait. In recent years, the literature on perspectives and perspectivism has grown substantially, and a number of issues, both involving foundational semantic questions and applications to specific types of natural language expressions, have been pursued. This workshop aims to contribute to that literature by focusing on less discussed, yet important aspects of perspectivalty.

There are at least two ways in which perspectives can be accommodated in a semantic theory. According to (broadly speaking) contextualist views, perspectives are part of the content of utterances. Thus, according to contextualism about, say, predicates of taste, when a speaker utters the sentence "Licorice is tasty", the content of her utterance specifies a perspective – for example, the speaker's. According to eternalism, times are specified in the content of tensed utterances and their truth is not time relative (i.e., eternal). Another

(broadly conceived) way to capture perspectival content is relativism, according to which perspectives are not part of utterances' content, but part of the circumstances of evaluation (Kaplan's term). For relativism about predicates of taste, when a speaker utters the sentence "Licorice is tasty", the content of her utterance is perspective-neutral, while its truth is relative to a perspective. According to temporalism, times are not specified in the content of tensed utterances and their truth is time-relative (i.e., temporal). The same options are viable in the case of the other perspectival expressions.

In this workshop we aim to explore several issues, of both kinds mentioned above. First, we attempt to theorize about perspectives in general: what exactly is their role in semantics and how exactly to capture perspectival content in a semantic theory, what are the best arguments for each way of capturing perspectival content described above, what (and how many) specific perspectival parameters should be postulated, what are the implications of postulating perspectival content for assertion etc. Second, we aim to flesh out the details by putting forward specific proposals that tackle the issues mentioned.

1. AN ARGUMENT FOR SEMANTIC PERSPECTIVISM

David Rey, University of Barcelona

In this talk, I want to propose an argument that seeks to justify the postulation of a perspective parameter in the semantics of English (and other natural languages). My argument begins with the observation that intensional verbs have a systematic shifting effect on the interpretation of embedded clauses.

Consider reports (1)–(3).

- i. Mary said that John lost his wallet
- ii. John believes that it might be raining
- iii. Mary thinks that this cake is tasty

The truth-value of an utterance of (1) – or, if you prefer, the truth-value of the expressed content – depends on whether John lost his wallet in every world compatible with the content of Mary's speech act – here I am adopting a Hintikka-style analysis of attitude reports and speech-act reports (Hintikka 1969) – at some time prior to Mary's speech act. The truth-value of an utterance of (2) depends on whether it is raining (at the time of utterance) in some world compatible with what John knows – I am following Kratzer's analysis of modality (Kratzer 2012). In a typical use of (3), the truth-value of an utterance of (3) depends on whether the referent of this cake is tasty to Mary in every world compatible with the content of Mary's thought. Thus, the time, world, and standard of taste that are relevant to evaluate the embedded clauses of (1)–(3) are, respectively, a time prior to the speech act of the agent of the report, a world compatible with the agent's state of knowledge, and the agent's standard of taste. The intensional verbs of (1)–(3) seem to produce an agent-based interpretation of the embedded clauses.

The argument that I want to explore offers an account of this phenomenon by positing a perspective parameter. On this account, sentences get truth-values relative to perspectives. By default, unembedded sentences are evaluated with respect to the perspective of the speaker. However, some linguistic items are perspective-shifters. Specifically, attitude and speech-act verbs shift the value of the perspective parameter to the perspective of the agent of the report. The key element that (1)–(3) have in common is the presence of a *that*-clause embedded under an intensional verb. Thus, if we assume that intensional verbs turn the agent's perspective into the current perspective of evaluation, we can predict the existence of readings for (1)–(3) in which the perspective of the agent – rather than the perspective of the speaker – is the one that is relevant to evaluate the embedded clauses of (1)–(3).

One important virtue of the account outlined in the previous paragraph is that it offers a uniform analysis of tenses, modals, and predicates of personal taste. In any embedded or unembedded sentence, the past tense provides a time that is prior to the current semantic perspective, the modal *might* provides a world compatible with what is known in the current perspective, and the adjective *tasty* attributes the property of being tasty with respect to the standard of the current perspective.

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2. MULTIPLE INDEXING RELATIVISM

Dan Zeman, Slovak Academy of Sciences

Many natural language expressions, such as predicates of taste, aesthetic adjectives, moral terms, epistemic modals etc. are *perspectival*, in the sense that they require a perspective to be supplied for their semantic interpretation. Recently, a related but interestingly different phenomenon has been brought to the surface: "perspectival plurality", the phenomenon whereby sentences containing two or more perspectival expressions require two or more perspectives for their interpretation. To illustrate, imagine that Halloween has just passed and the parents in the neighborhood have gathered to talk about what their kids did. When Johnny's parents' turn comes, one of them utters

- (1) Johnny played a silly prank and had a lot of tasty licorice.

In such a context, "tasty" should be interpreted with respect to Johnny's perspective, but "silly" shouldn't (since he thought the prank was anything but): it should instead be interpreted with respect to the speaker's, or a third person's, perspective. This example shows that predicates of taste exhibit perspectival plurality. Similar readings are available for the other expressions mentioned.

In this presentation, my aim is twofold. First, I motivate and defend the move to a novel form of relativism: what I call "Multiple Indexing Relativism" – the view that not one, but a *sequence* of perspectives has to be introduced in the circumstances of evaluation. (The system is similar to the one proposed by Vlach (1973) for times and Cresswell (1990) for possible worlds.) The main motivation to do so is that it neatly accounts for perspectival plurality. The truth-conditions of the reading of (1) made salient above are as follows:

- (2) $[[\text{Johnny played a silly}^1 \text{ prank and had a lot of tasty}^2 \text{ licorice}]]^{c, w, \langle p1[\text{speaker}], p2[\text{Johnny}]\rangle} = 1$ iff
Johnny played a silly prank in w according to the speaker's perspective and had a lot of tasty licorice in w according to Johnny's perspective,

where "c" stands for context, "w" for possible world and $pn[v]$ should be read as " v 's perspective is the value of the pn -th perspective". I defend the view by showing that multiple indexing is already part of the traditional Kaplanian picture, that it helps solve pressing problems related to communication and that complexity worries (raised, for example, by Glanzberg (2007)) can be circumvented.

Second, I show how the view can account for perspectival plurality in more complex linguistics environments. For example, both (3) and (4) have readings for the interpretation of which two perspectives need to be provided:

- (3) Every kid played a silly prank and had a lot of tasty licorice.
(4) The mother snipe thinks the ugliest baby birds are beautiful. (Sæbø, 2009: 337)

Accounting for perspectival plurality in such environments requires adopting a view on quantification and attitude verbs that is compatible with relativism. Regarding the first, Lasersohn's (2008) "index binding" can be modified and adapted to a multiple indexing framework by making binding in the index more selective – that is, as binding certain but not all perspectives from the sequence. Regarding the second, a semantics for "think" and other attitude verbs can be given so that certain, but not all perspectives in the sequence, fall under it. With this extension, Multiple Indexing Relativism should come out as powerful candidate for providing the semantics of perspectival expressions.

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3. REBUTTING STALNAKER'S OBJECTIONS AGAINST LEWIS 1980

Max Kölbel, University of Vienna

In this talk, I intend to rebut Stalnaker's 2018 objection to Lewis's 1980 "Index theory". In the 1980 paper, Lewis argued against Stalnaker and Kaplan's view that a semantics should assign intermediate semantic values (Kaplan's "contents" and Stalnaker's "propositions") as interpretations of sentences in context. More specifically, Lewis argues that the compositional semantic values of sentences cannot do double duty as Kaplanian contents or Stalnakerian propositions as objects of assertion. He concludes from this that there is no useful intermediate semantic value, and that semantics should simply take the form of an "index theory", i.e. assign functions from contexts and indices to extensions, and do without the intermediate semantic objects.

Stalnaker agrees with Lewis's premiss, i.e. that the compositional semantic values cannot play the role of objects of assertion. But he does not accept the conclusion Lewis draws from this: namely that propositions have no role to play in semantics. He argues that if the compositional semantic values cannot play the role of assertoric objects, then the conclusion should be that semantics needs objects of assertion in addition to compositional semantic values (CSVs). He proposes that these can be determined by the CSVs. He also claims that Lewis's index theory fails to differentiate between someone who has the knowledge about the context needed for interpreting an utterance and those who don't.

I shall argue a) that the point on which Stalnaker agrees with Lewis 1980 is in fact incorrect, and that Lewis came to see this error in close temporal proximity to his 1980 paper, i.e. in Lewis 1979. (That Lewis' change of mind was a change from the view he expressed in Lewis 1980 to the view he expressed in Lewis 1979, and not the other way

around, is clear from a footnote in the 1998 reprint of Lewis 1980.) I shall argue b) that Stalnaker's own preferred view of the relationship between CSVs and assertoric contents (that the former determine the latter), a view shared, e.g., with Rabern 2012, entails that separate assertoric contents are dispensable. This does not mean that there is a problem in introducing dispensable assertoric contents, or that introducing them might not make a theory of conversation more elegant. It simply means that Lewis is right about the dispensability of intermediate semantic objects. I shall argue c) that Stalnaker's objection against Lewis's index theory does not work. It does lead to a failure to recognise the difference between understanding what was said and not understanding it.

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FOUNDATIONS OF MEANING AND COMMUNICATION

André Bazzoni, LOGOS / BIAP / Univ. Barcelona; Josep Macià, LOGOS / BIAP / Univ. Barcelona; Neri Marsili, LOGOS / BIAP / Univ. Barcelona

This workshop will address several foundational issues regarding communication and its connections with language and meaning.

General questions to be addressed by the talks include:

- What makes an act of communication successful?
- What types of commitment successful communication imposes on speakers? What is the nature of such commitments?
- To what extent (if at all) can the notion of communication help illuminate the semantics/pragmatics divide?
- Can speech acts be appropriately characterized in terms of the commitments that they involve?

More specific questions related to the ones above include:

- Which specific conditions (if any) do proper names and other referential expressions impose on the success of communicative acts involving them? What is the communicative import of proper names? Does it differ from their semantic import?
- Is the stipulation of different levels of semantic value necessary for a correct account of meaning?
- What characterizes the speech act of assertion? In what exactly consists the normative nature of assertion? What is the relationship between assertion and truth?

The primary aim of the symposium is to promote a fruitful exchange between researchers working in interconnected foundational issues in the philosophy of language, as well as the general audience of SEFA 2019.

1. COMMUNICATING WITH NAMES: COMMITMENT AND SEMANTIC CONTENT

André Bazzoni, LOGOS / BIAP / Universitat de Barcelona

It is usually assumed that besides its being evaluable with respect to truth, the utterance of:

- iv. Blorapnek is arriving on Tuesday.

actually commits the speaker to the truth of (1). The paradigm case in which an utterance of (1) is deemed infelicitous is when the speaker (S) lacks any evidence for the fact that the hearer (H)'s friend Mr. Blorapnek is arriving from Armenia on Tuesday (cf. Marsili's talk in this symposium).

There is, however, a different reason for infelicity in connection with an utterance of (1) by S. Suppose indeed S knows of nothing at all called 'Blorapnek'; she just heard in the news that Blorapnek is arriving on Tuesday. Suppose further that H doesn't know of anything called 'Blorapnek' either. Now it seems that a more fundamental question than, "How do you know?" is pressing H, namely, "What's 'Blorapnek'?" If S's answer is along the lines of, "I don't know, I heard in the news that Blorapnek is arriving on Tuesday," then (1) is arguably to be deemed infelicitous—even though it turns out that the hurricane Blorapnek is arriving on Tuesday.

At least two questions arise in connection with this second situation. First, why is the associated assertion infelicitous? I will argue that infelicity stems from S's lacking *minimal information* about the referent of 'Blorapnek'. In general, I will suggest that one cannot count as a competent user of a name 'N' if one simply utters a cluster of sentences containing 'N' without being able to provide if requested *any* information about the referent of 'N'. (See also Macià's talk in this symposium for a different view on this issue.)

It seems that in a sense H's question ('What's 'Blorapnek'?') is more fundamental than the one ('How do you know?') relevant to the first situation above. Now our second question is, why is this so? The answer on offer here is that since H (just as S) is equipped with no minimal information about the referent of 'Blorapnek', he cannot felicitously *use* the name in the how-question, for the latter is an elliptic form of the full question, "How do you know that Blorapnek is arriving?" The hearer is able but to *mention* the name felicitously in the what-question above.

More general questions about the semantics of proper names might then ensue. Indeed, our discussion suggests that names are introduced by linguistic communities *as part of* a general linguistic system that must be *learned* by competent users of that system.

There is a difference in this respect from the case of assertion, in which the respective felicity rule can be described in pragmatic terms. In the case of names it seems one cannot postulate a purely pragmatic component associated with the minimal-information commitment, for without being able to associate any such information with a name there remains nothing to be learned about its semantic value.

One may roughly situate different theories of names with respect to the degree of minimality involved in competent uses of a name according to each view. I will finish the talk by presenting problems for some of those views.

2. WHAT DOES THE DATA REGARDING (UN)SUCCESFUL COMMUNICATION TELL US ABOUT THE MEANING OF PROPER NAMES AND OTHER DIRECTLY REFERENTIAL EXPRESSIONS?

Josep Macià, LOGOS / BIAP / University of Barcelona

Consider the following two scenarios (in the talk, we will consider some additional ones, including Bazzoni's "Blorapnek" example from his contribution to this symposium):

Case-1. George Orwell, the patient: A new patient who suffers from amnesia arrives at a clinic. His doctor, Alex, names him 'George Orwell'. Unknown to everyone in the clinic, the patient happens to be George Orwell, the writer. Toni, who doesn't know about the new patient but who knows about the writer, tells Alex, "George Orwell wrote *1984*." Alex takes Toni as intending to refer to the new patient. The name 'George Orwell' has the same syntax and the same referent for both Alex and Toni. Even so, it seems clear that there was some failure of communication between them. (Heck 1995)

Case-2. Sunny day in Edinburgh: I think that Ann knows that I am in Edinburgh, and I send a WhatsApp message to her with the text "It is very sunny in here today". Suppose, though, that she does not know at all where I am. Then, it seems, there was lack of successful communication.

One might think that these cases can help support a Fregean view of proper names and indexicals. Say, in case-1, the hearer failed to grasp the sense that the speaker was attaching to "Orwell" ('the famous writer').

I will argue that these cases, rather than forcing us to accept a Fregean view of the expressions involved, help to bring to attention some important facts regarding the nature of communication. I will focus on two:

- The existence of what I call *the coordination requirement* (that, very roughly put, requires that there be the right kind of connection between the use of the word by the speaker and the hearer) (Macià 2004). This will allow us to account for scenarios like our case-1.
- The fact that when speakers make an assertion (similarly for other speech acts) they typically communicate several propositions in addition to the one that is the literal meaning (in context) of the sentence that they uttered. I will argue, for instance, that in case-2, the hearer does understand the main proposition meant by the speaker –the one that is the literal meaning (in context) of the sentence uttered. It so happens, though, that the speaker thought also that his utterance would bring the hearer to believe some additional propositions –in particular, that it is sunny in the place called "Edinburgh". And the speaker believed furthermore that the hearer would be aware of this. Whether we should conclude that this additional proposition was also meant or not (an interesting issue in itself, and one for which Marsili's presentation in this symposium is relevant), we should, in any case, grant that it was a proposition that the speaker was assuming that it would be *communicated* to the hearer; and, the fact that it was not, accounts for our intuition that communication was not successful. Notice, finally, that this explanation is perfectly compatible with a direct reference view regarding the meaning of proper names and indexicals, and, relatedly, with the view that the proposition that was literally meant was a singular proposition.

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3. ASSERTORIC COMMITMENT

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Several philosophers argue that the speech act of asserting can be characterised in terms of its distinctive normative consequences – a view that can be traced back to the work of C.S. Peirce (Marsili 2015, Shapiro 2018). This paper aims to analyse the notion of *assertoric* commitment, and how it relates with the act of *asserting* something. Building on previous scholarship, I propose to characterise assertoric commitment as the conjunction of two deontic notions – ‘accountability’ and ‘discursive responsibility’.

The notion of ‘accountability’ captures the fact that in asserting that p , the speaker becomes reproachable if p turns out to be false. As Alston puts it, “the speaker “knowingly takes on the liability to (lay herself open to) blame (censure, reproach, being taken to task, being called to account), in case of *not-p*”. The notion of “discursive responsibility” is meant to capture the independent fact that, in asserting p , the speaker confers some specific conversational rights on the hearer: eminently, the right to demand that the speaker provides justification for p in response to conversational challenges (for elaboration, see Brandom 1994, MacFarlane 2005).

After analysing in better detail the notions of accountability and discursive responsibility, I will show that a definition of assertion incorporating both notions can draw the right distinctions, differentiating genuine assertions from other illocutionary acts. I will then proceed to consider some known arguments against commitment-based accounts of assertion.

First, there are conversational contexts where it is possible to assert, but it seems that the relevant commitments cannot obtain, because it is clear to all participants in the conversation that it is not possible to challenge or criticise the assertion. Examples are “written ‘speech’ acts or utterances which are on radio, television or are recorded, [... in which] the audience is somewhat remote” and unable to reply (Bird 2002:13), cases in which the hearer is physically unable to reply due to severe illness, temporary muteness, etc.

A second counterexample is presented by Goldberg (2013), who discusses ‘anonymous assertions’: statements made anonymously on message boards or comment threads on the internet. These assertions pose a problem for discursive responsibility because “when it is mutually known by all parties that a claim was made under conditions of anonymity, this has a diminishing effect on the sort of (assertion-generated) expectations that speakers and hearers are entitled to have of one another” (Goldberg 2013:135).

A third problematic case is discussed by Hiller (2016:38-41): assertions accompanied by a clause by means of which the speaker disavows discursive responsibility, as in (3-3’).

(3) There will be a downsizing in your department next week

(3’) But I won’t say more: do not ask me how I know it or why

I will argue that these three counterexamples can be defused by appealing to fine-grained distinctions about what it means to be subject to an obligation in general, and to ‘discursive responsibility’ in particular.

CONTRIBUTED TALKS

AGENTIAL GUIDANCE, ACTION IDENTIFICATION, AND INTENTIONAL REPERTOIRES

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A significant explanatory challenge for causalist models of agential guidance in any of their systemic versions is to specify with some minimal precision which of the events belonging to a complex agential network qualify as the action under guidance.

Just as whatever is exercising action guidance must preserve its identity throughout the execution of the action, say, be the same sustaining intention, on the opposite side of the controlling relationship the same action must be under the guidance of its agent. For instance, in the case of a feedback agential system, the very same action must be continuously related to its guiding agent through a feedback causal loop. This means that throughout its execution the very same guided action must be causally connected to its causal source, produce the intended consequences for which it was brought forth, and keep informed whatever functions as the guiding control center about the status of the ongoing performance. Moreover, for every modification during the execution of the guided action there will be some corresponding informational exchanges increasing still the number of events participating in the causal loop. This very complex network of causal events will go on until the main intended goal of the action is accomplished.

Typically, for a causalist the identification of an action with an event like a bodily movement is somewhat straightforward. The identification takes place in the form of some specific correspondence between the content of the mental item that is causing the action and the event that corresponds to the action. In such cases the identity of an action will depend directly on the specific content of such antecedent mental item. However, in the dynamic and complex causal context of guidance this strategy does not seem to work.

If the content of an antecedent mental item is going to play the role of identifying which event or sequence of events is the guided action, such representational content has to be flexible enough to allow for a whole array of potential event modifications that would qualify as belonging to the same action. The only way in which this flexibility can be accounted for is by the absence of content specificity. But then the idea that the corresponding content will serve as the source of identification for an action under guidance loses its force. Now all we have in the form of a guiding content is some sketchy action type linked to some general goal. That is, an action type that is vague and flexible enough to accommodate the necessary adjustments in the actual guiding performance. The problem with this loosening of the relevant guiding content is that most guided actions are very specific and fine-tuned to accomplish their goal. And, yet, if the corresponding guiding content is narrowed down by making it very specific in the form of an equally specific action type, then the modifications and adjustments that take place in guided actions would not be accounted for. Again, the identification of the relevant action is lost. It appears then that in the case of agential guidance both strategies to adjust the relevant content to the requirements of action identification run into a dead end.

What may seem to be a metaphysical complication for causalist systemic models of agency bears directly on the way in which such models are supposed to capture the relevant mechanisms involved in action guidance, particularly those involved in the formation of intentional repertoires containing the available types of actions that an agent may intend to perform. Generating such intentional repertoires presupposes some way of distinguishing

the different types of actions in the form of some corresponding behavioral correlates. The problem with the dynamic and yet exact nature of guided actions is that the corresponding behavioral correlates are very hard to pin down for the reasons mentioned above. Therefore, this problem makes the very formation of the relevant action-types that make up the intentional repertoire of an agent a mystery, and, a fortiori, their use in providing guiding intentions with their relevant content.

In this paper I explore the traditional ways in which causalists are inclined to offer a systemic account of agency to deal with the problem of identifying a guided action by appealing to the content of guiding intentions. I exhibit the limitations that such a traditional strategy has when accounting for the relevant content of guiding intentions, in particular, the negative impact that these limitations have in the case of accounting for the intentional repertoires required to generate the production of an action. Nevertheless, I offer a positive suggestion to cope with this problem by reviving a strategy often identified with the debate between coarse-grained and fine-grained theories of action individuation; a strategy which favors the earlier theories by introducing a key role for the description of actions. My claim is that a similar strategy can relax the way in which the content of guiding intentions performs its identifying work without running into the difficulties distinctive of agential guidance.

WHAT IN THE WORLD ARE HALLUCINATIONS?

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Visual hallucinations (henceforth I omit visual) have traditionally been characterized as perceptual experiences that are phenomenally indistinguishable from perception but which do not involve perceiving worldly objects. This characterization has troubled naive realists who offer their view as an alternative to representationalism about perceptual experience. This is because according to naive realists perception is the sensory awareness of worldly objects, and the phenomenal character of perception is (at least partly) constituted by perceived worldly objects. While illusions seem to broadly fit the naive realist account, hallucinations seem resistant since they do not involve perceived worldly objects. This has led to various modifications of hallucinations as well as the adoption of disjunctivism by naive realists.

But more recently some naive realists and naive realist-friendly views (Watzl 2010, Raleigh 2014, Ali 2018, Masrour 2019) have argued that we should reject the idea that hallucinations involve no perceived worldly objects. If these views are right, this would pave the way for common-factor naive realism, a view on which all perceptual experience involves perception. In what follows I contribute to this new understanding of hallucinations. I consider one set of obstacles facing these views—focusing on hallucinatory objects—and offer a solution.

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EXTENDING KNOWLEDGE HOW: ABILITIES AND SELF-REGULATION

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According to the *extended cognition theory*, cognition can radically extend beyond the bounds of the biological agent and comprise some of the artifacts and gadgets that they pervasively interact with. Cognition thus can 'extend' beyond the familiar bounds of skin and skull.

During the last decade, there has been an increasing interest in the extent to which *knowledge* and not only *cognition* can be extended. Carter and Czarnecki (2016) and Carter and Poston (2018) argue that knowledge-how can be extended in virtue of the hybridization of the categorical base or seat of an ability.

In this paper, I argue that their view falls prey to the *delineation problem* and the *cognitive bloat* objection. A straightforward answer to the question concerning what makes an action an *intelligent* action is that the agent *knows how* to do it. The problem is that if we endorse a simple ability view on extended knowledge-how, then there seems to be nothing that distinguishes abilities from states of knowledge-how. This is worrisome given that intuitively when we attribute knowledge-how to somebody, we are attributing a state that is more cognitively demanding and more epistemically valuable than the mere possession of an ability to do something. That is why, according to the *delineation problem*, if knowing how to do something means having the ability to do it, then we cannot properly delineate between actions that are intelligent and actions that are not. Moreover, if all it takes for extending knowledge-how is the hybridization of the seat of an ability, then knowledge how is extended far too indiscriminately. This takes us to the *cognitive bloat*.

In order to overcome these objections, I propose the *self-regulated ability view* on extended knowledge-how drawing from Elzinga (2018). In this view, an agent knows how to do something when they possess an ability to do something together with the capacity to self-regulate their action. This allows me to solve the *delineation problem*. On the other hand, I show how knowledge-how is genuinely extended by attending to the structure of cognitive abilities and to the mechanisms underlying self-regulation in cognitive psychology. I use this to block the *cognitive bloat* objection. I finish by illustrating my account on extended knowledge-how with some examples.

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DOING WITHOUT STRUCTURAL REPRESENTATIONS

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Despite the fact that the notion of a representation is a cornerstone of cognitive science, a definition of this central concept remains elusive. In this paper I would like to concentrate on the notion of 'Structural representation' (or 'S-representation'), which has become a recent focus of attention in the specialized literature. Very roughly, a particular cognitive mechanism M is a structural representation of S iff (1) there is a homomorphism between M and S (roughly, a mapping between relations in M and relations in S) and (2) some cognitive mechanism uses this homomorphism to behave adaptively (O'Brien and Opie, 2004; Ramsey, 2007; Gadziejewski and Milkowski, 2017). Crucially, the notion of S-representation has recently been employed to distinguish the set of genuine representations from the category of receptors, that is, those internal mechanisms that reliably correlate with certain environmental features but which, according to these authors, should not qualify as proper representations. Thus, the concept of S-representation plays a fundamental role in recent attempts to defend a form of representationalism that can escape the objection of being too liberal, i.e. attributing representations to many processes that intuitively lack them.

This paper has two main goals. On the one hand, I will argue that the notion of S-representation fails to appropriately specify a theoretically significant kind of cognitive phenomenon (which, *a fortiori*, implies that it fails as a criterion of demarcation for the category of 'cognitive representation'). On the other hand, I will offer a set of alternative concepts that are in a better position to draw important distinctions between cognitive representations and, accordingly, might be more suitable for playing the theoretical role that the concept of S-representation is supposed to fulfill.

The main argument against the notion of S-representation has the form of a dilemma. More precisely, I will argue that the previous definition can be understood in at least two ways and that neither of them provides a satisfactory and significant distinction between cognitive phenomena that can underpin the distinction between genuine representations and mere receptors. On the one hand, if the notion of S-representation is understood as merely requiring that there is a homomorphism between a cognitive mechanism M and a structure S and that M is exploited to behave appropriately, then mere receptors seem to satisfy this requirement (Morgan, 2014). A mechanism that can be in two states, which reliably covary with certain world events exemplifies a homomorphism that the system employs to deal with the environment.

To avoid this result, one could provide a more restrictive interpretation of the notion of S-representation, according to which the use of the homomorphism mentioned in (2) above

necessarily implies using the relations between M off-line in order to learn about S. The problem with this interpretation, however, is that it is too narrow, since processes that clearly should be classified as representations (even as 'structural representations', in an important sense of the term) would be excluded, such as waggle dances produced by bees or certain kinds of cognitive maps. Therefore, a broad understanding of S-representation is too liberal because it does not exclude mere receptors, and a more restrictive interpretation is too narrow since it excludes clear cases of representations. Consequently, the notion of S-representation cannot satisfactorily play the theoretical role that some philosophers are suggesting, namely to distinguish genuine representations from mere detectors.

Of course, this negative result should not be taken to imply that there are no interesting differences between mere receptors and more complex forms of representation. In the final part of my presentation I will point at some notions that, in combination, are in a better position to make some important distinctions between cognitive processes. I think that at least two notions are specially relevant in that respect: first, the distinction between what we might call 'structural productivity' (the capacity to produce new meaningful representations by employing some form of combinatorial syntax) and 'lexical productivity' (the capacity to produce new meaningful atomic representations), since receptors typically exhibit the latter, whereas more complex cognitive processes such as cognitive maps often employ the former. Secondly, the distinction between mere exploitability and actual exploitation of relations between representations (Shea, 2018). I will argue that these concepts are much more useful for cutting the nature of cognitive representations at its joints than the concept of S-representation.

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MENTAL ILLNESS: NOSOLOGICAL VALIDATION AND REALITY

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This talk aims to address the problem of nosological validation in psychiatry, presenting the fundamental lines of its development since the seventies, exposing its relationship with the reality of mental illness and reflecting on its limits. The question of the validation of psychiatric classifications involves not only empirical but also philosophical problems, as it is based on numerous metaphysical assumptions. Broadly speaking, we can delineate two conceptions of nosological validation: pragmatic and realistic. The first equals validity and

utility: a diagnostic category should be considered valid if it is useful for certain purposes; the second establishes that a diagnostic category can only be validated if the real entities that fall under it are discovered. It is this realistic conception that prevailed in psychiatric research and also marked clinical practice.

The path followed by medically oriented psychiatry was to develop a set of criteria for the validation of mental illnesses and also for their diagnosis - a project that culminated in 1980 with the introduction of the third version of the well-known DSM. This laid the foundations for the medical paradigm of mental illness, especially in the field of research, which had a good set of strong realistic metaphysical assumptions: mental illness was characterized as a natural class, existing independently of classifications, clearly delineated in the structure of the natural world. Likewise, mental illnesses were considered to be clearly delimited from normality, presupposing a natural fact that marked certain symptoms or syndromes as pathological. Furthermore, together with the take-off of neurosciences in the 1990s, mental illness was conceptualized as a brain disease: although psychiatric writings are usually ambiguous about the metaphysical mind-body relationship, it is easy to find in them positions ranging from some version of type identity theory to eliminativism. All this led to the understanding of nosological validation as the discovery of the *reality* of mental illness—the discrete, biological, natural entities behind classification.

Faced with this realistic approach, I will explore the limits that the natural world presents for the classification of mental illnesses and I will advocate a reformulation of realism that takes into account the reality of mental illness also as a social fact.

ERRORS OF REASONING IN MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS?

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What can be considered as an error of medical diagnosis? If medical diagnosis is taken to be a kind of reasoning, then error of diagnosis is probably an error of reasoning. We usually refer to errors of reasoning as fallacies. Therefore, we might try to define error of medical diagnosis in terms of fallacies. But such a strategy is doomed to fail if we do not specify what is a fallacy and which kind of fallacy would we be concerned here with. Our point is to show that when non-standard (i.e. non-deductive) criteria of correctness of reasoning are taken into account, inferences that are sometimes considered are fallacies are not and can even display some kind of pragmatic and cognitive virtue. This is indeed the case of abductive reasoning, which allows acting despite a persisting state of ignorance. We will argue that, concerning the inferences at stake in medical diagnosis, we should not blame the physicist on the basis of deductive criteria of error or for his action in a state of relative ignorance. More concretely, medicine is considered as an experimental science. In fact, we may explain various processes by taking into account the symptoms, or signs, displayed by a person who is not in a well-being state, and finally think in the illnesses which cause them. We usually distinguish between two types of medical diagnosis. First is an inductive probability based diagnosis. This is a quite common diagnosis very often used in statistical programs or methods in diagnosis. The second one is the causal reasoning for etiological diagnosis. This

one is endorsed by the doctors who generate a set of hypotheses and then they test them. This is the one we are interested in. The hypothesis is about a malady which is usually tested and confirmed or refuted.

Nevertheless, is it always like this? If we check the history of medical diagnosis (Barés 2018), and even nowadays medical diagnosis, the testing step does not always occur. So, if we do not test the hypothesis, is it still an experimental reasoning? Which kind of reasoning are we talking about? Our point is to analyze the medical reasoning without test by giving concrete examples.

First we define what is an experimental reasoning following Claude Bernard (1966) and we conclude that even without test we are in front of an experimental reasoning. But what kind of reasoning? Second, we introduce a model to analyse the causal reasoning in medical diagnosis that take into account the test. This is ST model for medical diagnosis (Magnani 2001). This model considers that we are in front of a first abductive step that is completed with other inferential steps. When we introduce the clinical trials we arrive into what he calls a cycle of abduction/deduction–induction. Nevertheless, as we have said before, the diagnosis is not always followed by the clinical trial due to practical or financial problems. Usually we have limited resources and the diagnosis lacks of testing reliability. In this case, we are in front of a conjecture that is not confirmed and we continue acting in an ignorance preserving way. Such inferences have nevertheless a cognitive virtue. For this cases, we will use and compare ST– model with GW model for abduction applied to medical diagnosis. Abduction is considered as an inference that is not deduction, either induction. The canonical definition is due to Peirce (*Collected Papers* 5.189):

The surprising fact C is observed.

But if A were true, C would be a matter of course.

Hence there is reason to suspect that A is true.

Actually, we will consider medical diagnosis in terms of “full abduction”, in the sense of Gabbay and Woods (Woods 2013). It consists in setting a conjecture that is followed by an action, that is to say, by treating the patient in an ignorance preserving way. We are in front of an inference from the best explanation that is still a conjecture. The conjectural aspect carries us to the problem of maybe is a well decision, but it could be the wrong malady.

After establish that the medical diagnosis with test is still a reasoning (experimental reasoning) and an abduction, we will enter into the debate about what is an error of reasoning. In medical diagnosis, we talk about an error of reasoning when we have a wrong diagnosis. Nevertheless, we need to specify what exactly a good reasoning is in a nondeductive inference. The point is that we are not actually in front of an error of reasoning when we talk about a wrong diagnosis, but just in a non–confirmed hypothesis.

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LIBERTAD, RESPONSABILIDAD MORAL Y ALTERNATIVAS DE ACCIÓN: UNA CRÍTICA A LA TEORÍA COMPATIBILISTA DE DANIEL DENNETT

José Óscar Benito Vicente

Daniel Dennett ha defendido en múltiples ocasiones (1984, 1992, 2001, 2004) que, aunque la teoría compatibilista respecto al libre albedrío fuera cierta y viviéramos en un mundo causalmente cerrado, la ausencia de alternativas no pondría en peligro el carácter agencial de las personas ni su responsabilidad moral. Así, al examinar la célebre afirmación de Lutero ante el emperador Carlos V en la Dieta de Worms (“Aquí estoy, y no puedo hacer otra cosa”), tanto compatibilistas como libertaristas podrían concordar en que, con ella, Lutero no estaba tratando de eludir su responsabilidad; más bien, estaría afirmando que su conciencia le forzaba a actuar precisamente del modo en que estaba haciéndolo. En un caso como este -señala Dennett- veríamos claramente que no eximiríamos de culpa o de mérito a alguien simplemente porque pensáramos que no podría haber hecho otra cosa.

Sin embargo, tal y como el propio Dennett reconoce, un libertarista podría alegar que la decisión de Lutero fue moralmente relevante precisamente porque *sí* podría haber hecho otra cosa: quizá, en última instancia, podría haber traicionado sus convicciones y haberse resignado a acatar la autoridad del Papa y el Emperador. Por ello, Dennett propone un ejemplo alternativo en el que claramente nos encontramos en un universo determinista: un maratón de partidas de ajedrez entre computadores. Cuando se enfrentan dos de ellos -argumenta- sólo puede pasar lo que, de hecho, pasa; pero ello no implica que este sea un mundo sin prevención, sin ataque y defensa, sin oportunidades perdidas, sin el toma y daca de la agencia genuina y sin auténticas posibilidades. Dennett afirma que la determinación de su mundo no les priva de sus diferentes capacidades y habilidades para aprovecharse de las oportunidades que se les presentan y que, por ello, dicho mundo no estaría tampoco exento de autoría y mérito.

Dennett reconoce que un computador de ajedrez sería un agente demasiado simple como para ser candidato plausible a un libre albedrío moralmente significativo. Y agudamente señala que, posiblemente, la diferencia más importante entre este tipo de artefactos y las personas, más allá de su superior grado de complejidad, es que las personas tienen creencias que influyen en su comportamiento; y que, más concretamente, suelen tener la creencia de que son libres y responsables. Y dado que no contamos con libertad y responsabilidad moral desde nuestro nacimiento, sino que las vamos adquiriendo de forma progresiva, es perfectamente posible admitir que un agente libre y responsable, que considera que el futuro es “abierto” y depende de él”, puede haber surgido a partir de un agente no responsable que siempre actuó en el pasado de la única forma en que podía hacerlo. Libertad y determinismo no serían, por tanto, incompatibles.

Ahora bien, y tal y como puntualiza Dennett, el éxito de esta maniobra depende en buena medida de tengamos la creencia de que disponemos de libre albedrío: “Es muy probable- acepta Dennett- que el hecho de creer que se tiene libre albedrío sea una de las condiciones necesarias para tener libre albedrío: un agente que gozara de las otras condiciones necesarias -racionalidad y capacidad de autocontrol y de introspección de orden superior-, pero que fuera inducido engañosamente a creer que carece de libre albedrío, estaría tan inhabilitado por dicha creencia para elegir libre y responsablemente como por la falta de cualquiera de las otras condiciones” (1992, p. 191).

Incluso desde una perspectiva libertarista, en la que yo mismo me situaría, es posible coincidir con Dennett en muchos de los puntos que defiende. En primer lugar, parece razonable aceptar la idea de que nos constituimos como agentes libres y responsables de forma gradual, tanto a nivel ontogenético como filogenético. Por ello mismo, parece también sensato aceptar que nuestra libertad no es, ni puede llegar a ser, absolutamente independiente de todo tipo de condicionamiento. Un libertarista también podría aceptar que no es necesario que *en todo momento* tengamos alternativas para que se nos pueda considerar responsables de una cierta acción y, desde luego, coincidiría con Dennett en señalar la importancia de la creencia en nuestra propia libertad para que esta sea posible.

Sin embargo, considero que existen ciertas debilidades en los argumentos de Dennett, que trataré de mostrar en la presente comunicación. En primer lugar, defenderé que los conceptos de “agencia” o “autoría” pierden buena parte de su sentido original en un mundo determinista, lo que quedará de manifiesto al examinar con más detalle la analogía que Dennett establece con las computadoras de ajedrez. Señalaré asimismo que el mérito y la responsabilidad moral se difuminan si aceptamos una postura compatibilista, y que la posibilidad de crear alternativas, establecer fines y tomar en consideración valores morales supera los límites de una racionalidad estrictamente instrumental, como la que parece defender Dennett. Finalmente argumentaré que, al aceptar que creer que soy libre es un requisito fundamental para poder llegar a serlo, Dennett está incurriendo en una curiosa paradoja: dado que creer que somos libres implica, como el propio Dennett reconoce, la capacidad de proponernos metas y ejercitarnos en el desarrollo de un cierto carácter, y que el compatibilismo defiende que nuestro futuro está causalmente determinado y que no disponemos de auténticas alternativas, parece que la creencia en el compatibilismo supondría un serio problema para poder llegar a ser libres (incluso entendiendo esa libertad en un sentido estrictamente compatibilista). De forma paralela, la responsabilidad moral, tal y como la entiende Dennett, sólo sería posible gracias a nuestra ignorancia acerca de cómo van a desarrollarse (necesariamente) los acontecimientos, y de nuestra creencia (falsa, según el compatibilista) de que tenemos verdaderas alternativas de acción.

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IS LOGIC REVISABLE? THE WRONG KIND OF QUESTION

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Is logic revisable? If we take *anti-exceptionalism about logic* (Priest 2016; Williamson 2017) as the state of the art in the philosophy of logic, then the answer is yes. Anti-exceptionalists hold that logic is continuous with science both in its subject matter and in its methods. Therefore we should conceive of logic as theory. Theories are accepted by rational theory-choice. Evidential standards are empirical adequacy, strength, simplicity, unifying power *etc.* Theories that do better with respect to the standards of theory-choice ought to replace – that means *revise* – worse theories. In the context of theory-choice, ought implies can; hence, logic is revisable. Let's call this the *revisionist* position.

However, the statement that logic is revisable should not pass for the obvious. In some unpublished lectures in the 1970s, Saul Kripke has criticized notions like 'adopting' or 'revising' a logic (Berger 2011). He opposes the very idea that logic can be adopted or revised in the same way as a scientific theory. Logical reasoning is constituted by inferential principles, not by empirical hypotheses. According to Berger's reading, changing a logic cannot mean anything else than correcting reasoning mistakes or developing new formal linguistic means to describe deductive validity. So if we take the Kripke notes as the state of the art in the philosophy of logic, then the answer is no. Let's call this the *conservative* position.

My thesis is that the question cannot be answered in a straightforward way for revision is an ambiguous notion. Both the revisionist party and the conservative party mean something else with 'revision' of logic given their respective presuppositions on the subject matter of deductive logic. So with respect to proposed cases of logical revision the question of revisability merely induces verbal disputes between revisionist and conservative. In the revisionist sense it is almost trivial that logic is revisable. In the conservative sense there is a good case to make against revisability of logic.

I will start with rehearsing the arguments of – what I consider – the best representatives of the revisionist and conservative position respectively: the anti-exceptionalists versus those who have worked out Kripke's ideas. Here it will become clear that both parties understand quite different things when they discuss examples of purported logical revision. I will identify some types of verbal disputes that will arise from these examples, and the associated strategies that the conservative would take to explain away a case as a genuine revision. Where the revisionist would say that there is revision, the conservative may reply that the proposed logic

- v. is a correction of logic: the case of classical logic as a successor to syllogistic.
- vi. is an extension of logic: the case of many-valued logics.
- vii. only contains a particular fragment of valid deductive inference: the case of relevant logics.
- viii. is a linguistic change: the case of free logics.
- ix. does not have deductive inference within its scope: the case of conditional logic.

The following step is to make the point harder in the sense that *no* substantive dispute is *possible*. I will argue that the revisionist and the conservative are respectively committed to

two distinct presuppositions about the subject matter of logic. Both presuppositions seem equally permissible, but both will lead to different conclusions about whether logic is revisable.

The aim of deductive logic is to capture *validity* – the property of truth-preserving inference. The *revisionist* presupposition is that deductive validity can be recovered from *theory*. A formal logical theory consists of a formally defined language, a formal semantics, and a proof theory or decision method. The proof theory or decision method determines whether a proposed argument is valid or not. The obvious application of a formal theory is that it is interpreted with respect to a context of reasoning to evaluate proposed arguments and to regiment that reasoning practice.

The *conservative* presupposition is that deductive validity can be recovered from *practice*. Agents aim to reason deductively using natural language. The epistemic notion of truth-preserving inference arguably arises from the desire of an agent to force the spectator into accepting a conclusion as true, when they accept the premises as true (Dutilh Novaes 2015). In other words, an inference is considered to be deductively valid iff ‘for all situations’ the conclusion is true whenever the premises are true. Validity is accordingly determined by which facts ‘follow from’ which. Note that some constitutive principles of inference, like modus ponens or universal instantiation, are required here to make this consequence relation ‘following from’ meaningful in the first place.

The crucial observation is that each presupposition implies a distinct notion of validity: (i) a theory-relative *formal* notion of validity – deductive inference is accordingly a mathematical property; (ii) a practice-based *material* notion of validity – the property of deductive inference is grounded in facts and constitutive inferential principles. The logician as theory-builder wants to capture material validity with the help of formal validity for some context of reasoning – such facts count as his evidence. Nonetheless, both notions of validity, that revisionist and conservative respectively have in mind when talking about revision, are distinct.

So under the revisionist presupposition, theory-change entails revision simply when there are nontrivial formal differences between two theories and the new theory is more adequate for instance in capturing deductive inference for the intended contexts of reasoning. Under the conservative presupposition, revision would mean that we change something about which facts follow from which, or give a different meaning to that consequence relation. Yet, in the former case, we cannot revise facts, we can only be wrong about them; in the latter case, even though their application is fallible, it seems that we cannot dispense with the constitutive inferential principles that give meaning to deductive consequence. So in that sense logic seems not revisable.

Finally, I will revisit the described verbal disputes i.-v. The insights about the distinct conservative presupposition help to explain why the conservative always has a strategy at hand to explain away cases of purported revision.

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MUTUAL GROUNDING FOR WEAK MATHEMATICAL STRUCTURALISM (WMS): THE 'IDENTITY PROBLEM' RECONSIDERED

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The main purpose of this paper is to introduce what will be called Weak Mathematical Structuralism (WMS) as further position within the mathematical structuralist debate. WMS provides a more moderate understanding of Shapiro's (1997) *ante rem* structuralism and is considerably based on a mutual – though not properly symmetric – notion of grounding. Whereas Shapiro's (1997) account is committed to a background ontology of mathematical structures and reduces the nature of individual objects to mere positions in these structures, WMS applies a non-eliminative approach to both objects and structures.

Shapiro understands mathematical objects in terms of a 'places-are-objects' perspective, in which (empty) places may qualify as legitimate objects. This leads to a typical criticism, i.e. the identity problem concerning structures with non-trivial automorphisms, composed by distinct mathematical objects that appear as structurally indiscernible (+ 1 and -1 in the relative number structure and +*i* and - *i* in the complex number structure).

I will propose a variation of the 'places-are-objects' perspective in which mathematical objects are something more than mere positions, but something less than the thicker objects which occupy these positions in the concrete systems. I will define such objects *thin mathematical objects* and describe them as providing a possible solution to the identity problem.

In contrast to Shapiro's purely structural entities, which possess structural properties only, thin objects are endowed with both structural and non-structural properties. In this framework, I will refer to non-structural properties in terms of *kind properties* (the properties which qualify numbers as natural, relative, rational, etc.). Such properties, even though do not determine their essential identity as individuals, will be useful to introduce them as numerically distinguished *relata*, conceivable independently of the structure they belong to.

I will now delineate WMS starting from Wigglesworth's (2018) formulation of *ante rem* structuralism in terms of grounding. In Wigglesworth's proposal, structures are identified with unlabelled graphs, composed by nodes and edges between the nodes. On that view, the identity of objects is partially grounded in the identity of all the other objects in the same structure and fully grounded in the identity of the structure they belong to. I will handle the second assumption, that accounts for the relation between objects and structures.

Although Wigglesworth understands this relation as asymmetrical, I advance an alternative notion, which I shall define *Mutual Grounding*. This is expressed by two distinct grounding claims holding at the same time, *Object Identity* and *Structure Existence*. A third

Structure Identity claim will specify the identity criteria of structures independently of objects. I will firstly present the *Object Identity* claim:

Object Identity: objects are fully grounded in the structure for their identity (a) but not for their existence (b).

The comparison between mathematical structuralism and graph theory allows grasping thin mathematical objects more in detail. In this conception, objects can be understood as *unlabelled and edgeless nodes in graph*, as illustrated in the following figure:

G: ○ ○

These nodes are interchangeable, because they can be permuted while leaving the graph unchanged; hence, their identity as individuals is solely determined by the graph G, as required by *Object Identity* (a). However, *Objects Identity* (b) holds as well, since relations require things to stand in the relations – the nodes in question cannot collapse into one another, because they are discernible as far as their (non-structural) kind properties are concerned.

On this basis, two definitions of thin mathematical objects can be outlined:

1. thin objects are things whose essential identity is grounded in the relevant structure, but whose existence must be acknowledged if relations are to be posited.
2. Thin objects are things that (in addition to their structural properties) possess also non-structural kind properties.

Let us now consider the *Structure Existence* claim:

Structure Existence: structures are fully grounded in individual objects for their existence (a) but not for their identity (b).

Concerning *Structure Existence* (a), the basic idea is that without distinct things existing metaphysically prior to the structure, there is nothing to stand in the relations that are supposed to confer individuality on the *relata*. At the same time, the identity of structures is to be settled independently of objects themselves, in accordance with *Structure Existence* (b). This introduces the third *Structure Identity* claim:

Structure Identity: structures are fully grounded in their isomorphism classes for their identity.

As acknowledged by Wigglesworth, the identity of structures does not depend on the identity of objects—which can be permuted while leaving the graph unchanged—but on the operation of adding or removing an edge, that would result in a different graph. In a nutshell, consistently with Shapiro's (1997) definition of structures, the identity of graphs is determined by their isomorphism classes, where no concrete systems are at play.

On the one hand, thin mathematical objects as defined in *Object Identity* and *Structure Existence* appear *substantial enough* to be introduced in the structural ontology. Significantly, this conception provides a possible response to the identity problem, distinguished from those already proposed in the literature: thin objects have been elaborated as things existing metaphysically prior to the structure and being numerically distinguished in virtue of their non-structural kind properties. This seems to hold in some cases of non-trivial automorphisms as well: in the relative numbers structure, the numbers

+1 and -1 are discernible because +1 belongs to the natural numbers kind, that is a subset of the relative numbers kind.

On the other hand, the introduction of thin objects in the ontology does not commit to eliminative structuralism, in which abstract structures depend on the concrete systems instantiating them. By contrast, thin objects are also *weak enough* to preserve an *ante rem* individuation of structures, as showed by the *Structure Identity* claim.

To sum up, WMS is presented as a middle-ground position which attempts to overcome some difficulties of *ante rem* structuralism (i.e. the identity problem) without abandoning its main intuitions (i.e. the priority of abstract structures).

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A DISPOSITIONALIST ACCOUNT OF SYMMETRIES AND CONSERVATION LAWS

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There are three main frameworks to account for the metaphysics of laws of nature: humean supervenience, the governing views, and dispositionalism. According to the first, laws are a specific type of regularities in the humean mosaic: they are the ones described by the axioms (and theorems) of the best systematization of the world that combines (and balances) simplicity and strength. In governing accounts, the laws are metaphysically robust—they govern/produce and (metaphysically) explain the regularities. According to dispositionalism, natural regularities are explained by fundamental, sparse, powerful properties. Dispositional accounts can be realist or anti-realist about laws. Each of these metaphysical frameworks faces some difficulties in accounting for the role of symmetries and conservation laws in modern physics. The reason for this is that, in the dominant understanding of symmetries, they are in a very particular relation with some natural properties and fundamental particles. An example of the first kind is the case of rest mass and spin. On the one hand, they are considered as *fundamental*, that is, as part of the ontological bedrock of the world. The very notion of (absolute/relative) fundamentality is (almost) universally unpacked in terms of (absolute/relative) *independence* (Cf. Tahko 2018a, Bliss and Priest 2018, and Tahko 2018b for an exception). For this and other reasons, fundamental properties such as rest mass and spin are considered to be independent of (more fundamental than) features that belong to higher levels of the hierarchical order of reality. In particular, they are thought to be independent of regular

dynamical laws, conservation laws and the relevant symmetry (the global Poincaré symmetry). However, on the other hand, as Wigner (1939) famously showed, computing all the irreducible representations of the Poincaré group on the space of states of elementary particles generates a classification of all elementary particles in terms of their mass and spin. So rest mass and spin can be identified via a symmetry-based procedure. As French (2018: 7) puts it, they seem to ‘drop out’ of this particular symmetry. To sum up: on the one hand, symmetries look as descriptions (or more precisely: specific constraints to our descriptions) of the fundamental aspects of the world, so they seem to depend upon the fundamental entities; on the other hand, the fundamental entities, for the given reasons, seem to depend upon the relevant symmetries.

In the debate on the metaphysics of laws of nature, some take the way of a radical solution to this issue. French advocates for a *reverse-engineering* of dispositionalism: “whereas the dispositionalist takes the laws to arise from or be dependent in some way upon the properties ... I shall invert that order, taking the properties to be dependent upon the laws and symmetries” (2014: 264-64). In fact, French favors an eliminative version of ontic structural realism that eliminates everything but structure from the ontology. In the friends of powers team, Bird’s radical move is to “regard symmetry principles as pseudo-laws”. The hope is that “symmetry principles and conservation laws will be eliminated [from future science]” (2007: 229).

In this talk, I put forward a moderate solution within the dispositionalist framework, based on a novel notion of ontological dependence. It permits accounting for the determining role of symmetries and conservation laws in modern physics without abandoning the intuition that dispositional properties are ontologically prior to everything else in nature.

The orthodoxy takes ontological dependence as a strict partial order, that is, as *irreflexive*, *transitive* and *antisymmetric*. Each of these formal features has been questioned in the recent literature. In particular, some authors argued that dependence should be conceived as non-symmetric, rather than antisymmetric (e.g. Thompson 2016, Barnes 2018). I hope to show that the case of symmetries constitutes an additional reason that makes that claim plausible. However, the assumption that ontological dependence is non-symmetric is often taken to imply some undesirable consequences to the standard view on fundamentality, that is, the idea that reality comes in ordered “levels” or “layers”. To avoid that result, I put forward an original analysis of the notion of dependence that combines two existing hyperintensional strategies to characterize it: via essence (Fine 1995) and via explanation (Schneider 2006). In a nutshell, the new notion of ontological dependence (S-dependence) distinguishes *existential dependence* (E-dependence) from *identity dependence* (I-dependence), where E-dependence is understood by the means of the finean approach, and I-dependence is cashed out in terms of the explanatory account.

(S-dependence) x S-dependes upon y =_{df} x E-dependes upon y , and y I-dependes upon x .

So, turning to the case of symmetries, let be PROP a base of fundamental (dispositional) properties and SYM the relevant symmetries, this view holds that

SYM S-depend upon PROP

which means that SYM E-depend upon PROP, and PROP I-depend upon SYM. That is to say that fundamental properties are ontologically prior to the symmetry principles, but depend on them for their identity.

After illustrating the new approach with some different examples from physics and metaphysics (e.g. applications of Noether theorem and metaphysical theories about the fundamental category of ontology), I argue that, to a reasonable extent, this notion of non-symmetric dependence is coherent with the central intuitions of the standard view on fundamentality. Finally, I try to show how my approach provides a comprehensive understanding of the role of symmetries and conservation laws in modern physics within a dispositionalist framework.

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BULLSHIT AND FORMS OF VERBAL DECEIT

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It has become almost a cliché to say that we live in a post-truth world; that people of all trades speak with an indifference to truth. Speaking with an indifference of how things really are is famously regarded by Frankfurt (1986) as the essence of bullshit. I'll build on recent work in pragmatics (mainly by Dynel 2011) to give an account of bullshit that is more encompassing than Frankfurt's initial characterization. Ever since Grice (1967) linguists and philosophers dealing with the inner workings of communication treat conversation as a form of joint-action, and by now there is a large corpus of evidence that suggests this is correct. However, time and again we are reminded that people also use language to deceive and manipulate their audience. Nonetheless, as it has been widely discussed in pragmatics, the gricean view on conversation can also explain a wide range of cases in which the conversational partners are *intentionally* uncooperative, in which case they engage in deceit. One type of such deceit is bullshit

According to Frankfurt, the essence of bullshit "is just [the speaker's] lack of connection to a concern with truth" (Frankfurt, 2005, 29). Still, Frankfurt gives a description of what the bullshiter does, which offers a good starting point for a more encompassing view. According to him the bullshiter "offers a description of a certain state of affairs without genuinely submitting to the constraints which the endeavor to provide an accurate representation of

reality imposes. Her fault is not that she fails to get things right, but that she is not even trying.” (Frankfurt, 2005: 32). I suggest that we treat bullshitting is a type of deviant speech that mimics informed statements. The bullshitter intends his speech to look like an informed statement, and to be taken as such by the audience. What he hides from the audience is the fact that he says things for which he lacks evidence. In Gricean terms, bullshit is the result of the violation of the second submaxim of Quality: *do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence*.

Bullshit, as opposed to lying or misleading by untruthful implicatures, is not a form of *deceit about content*. Bullshit is, as Frankfurt aptly points out, not as much a matter of *falsity*, as a matter of *fakery*. His deceit is not necessarily about the truth of the information communicated, but rather *deceit about his enterprise*. Whereas the liar and the one falsely implicating deliberately promote falsehood, the bullshitter doesn't. What the bullshitter says might turn out to be true, or might turn out to be false. He doesn't care. What the bullshitter misrepresents is not necessarily the state of affairs about which he speaks, after all, some of the things he says might be true, but his epistemic attitude towards what he is saying. This, according to Frankfurt, shows that “the fact about himself that the bullshitter hides ... is that the truth-values of his statements are of no central interests to him” (Frankfurt, 2005: 55).

Given that Frankfurt defines bullshit as *indifference towards truth* but his account gives us the tools to understand it as *indifference towards evidence*, I argue that we should prefer the latter one since it is a more encompassing characterization of bullshit than the former, and thus it can account for more cases. Imagine someone who makes statements for which he has no evidence whatsoever, but nevertheless believes them to be true because “his guts tells him so”. We can further imagine that such statements are contradicted by specialist's opinion, but this doesn't move him a bit. We do judge statements “based on guts alone” that run against proper evidence to be bullshit, even if they are made by someone concerned with truth. Accordingly, one may care about the truth, and nevertheless bullshit if, for example, he fails to observe the evidential requirements of his claims.

Frankfurt also takes bullshit always to be a matter of intent. In fact, this is precisely what Cohen (Cohen, 2012, 104) criticizes him for. But Frankfurt himself asks, without answering, though, whether an utterance can qualify as bullshit given that “the utterer's heart is in the right place”, that is, given that the utterer is an honest but confused producer of bullshit. I think that the answer should be ‘yes’. True, some bullshitters might turn out to be real charlatans. They intentionally mislead their audience about the lack of adequate evidence for what they say. But then there are their honest followers and true-believers. There are those duped and ensnared into believing and promoting claims for which there is no adequate evidence. For example, there are those who express and promote pseudo-scientific content and honestly believe it. If we understand bullshit as a violation of the second submaxim of Quality we can make sense of this possibility and it captures well both the form of pedestrian bullshit that Frankfurt characterized and the “deeper” form that concerned Cohen. Bullshit is a deviant speech-act in which one says something for which she lacks adequate evidence.

I'll end with an application: I'll argue that this account of bullshit meshes well with recent delineations of pseudo-science within philosophy of science, and that it helps us make sense of certain narrative tropes found in some (in)famous philosophical texts discussed by Sokal & Bricmont and by Bouveresse.

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WHEN IS IT OK TO CALL SOMEONE A BASTARD? AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF PEJORATIVES

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Background. A striking characteristic of expressives like ‘that bastard’ is that their expressive content *projects* out of semantic embeddings and becomes hard to address in conversation. In this paper we focus on the question of when one may felicitously refer to somebody using such a pejorative. Tonhauser et al. (2013) claim that pejoratives do *not* impose any strong contextual felicity constraint (SCFC); that is, they claim that an utterance in which a person is being referred to as ‘That bastard’ is acceptable regardless of how the other conversation participants feel towards the person at stake. If that were correct, then such pejoratives would not require the audience to share a certain perspective with the speaker. In our study we faced three research questions: (RQ1) whether expressives like ‘That bastard’ impose a SCFC and, if it is the case, whether (RQ2) the *that-* construction or/and (RQ3) ‘bastard’ alone are responsible of the activation of the SCFC. In this short abstract we address (RQ1) only.

Our study. Participants. 90 participants (Italian native speaker) participated as volunteers [MA= 23.59; SD=6.83; 59f; 31m]. The experiment was administered online.

Stimuli and Method. We created 8 written vignettes in Italian. Each story was composed of a *context scenario* composed of three sentences followed by a *target sentence*. The context scenarios presented a fictional circumstance introducing a conversation between two individuals speaking about a third person. The target sentence described an utterance of one of the two interlocutors expressing a judgment on the third person. Three independent variables were manipulated: two on the target sentences, one on the scenarios. First, target sentences could express a judgment including either the pejorative expression *stronzo* (Engl. tr. ‘bastard’) (*PEJ*) or a controller sentence including a non-pejorative expression (*CON*). The target sentences could also be realized either with or without a *that-* construction in both conditions *PEJ* and *CON*, for example: *PEJ*: “Marco is a bastard” (it. *Marco è bastardo*); *CON*: “Marco is a Sicilian” (it. *Marco è siciliano*); *That-PEJ*: “That bastard Marco” (it. *Quel bastardo di Marco*); *That-CON*: “That Sicilian Marco” (it. *Quel siciliano di Marco*). Moreover, the information provided in the second sentence of the context scenarios was

manipulated in such a way that it generated either a m-positive (m-Pos) or a m-neutral condition (m-Neu). In the former, the second sentence provided the information expressed by either the pejorative or by the non-pejorative expression; conversely, in the latter, no information was provided (see Example 1). This experimental manipulation resulted in a 2x4 Latin square within-subject design where six experimental conditions were considered: m-Pos/PEJ, m-Pos/CON, m-Pos/That-PEJ, m-Pos/That-CON, m-Neu/PEJ, m-Neu /CON, m-Neu /That-PEJ, m-Neu/That-CON. The procedure consisted in reading the context scenarios. Participants were then asked to rate on a 5-points Likert scale the degree of acceptability of a list of 12 sentences describing utterances of one of the two interlocutors about the third person of the story. The list contained 11 filler sentences plus the target sentence, presented in random order.

Rationale of the study. The study aimed at investigating whether the availability of the relevant contextual information (m-Pos vs m-Neu) is a predictor of the degree of appropriateness of an utterance containing a pejorative expression: a lower average rate in m-Neu condition as compared to m-Pos could be legitimately interpreted as the result of a contextual infelicity prompted by a strong contextual constraint. Note that our paradigm is designed in order to rule out any priming effect generated by the availability of the contextual information in the preceding context: if pejorative expressions impose a strong contextual constraint, then in condition m-Neu we should also observe lower average rates in That-PEJ as compared to That-CON.

Results. We analysed whether there are any differences in response combinations between (i) m-POS vs. m-NEU, (ii) That-PEJ vs. That-CON and (iii) PEJ vs. CON. We present only (and all) the significant results. However, we will discuss those related to RQ1 only. First, the two-sided Wilcoxon sum-rank test with Yates' continuity correction revealed that the responses in m-Pos/PEJ significantly differed from the responses in m-Neu/PEJ ($W(1677)$; $p < 0.0001$), with higher rates in m-Pos/PEJ than in m-Neu/PEJ; m-Pos/CON significantly differed from m-Neu/CON ($W(3254)$; $p < 0.01$) with higher rates in m-Pos; m-Pos/That-PEJ significantly differed from m-Neu/That-PEJ ($W(1422.5)$; $p < 0.0001$) with higher rates in m-Pos and, finally, m-Pos/That-CON significantly differed from m-Neu/That-CON ($W(2417.5)$; $p < 0.0001$) with higher rates again in m-Pos – see Fig. 1. Second, two-sided Wilcoxon sum-rank test with Yates' continuity correction revealed that the responses in m-Pos/PEJ significantly differed from m-Neu/CON ($W(1707.5)$; $p < 0.0001$) with higher rates again in CON; m-Neu/PEJ significantly differed from m-Pos/CON ($W(4901.5)$; $p < 0.01$) with higher rates again in CON and, finally, m-Neu/That-PEJ differed significantly from m-Neu/That-CON ($W(5523.5)$; $p < 0.0001$) with higher rates in m-Neu/That-CON. Interestingly, a significant difference was observed between m-Neu/CON vs. m-Neu/That-CON ($W(4926.5)$; $p < 0.009$) with higher rates in m-Neu/CON – see Fig. 2.

Conclusion. Pace Tonhauser et al., 'that bastard' (*quello stronzo*) does impose a strong contextual felicity constraint, as it is not really acceptable when uttered in a context neutral with respect to the question whether the target deserves to be regarded as a bastard. Although all sorts of expressions are less acceptable in m-neutral contexts than in m-positive contexts, pejoratives are so in a much stronger way (Fig. 2). Note also that the unacceptability of pejoratives in m-neutral contexts cannot be due to a 'taboo' effect of using a bad word, given that 'bastard' (*stronzo*) is perfectly acceptable in m-positive contexts (i.e. contexts where the person referred to deserves a negative attitude).

Example 1. The context scenarios

Pos_PEJ. Sara and Luca are at a graduation party. The guest of honour has invited also Marco. Nobody stands him because of his arrogance. When Marco arrives at the party, Luca says to Sara:

Pos_CON. Sara and Luca are at a graduation party. The guest of honour has invited also Marco. Marco is Sicilan and he brought a dessert typical of his place. When Marco arrives at the party, Luca says to Sara:

Neu_PEJ/CON. Sara and Luca are at a graduation party. The guest of honour has invited also Marco. When Marco arrives at the party, Luca says to Sara:




Fig 1. Mean rates to the target sentences (PEJ and That-PEJ) vs. controllers in m-POS vs. m-NEU.




Fig 2 Comparison between PEJ and T hat-PEJ with the controllers in m-POS vs. m-NEU.

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3D/4D METAPHYSICAL EQUIVALENCE: LESSONS FROM THE SPECIES DEBATE FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF CHANGE AND PERSISTENCE

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In a recent paper, we explored the consequences that the *species-as-individuals thesis* together with the *species concept problem* have for metaphysical theories of persistence. In particular, we addressed the question whether the *species-as-individuals thesis* together with the *species concept problem* threaten the thesis of metaphysical equivalence (ME) between three-dimensionalism (3D) and four-dimensionalism (4D). In this regard, Reydon (2008) has offered a positive answer to this question. He considers ‘species’ to be a homonymous term (Reydon 2005), that is, a term that refers to two different ontological entities, i.e., *evolverons* (synchronic entities) and *phylons* (diachronic ones). He associates *evolverons* with a 3D theory of persistence of species, and *phylons* with a 4D theory. If there were equivalence between these two theories, intertranslation between them would be possible. However, Reydon argues, intertranslation is not possible due to the presence of problematic cases in

species (hybridization and asexual species), and therefore, there is not equivalence between a 3D and a 4D conception of species.

In our previous work we challenged Reydon's conclusion and offered a positive answer regarding the 3D/4D ME. We proceeded by questioning Reydon's crucial assumption, namely that the term 'species' is homonymous, and arguing that *evolverons* and *phylons* are not two different ontological entities, as Reydon claims, but one entity that can be considered under two different perspectives (Triviño and Cerezo 2015). We deployed several arguments. The main one was based on the difficulty to make sense of the *evolving* species (the *evolverons*) as being different from the *evolved* ones (the *phylons*) if the latter results precisely from the activities and interactions of the former. We also dealt with Reydon's biological examples to motivate his challenge to intertranslatability, namely: asexual species and hybridization. In this regard, we argued, among other things, that these are problems for biology itself, rather than consistent parts of the biological theories on which philosophical reflection should base its arguments.

Yet, the detractor of 3D/4D ME might insist that the nice biological examples invoked in Reydon's paper (Reydon 2008) are valid as problematic cases that challenge the idea that *evolverons* and *phylons* are just two dimensions of the same entity. In this talk we assume this consideration and argue that, even if *evolverons* and *phylons* are two different entities and sentences involving them are not intertranslatable, the 3D/4D ME is not challenged because the persistence of each of those entities can be adequately described in both 3D and 4D terms. Our strategy, therefore, is not to challenge the idea that *evolverons* and *phylons* are not intertranslatable, but rather the association between *evolverons* and 3D entities and *phylons* and 4D ones.

We will proceed by distinguishing two different issues that we think are confused in Reydon's work: the issue concerning the *temporal consideration* of an object (*synchronic* and *diachronic*) and the issue of the persistence of an object (*endurance* or 3D and *perdurance* or 4D). Regarding the temporal consideration of an object: given two organisms A and B of a species S, they are *synchronic* iff A and B coexist at some time, even if they exist at more times than the time at which they coexist. And they are *diachronic* iff they exist at different intervals of time, so that there is no time at which A and B coexist, but there is a chain of organisms existing at times between the times of existence of A and the time of existence of B which can link A and B through synchronic relations by means of biological reproduction. The synchronic and diachronic character of an entity pertains, therefore, to the relation of such entity to other ones *with regard to the time of existence*. However, persistence as *endurance* or as *perdurance* refers to the way in which an entity (regardless of how it is temporally considered) exists in more than one time while remaining the same entity. By taking into account this distinction, we will show that both *evolverons* and *phylons* can be associated with endurance and perdurance such that intertranslatability holds for each of the entities and the 3D/4D ME can be restored. We will offer different arguments to support these associations, namely the *process argument* and the *gene-flow argument*. These arguments are grounded in the dynamical and temporal nature of both synchronic and diachronic views of species, and we will reinforce them by appealing to Kunz's recent work on the notion of species (Kunz 2012). Stamos' conception of species (Stamos 2003) and the way in which Reydon discusses it will also be used as part of our arguments in the paper. Finally, we hope that this debate helps to illustrate a misunderstanding behind contemporary reflections on metaphysics of change and persistence, namely a misunderstanding between the *explanation* of change and

persistence (which is what is behind Reydon's approach) and the *description* of the entities persisting through time.

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GROUNDING LEGAL POSITIVISM

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Legal systems shape and regulate many aspects of our lives, by ensuring that a variety of legal facts obtain: that negligent actions of certain types trigger civil liability, that pluralities who meet certain requirements are married, and many others. Yet in legal theory and philosophy of law, the nature and status of such facts has long been disputed. While it is plausible that legal facts are not basic in the way that (say) facts about fundamental physics are, it remains unclear just how they derive from more basic facts, and which other facts determine them.

Legal positivism (LP) and anti-positivism (AP) are the two main families of views trying to answer the question of what determines the legal facts. Though answers to this question may in principle focus on the relevance of facts (or other entities) of various kinds, the dividing line that has traditionally been regarded as of special philosophical interest, and that sets LP and AP apart, concerns the role of *social* and *moral* facts in determining the legal facts.

To a first approximation, the core idea that drives positivist thinking about law is that law is a social construction. This claim, in turn, is usually cashed out by reference to the social sources thesis, according to which the existence and content of the law is a function of its social sources. In contemporary settings that conceive law as a plurality of legal facts, the view naturally translates into the claim that every legal fact is determined by social facts.

Anti-positivists, by contrast, regard law not as a human creation that is in some sense 'up to us', but rather as necessarily determined partly by morality. While granting some role to social facts in law determination, they reject the social sources thesis, and hold that necessarily, legal facts depend not only on social facts, but on moral facts as well.

Within the positivist camp, it is customary to single out two types of positivist positions: inclusive and exclusive positivism (ILP and ELP respectively). The traditional way of drawing the distinction between them is modal: while both subscribe to positivism's core tenet, inclusive positivists allow, whereas exclusive positivists disallow, that legal facts may sometimes depend on morality. In addition, inclusive positivists typically maintain that whenever a moral fact is responsible for determining a legal fact, there have to be some social facts that *make* moral facts so responsible. In other words, ILP allows moral facts to be legal determinants, but only in so far as it is social facts which *grant* them such a role.

The positivism/anti-positivism debate has both theoretical and practical significance. On the one hand, by inquiring into law's necessary building blocks – into the kinds of facts responsible for determining it – an attempt is made to elucidate what constitutes a certain phenomenon. And if a successful account of law were to be found, it would yield an explanation of legal reality in more fundamental terms, providing us with understanding of an important aspect of our shared reality.

On the other hand, answers to this question have also a crucial practical import. For different views on what makes law carry different commitments concerning how the content of particular laws is determined. And since the resolution of judicial disputes partly turns on figuring out what the applicable law is (what the legal facts that are relevant to the case at hand are), different views on the legal determinants will at times support different conclusions on how judicial disputes should be solved (according to the law), a matter that is clearly of great practical significance.

Despite the centrality and significance of this debate, two issues that have a considerable bearing on it have remained largely unexplored: what is the nature of the determination relation relied on by positivism and its rivals, and how are these views best formulated in terms of it?

This paper will tackle the latter question. In doing so, it will make crucial, though not exclusive, use of the notion of *ground*, recently at the center of intense discussion and theorizing within metaphysics. In legal philosophy as elsewhere, grounding can play a philosophically significant role by limning the space of available theories and the issues they investigate, enabling us to shed light on the core of positivist thinking about law, and to evaluate its strengths and weaknesses.

A number of considerations militate in favor of interpreting LP and AP as offering competing grounding claims. I won't rehearse them here. What is crucial for current purposes is that while the view that legal positivism is best understood as a thesis about grounding has been widely accepted in recent years, it remains far from obvious how positivism may be defined ground-theoretically.

The goal of this paper is to fill this gap, and provide precise and theoretically illuminating formulations of positivism as such, as well as of its inclusive and exclusive variants. Perhaps surprisingly, it will turn out that simple candidate definitions suffer from serious shortcomings. This, I shall argue, will warrant an appeal to the notion of a social enabler.

The paper will be structured as follows. Following some preliminary remarks to introduce the relevant ground-theoretic notions and concepts, I set out and discuss some simple grounding-based formulations of positivism, based on the notions of full and partial grounding. I then raise a number of objections against them, and present a more adequate definition capable of solving their problems, which crucially relies on a robust notion of social

enabler. Finally, I model inclusive positivism and exclusive positivism on the resulting template, and outline the advantages of the ground-enablers proposal.

(I CAN'T GET NO) ANTISATISFACTION

**Pablo Cobreros, University of Navarra; Elio La Rosa, Ludwig Maximilian University;
Luca Tranchini, University of Tübingen**

Substructural approaches to paradoxes have attracted much attention from the philosophical community in the last decade. In this talk we focus on two substructural logics, named ST and TS, the first of which is non-transitive, the second non-reflexive. The target of this talk is making explicit the correspondence of duality between these logics.

SIMPLICITY FOR (LINGUISTIC) UNDERSTANDING

**María Inés Corbalán, Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina; Giulia Terzian,
University of Bristol**

The Minimalist Program (MP) in generative linguistics is predicated on the idea that simplicity (here used as an umbrella term to encompass also elegance, parsimony, etc.) is a property of its object of study — the human language faculty (FL) — on the one hand; and of linguistic theory, on the other.

Thus MP is guided by two types of simplicity considerations, respectively known as principles of substantive and methodological economy. Minimalists construe the latter as instances of Ockham's razor, thus explicitly aligning themselves with a long-standing tradition in both science and philosophy of favouring theories that are simple, elegant, parsimonious, and so on. In turn, s-economy principles stem from the minimalist thesis that the language faculty is itself simple, elegant, and computationally efficient, or optimal. Importantly, minimalists often say or imply that we should expect the two kinds of simplicity to somehow converge, though they rarely offer arguments to this effect. Even more worryingly, justifications for either simplicity claim are hard to come by in the literature.

In this talk we sketch a proposal that would allow minimalists to address each of these concerns. We begin by unpacking the minimalist expectation that object-and theory-simplicity will or should converge, which we argue is parasitic on a long-standing habit, in generative linguistics, of conflating the two notions.

More specifically, we suggest that the convergence assumption is in turn the result of the conjunction of — and failure to clearly distinguish between — the generative community's commitment to the following: (1) a strong form of (semantic scientific) realism, (2) a metaphysical thesis according to which the world is simple (known in generative circles as the Galilean stance, or style), (3) a 'naturalist' stance according to which 'language should be studied in the same way as any other aspects of the natural world' (Al-Mutairi 2014, 34), (4) the 'Occamist urge to explain with only the lowest number of assumptions'.

Crucially, this conflationary habit threatens to seriously undermine the very core of MP, and specifically its key thesis (known as the Strong Minimalist Thesis) according to which the human language faculty is essentially simple — insofar as it is perfectly designed and maximally efficient. Moreover, it casts serious doubt on the widespread minimalist assumption that the human language faculty can only be accurately described by simple theories.

In the second part of our talk, we offer minimalists a way out. Building on the foregoing, the first part of our mitigating strategy is to direct the minimalist towards a more transparent conceptual framework, within which it becomes possible — indeed, straightforward — to clearly distinguish and firmly separate the two notions of simplicity.

Finally, we turn our attention to theory-simplicity. We begin with a brief sketch of the orthodox accounts of simplicity — along with other aesthetic values — in the philosophy of science, which construe these notions as either purely epistemic, truth-conducive criteria of theory construction and theory choice; or as purely pragmatic and even subjective values, with connotations of ‘easy-to-use’ and the like.

We will then outline and defend an alternative, compatibilist proposal and suggest that it is particularly well suited to minimalist purposes. The proposed account draws on recent discussions in the philosophy of science concerning the role of theoretical values — and even more specifically, of aesthetic values — in shaping scientific explanation and scientific practice (Breitenbach 2013; de Regt 2017; Ivanova 2017). On the proposed account, simplicity is cast as a cognitive-pragmatic value that serves a distinctively epistemic function: specifically, it is conducive to *scientific understanding*, where the latter is one of the central aims of science.

A first and important part of our proposal, then, is that minimalists weaken their commitment to (1) above, and that truth be replaced by understanding as the aim of linguistic inquiry. Following a brief overview of the current debate on understanding, we present an illustration of our general methodological suggestion, featuring a model — the paradigm theoretical vehicle in science — that (a) instantiates simplicity and (b) is a vehicle of understanding *also in virtue of* (a). Taking our cue from this illustration, we will then make a case for re-interpreting minimalist hypotheses — ascribing ever-increasing simplicity to FL — as simplified and idealized *models* of FL.

Finally, we will argue that the proposed compatibilist account not only sits better with actual scientific practice, but moreover it helps illuminate the relation between ascriptions of simplicity to phenomena on the one hand, and to scientific representations on the other. Crucially, it allows us to entertain and justify both sorts of claims while at the same time resisting the minimalist expectation that the two should converge.

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EXPERIENTIALISM AND TWO CASES OF HEARING

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While we commonly report that we hear ordinary objects and the events in which they participate, according to some, we only indirectly hear them in virtue of being directly presented with sounds. The aim of this paper is to assess in what sense – if auditory perceptual experience only directly presents us with sounds – what is present in experience may ground hearing ordinary objects and events other than sounds.

This paper is divided in three parts. In order to distinguish the view at issue from other views in the vicinity that may deserve separate treatments, in the first part, I will identify a particular version of the indirect view by illustrating the theses that it endorses and by drawing examples from Broad (1951) and Berkeley (1713). Given the view's endorsements, in the second part, I will investigate what role experience of sounds can be taken to play in grounding hearing ordinary objects and events. I will argue that the indirect view at issue is committed to the claim that indirectly hearing ordinary objects and events in virtue of the sounds that they make, depends on deploying the relevant concepts in experience. However, in the third part, I will argue that this commitment is undesirable, for it fails to accommodate a difference between two cases of hearing.

PRAGMATISMO, CIENCIA Y DEMOCRACIA EN LA ERA DE LA POSVERDAD

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Posverdad y ciencia deberían ser nociones autoexcluyentes en un mundo donde la ciencia tiene cada vez un papel más decisivo en la actividad política y cotidiana de los ciudadanos. Aun así, cómo establecer si una proposición, una afirmación o una teoría son verdaderas se ha convertido en un problema de relevancia pública y política. Cada vez son más lo que defienden que el conocimiento científico no es una forma privilegiada de entender la realidad y, por lo tanto, que no hay buenas razones para usar la ciencia como base para tomar algunas decisiones. En esta comunicación, en cambio, se pretende articular un alegato en favor de la actividad científica, la noción de verdad y la democratización del conocimiento evitando caer en absolutismos y posturas ingenuas.

Algunos autores no se conforman solo con afirmar la llegada e instauración de la “era de la posverdad”, sino que incluso defienden la inevitabilidad y la pertinencia de dicho acontecimiento. Este es el caso de Steve Fuller cuando señala que: “a post-truth world is the inevitable outcome of greater epistemic democracy. [...] once the instruments of knowledge production are made generally available —and they have been shown to work— they will end up working for anyone with access to them. This in turn will remove the relatively esoteric and hierarchical basis on which knowledge has traditionally acted as a force for stability and often domination” (Fuller, 2016, pp. 2-3). Sin embargo, la democratización epistémica no conduce necesariamente a la aceptación de esa posición. Como el editor de *Social Studies of Science* ha apuntado: “Embracing epistemic democratization does not mean a wholesale cheapening of technoscientific knowledge in the

process. [...] the construction of knowledge [...] requires infrastructure, effort, ingenuity and validation structures” (Sismondo, 2016, p. 3). La posverdad, que establece que “lo que uno quiere que sea verdad es verdad” (Wilber, 2017, p. 25), defiende una noción voluntarista de la verdad, donde el valor de verdad no es algo relevante para mantener una afirmación y sustentar una creencia. Sin embargo, cuando se intenta establecer la veracidad de una creencia no hay lugar para decisiones individualistas y caprichosas.

Para el relativismo radical, el consenso científico se alcanza por el mismo tipo de mecanismos que en otras instituciones sociales, es decir, por redes que fabrican los “hechos” mediante la negociación política, o por otras formas de dominación. Sin embargo, la noción de verdad que los relativistas están atacando incurre en la falacia del hombre de paja: la verdad como el “punto de vista de Dios”, que muy pocos filósofos o científicos defienden ya. Sugerimos que una alternativa a las tesis de los defensores de la posverdad es la noción de verdad desde el pragmatismo, que, a su vez, sugiere mecanismos para desarrollar una verdadera democracia epistémica que no implica caer en el relativismo, como Fuller sostiene. Esto podría parecer controvertido si erróneamente se piensa en la versión caricaturizada, malentendida y popularizada del pragmatismo, esto es, aquella que simplemente tiene en cuenta la unión entre la utilidad (en un sentido muy llano) y la verdad. Sin embargo, ya sea entre los pragmatistas clásicos como John Dewey o los neopragmatistas (por ejemplo, Philip Kitcher y Susan Haack), la construcción del conocimiento científico, con todas sus limitaciones, es la mejor manera de alcanzar verdades fiables y contrastadas, aunque de forma parcial o rectificable.

El pensamiento de Haack a este respecto, sobre todo en lo relativo al concepto de verdad, sirve a la perfección para mostrar cómo las tesis de relativistas y defensores de la posverdad hacen referencia a una actividad que se puede denominar como “pseudoinvestigación”, pero que, sin embargo, no tiene cabida en la “investigación científica”. Toda investigación —sea esta del tipo que sea— debe tener en el horizonte un concepto de verdad que actúe de criterio comunitario decisivo para la consecución de verdades falibles y parciales, y al mismo tiempo lo suficientemente sólidas como para ajustarse a unos estándares epistémicos en los que la comunidad científica y la humanidad en su conjunto ha puesto su confianza y ha comprobado su validez.

Otro de los aspectos que se han discutido desde el pragmatismo, tanto clásico como contemporáneo (Dewey, 1927; Kitcher, 2001), es la necesidad de incorporar en la deliberación política los mecanismos de discusión y acuerdo que se han desarrollado en la práctica científica. Para Dewey los ciudadanos deberían apropiarse de los conocimientos científicos no solo para saber más y mejor, sino también para adquirir ciertos hábitos mentales, porque el futuro de la democracia está conectado con la difusión de la actitud científica (Dewey, 1927, p. 176).

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HOW I STOPPED WORRYING AND LEARNED TO LOVE MEINONGIANISM

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Fictional realism (henceforth FR)—the position that fictional characters are existent abstract objects—is a prominent position in the philosophy of fiction. FR is motivated by being able to take data about practices of fiction at face value. Those data consists partly of forms of prima facie true discourse about fictional characters, for example:

- (1) Arya Stark is a well-developed character
- (2) According to Harry Potter, Hermione Granger is a wizard

According to FR, statements like (1) and statements like (2) are about abstract fictional characters. Parafictional statement (2) captures what is true about the fictional statement "Hermione Granger is a wizard". Whereas the fictional statement is not literally true, (2) is. The challenge is that FR also needs to account for true negative existentials employing names that are also used to refer to fictional characters.

In this discussion, I assume Thomasson's conception of negative existentials for FR:

If N is a proper name that has been used in predicative statements with the intention to refer to some entity of ontological kind K, then 'N does not exist' is true if and only if the history of those uses does not meet the condition for referring to an entity of kind K. (Thomasson 2003, p. 217).

Thomasson explains that whenever we say that Arya Stark does not exist or that Hermione Granger does not exist, the value for K is person, not abstract object. This forces a conceptual distinction between what the fictional character is pretended to be (henceforth "the pretended object") and the abstract existent fictional character. As said, external discourse is about the latter according to FR, but negative existentials employ the use of the name intended to refer to the former: Hermoine the person does not exist, but external discourse is about an existent abstract fictional character. I argue that taking external discourse and negative existentials at face value entails Meinongianism rather than FR: fictional characters do not exist, yet external discourse is about those nonexistent objects.

There are two problems for Thomasson's account. The first problem is that this account is at odds with taking parafictional sentences at face value. Following prominent fictional realists in construing parafictional sentences as de re about abstract objects, the question arises what justifies interpreting them as not being about the pretended object. First, (2) does not express that the story alleges that an abstract object has the property of being a wizard. Rather, it seems that parafictional sentences are about the pretended object. Second, if parafictional sentences are about abstract objects, it becomes hard to see why negative existentials would not be. It seems more reasonable to suggest that parafictional sentences and negative existentials have the same referential intention, namely to refer to the pretended object.

The second problem is generated by fragments where multiple forms of external discourse are tied together by employing anaphoric pronouns. If we assume that anaphoric pronouns are co-referential, all the occurrences of the anaphoric pronoun have to refer to the same object, which forces the conclusion that negative existentials and external discourse are about the same object. For example:

(3) Hermione Granger is a well-developed character. According to Harry Potter, she is a wizard. However, she does not exist because she is a fictional character.

On the assumption mentioned, (3) is about a single object that does not exist. The fictional realist can avoid this conclusion by claiming that anaphors can work as pronouns of laziness for the referring expression in question. Thomasson uses “The Rite of Spring is in the top left drawer; you know I heard it in Boston last week, it went on for 45 minutes” (Thomasson 2010, p. 129) as an example, where “it” replaces 2 “The Rite of Spring”, which refers to the copy of the score, the musical work, and the performance in turn. However, in order for this solution to work, “she” in (3) refers to a complex of the pretended nonexistent object and the abstract existent, which entails that there is a pretended nonexistent object. FR should desperately avoid such a result, because even if FR does not commit to complex objects, it still follows that some of the occurrences of the pronoun refer to the pretended nonexistent object.

Another aspect of the problem is that (3) employs the personal pronoun “she” consistently. This pronoun suggests that external discourse is about an object which is intended to satisfy being a person. However, because fictional statements are false, the object referred to does not satisfy being a person. So, the pronoun refers to an object satisfies being is a person in a pretenceful way only. If it would be an abstract yet existent object that would be referred to, we should be able refer to it by means of a neuter pronoun “it”. However, such a use is not felicitous:

(4) Hermione Granger is a well-developed character. According to Harry Potter, # it is a wizard. However, # it does not exist because # it is a fictional character.

The infelicity of (3) suggests that external discourse is about the pretended nonexistent object, rather than about the abstract fictional character. If there is an existent fictional character, it can only be referred to by means of the pretenceful use of the personal pronoun. The absence of being able to directly refer to such an object puts into question whether such an object exists at all. Rather, it would seem more natural that to interpret such discourse as referring to a nonexistent person, if it is about an object at all.

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A DEFLATIONARY VIEW OF ONTOLOGY FOR SCIENTIFIC THEORIES:

A NEO-CARNAPIAN APPROACH

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May our best scientific theories serve to establish the ontology of the world? One traditional answer has been that of the realists: our best scientific theories are aiming at establishing which are the (kinds of) entities that really exists. Provided that our best scientific theories can be said to be approximately true and that we rely on a standard semantics, this entails that their theoretical terms must refer to mind-independent spatio-temporal objects.

That view is to be contrasted with different forms of instrumentalism; from those that say that scientific theories are merely tools for systematizing and predicting observational phenomena lacking a truth-value to those that maintain that scientific theories literally have truth-value, even may be true, but consider that to accept a theory just involves to believe in the observational part of the theory.

We want to focus on the view held by Carnap (1950/56 and subsequent work), i.e. a form of agnosticism in relation to the issue of the real existence of theoretical entities: scientific theories don't serve to establish what really exists in the world (in the usual realist interpretation). On the other hand, Carnap (1958, 1961, 1963, 1966, and Psillos 2000a) opted for a genuinely new stance (sometimes presented as 'neutral' regarding the realist/instrumentalist debate. Besides, proposed another form of understanding ontological commitment for theoretical terms. Given his distinction between external and internal questions, it is possible maintain that an external consideration of the ontological claims is meaningless. Ontological commitments are always to be understood as internal to a given linguistic framework. The problem of the reference of theoretical entities is addressed by the last Carnap in relation with his renewed attempt to explicate the analytic/synthetic distinction for any axiomatized scientific theory by using its Ramsey sentence (RS). In a RS higher-order variables of the appropriate type (bound by existential quantifiers) replace the theoretical terms of the original theory and, according to Carnap, designate purely logico-mathematical entities (see Carnap 1963, 963).

Recently, Carnap's point of views have been criticized in various ways. Lavers (2016) has pointed out that, in fact, Carnap wouldn't have overcome his instrumentalist scruples. Psillos (1999, 2000b) points out that Carnap's alleged neutrality and attempt of reconciliation between realism and instrumentalism would be severely compromised given that his RS strategy faces the 'Newman objection'. This objection establishes that RS provides just a purely mathematical relational structure without restrictions regarding its components, except for the fact that the cardinality of its domain allows for containing all the entities that are needed for classical mathematics. Such cardinality is, nevertheless, trivially ensured given the potentiality of the logical-mathematical language of RS. The existence of such relational structure is, thus, guaranteed *a priori* given that we assume the consistency and empirical adequacy of TC, a finite axiomatic system of theoretical postulates T plus correspondence rules C. It follows that existential assertion about theoretical entities, that is supposedly nontrivial at all, *become trivial and a priori*.

The Newman inspired objection as applied to Carnap's strategy can receive two alternative readings; respectively, the ontological and the epistemic (see Uebel 2011). On

the first reading, supported by Psillos (1999, 2000b), the envisaged solution is to introduce realist constraints regarding the referents of theoretical terms in order to avoid the trivialization result. Two remarks must be made in relation to this kind of solution: (i) *pace* Psillos, it would suffice with some sort of restriction enough to stop the trivialization, but not necessarily committed to realism (it could in turn appeal to artificial kinds) (see Demopoulos 2007); and (ii) if we take into account that the deflationary character of ontology is also applicable to the observational vocabulary, the objection is forceless against Carnap (cf. Uebel 2010, 2011; Friedman 2011).

The epistemic reading, supported by Friedman (2011) and Demopoulos (2007, 2008), is however not so easily disarmed. According to it, the theoretical assertions of a theory whose observational content is taken to be true become almost analytic truths with no empirical surplus over and above its observational consequences (given the identity between TC and RS). Uebel's (2011) proposal consists in pointing out that Carnap's appeal to RS is made from an idealized, a-historical perspective in order to provide an explication of the analytic/synthetic distinction. Given the idealization in question, the correspondence rules are held fixed and all possible observational data are included. But then, clearly, what serves for idealizational purposes cannot be applied to a historically situated theory. A situated theory could perfectly enjoy an empirical surplus over and above the observational content already tested. This consideration would undermine the epistemic reading. If Uebel's proposal is correct –as we think–, then Carnap's appeal to RS and his neutral stance regarding the realism/instrumentalism debate can be said to be orthogonal. If the Newman objection in its epistemic version remains, then we should opt to maintain Carnap's agnosticism without the Ramseyfication project. Two new remarks are crucial at this point: (a) the mathematical entities are just extensionally equivalent to the entities designated by the theoretical terms of a theory, but the intensional content of a mathematical expression is not the same as the intensional content of a theoretical term (cf. Psillos 1999, 53 ff.); (b) the role of the numerical values is just to represent the putative referents of the theoretical terms as intensionally determined. Given this, the intensional content of a theoretical term constraints the corresponding postulated referent of the term (without any realist assumption). In the final part of our contribution we will defend to abandon the idea of identifying theoretical entities with purely logico-mathematical entities, though still accepting that theoretical entities cannot be alleged spatio-temporal objects. We would remain faithful to Carnap's agnosticism if we took theoretical entities to be abstract artifacts (in a similar sense as Thomasson 1999) characterized by theoretical descriptions made in the corresponding theory. This can be made without abandoning the deflationary approach to ontology.

STOP REPLICATING, START CLASSIFYING. ACT-BASED PROPOSITIONS FOR INDEXICAL COMMUNICATION

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In the philosophical discussion on communication there is a perspective which enjoys considerable, if not majority, acceptance. Let's call it the *Transmission model of*

communication. According to this model, communication consists in the transmission or replication of propositions, so when a speaker makes an utterance the hearer reconstructs the proposition that the speaker wants to communicate. The strongest version of this thesis is the *Naïve* conception of communication (Heck 2002)-sometimes called the belief transfer model (Egan 2007) or the FedEx model (Weber 2013). According to the transmission model there are three elements which intervene in a communicative process: (a) the propositional content of the speaker's thought, (b) the proposition grasped by the hearer and (c) the proposition literally expressed by the sentence. In the *Naïve* conception the three elements are actually the same because the underlying idea is that the content, the information which is transmitted, undergoes no change.

There is a well-known problem presented by the *Naïve* conception: to explain cases in which we try to communicate indexical thoughts. Indexical thoughts are restricted by the context and essentially linked to it. The truth conditions and the content of an utterance are relative to a particular context. The reason for this phenomenon is that there is a part of the content which can only be entertained by the speaker and not by the hearer, so that it cannot be transmitted or replicated. Perry (1979) called this phenomenon *limited accessibility*. All the different versions of the transmission model aim to offer a solution to the problem that indexical utterances pose for the *naïve* theory. On the one hand, we have solutions in which a transformation- recentering process is carried out and in which no content is required to be shared by the speaker and the hearer (Gibbard 2012, Weber 2013). On the other hand, there are those of a Fregean substitutive spirit, according to which what is communicated is a substitutive (*ersatz*) thought or proposition in such a way that this new thought is shared between the speaker and the hearer (Kölbel 2013, Torre 2010).

What I will provide in this paper is an alternative to the transmission model of communication: the *Classificatory model of communication*. This model is grounded on the act-based view of propositional content (Hanks 2011, 2015). I shall argue that in this new conception cases of indexical communication are not a problem and that, therefore, the model does not need any adjustment or modification (substitutive, transforming or recentering process) to explain how successful communication is achieved in such cases, which simply fit smoothly into the model.

In the first place, I will argue that the reason why all the variants of the transmission model of communication are forced to carry out a process of modification of the utterance performed by the speaker is that they all maintain a Fregean conception of content. In that view, there is only one concrete proposition that can be considered correct as the content of an utterance, so that in cases of indexical communication we would need to postulate a readjusted additional content, which is a disadvantage in order to explain how successful communication is achieved.

According to act-based view propositions are types of actions which function as classifying devices allowing us to individuate beliefs. They are also the bearers of truth conditions, which are obtained through instantiated or possible tokens pertaining to each type. Thus, when a speaker makes a token utterance the hearer classifies it under a certain type. On the classificatory model, successful communication consists in a hearer classifying the speaker's utterance under an appropriate type. Among the types we find that some of them are more specific than others in the sense that some contain more information and details than others, i.e. some are more coarsely-grained and others which are fine-grained. When we classify an utterance there is not a single type which is the only correct one, but

there is a variety of types under which we can classify it. In the act-based view is defended that there are semantic reference types which are certain types of reference acts, for example, a type of reference act I perform when I use the name 'Russell'. Accordingly, "two acts of reference fall under the same semantic reference type just in case anyone who is semantically competent with the terms used in those acts will know that those two acts corefer" (Hanks 2015, 8). This feature combined with the variety of types is what will allow us to accommodate the indexical cases without major trouble

As I will argue, indexical utterances do not pose a problem for the classificatory model. Suppose a speaker says "I am extremely tired". On the classificatory approach, the speaker has performed a type of action that only she can perform. In that sense, the content of her utterance is of limited accessibility. However, there is no barrier to a hearer classifying this utterance under that type, even if the hearer is not capable herself of performing a token of that type. In this way, indexical utterances can be easily integrated into the classificatory model of communication.

ON READING THE TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS: WITTGENSTEIN AND METAPHYSICS

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During the past decades there has been a growing interest in the debate regarding how we must read Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* in order to account for its contents and the paradoxical remark in 6.54 (i.e. that the propositions of the *Tractatus* appear to provide theories/insights whilst being nonsensical). Traditionally there have been two main alternative readings. First, the standard reading (see e.g. Anscombe 1971; Hacker 1986; 1996; 2017) that claims that Wittgenstein's propositions provides philosophical theories and doctrines, specifically a realist metaphysical ontology and a picture theory. Second, the resolute reading (see e.g. Connant 1989; 2000; 2002; Diamond 1991; 1997; 2000; 2005) that rejects the idea that Wittgenstein advances philosophical theories or doctrines in the *Tractatus*.

One of the main objections against the standard reading consists in singling out the illegitimate attribution of metaphysical realism to Wittgenstein (Ishiguro 1969; McGuinness 1981; 1985; Winch 1987; McGinn 1999; Moyal-Sharrock 2007; Goldfarb 2011; MacNeil 2017). Namely, claiming that Wittgenstein advances metaphysical truths that characterize a thought-independent and language-independent reality. This attribution of realism to Wittgenstein is illegitimate insofar it assumes a gap between world and language that is non-existent in the *Tractatus* (Black 1964; Ishiguro 1969; McGinn 1999; Williams 2004). Moreover, it takes ontological claims as the basis for an account of language, thus putting the cart before the horse (MacNeil 2017, 357).

My aim in this paper is to offer a viable solution to this objection and advance an alternative metaphysical reading of the *Tractatus* which takes him as advancing philosophical theories without entailing a commitment to metaphysical realism. Specifically I am going to argue that Wittgenstein advances a picture theory of reality where pictures (and their logical structure) taint all ontological issues.

Pictures (i.e. propositions and thoughts) are what we employ to model and represent reality. For Wittgenstein the sense/meaning of pictures is dependent upon two different elements: (i) they must be logical pictures (i.e. they must have a logical form that they share with reality) and (ii) they must represent the existence and non-existence of states of affairs. Pictures are constituted by a connection of elements that have a certain structure. Elements are representative of objects and the structure of elements in a picture will represent the structure of objects in states of affairs (TLP 2.14, 2.15). This correlation between elements and objects is what Wittgenstein calls 'pictorial relationship' (TLP 2.1514). Additionally, these pictures are bipolar, true or false (TLP 2.21). The truth and falsity of pictures is determined by the agreement or disagreement between their meaning (i.e. what they represent) and reality. Hence, the totality of true pictures will provide a full description of all the facts that constitute the world. Reality cannot outrun our picturing.

Defendants of the standard reading generally argue that Wittgenstein offers this picture theory on the basis of a realist metaphysical ontology introduced in the 1's and 2's. However, I believe there is an alternative understanding of these ontological propositions that does not encompass attributing realism to Wittgenstein. The opening remarks of the Tractatus focus on the structure that pertains necessarily to any possible world. Wittgenstein claims that the world is all that is the case, the totality of facts (TLP 1, 1.1). Facts are the existence of states of affairs that, in turn, are a combination of objects (TLP 2, 2.01). Objects are simples that make up the substance of the world (TLP 2.02, 2.021, 2.024). Whilst objects do not alter, their configuration changes and produces states of affairs: objects are connected to each other in a state of affairs and this specific combination is the structure of the state of affairs (TLP 2.0271, 2.0272, 2.03, 2.032, 2.034).

These ontological claims are not characterizing a language-independent and thought-independent reality in order to later provide a picture theory. Conversely, Wittgenstein is characterizing reality as we picture it. The isomorphic relation between pictures and world is not coincidental: it is intentional. The categories and distinctions introduced in order to provide a picture theory are extended and applied to what they represent: the ontology characterized in the Tractatus. The only possible reality available is that which is presented in our picturing. Reality is constructed and altered by every true picture (TLP 3.01, 4.0311, 4.0312, 4.1, 4.11, 5.5262, 6.53). Picturing structures reality as such. Hence why the structure of states of affairs (a connection of objects) coincides with the structure of pictures (a connection of elements). 'Picture' and 'World' refer here to the formal totalities of pictures and the world (Sullivan 1996: 207). Consequently, the relation between world and pictures outlined must be understood as two interdependent formal totalities that share the same structural features.

Moreover this alternative reading coincides with Wittgenstein's remarks regarding the logical form shared by pictures and the world. This logical form is the form of reality, the scaffolding of the world. However, it does not pertain inherently to the world (as the standard reading seems to assume), conversely logical form only pertains to the world insofar as the only possible world available to us is constructed by pictures with the help of logical scaffolding (TLP 4.023). The facts that constitute the world must be given in logical space (TLP 1.13) and the points and spaces in this logical space are uniquely determined by pictures (TLP 3.4, 3.42). Ontological claims are tainted both by pictures and the logical form of pictures.

In sum, Wittgenstein is advancing a picture theory of reality where picturing and its logical structure determine ontology and its structure, thus avoiding any commitment to metaphysical realism. But what kind of metaphysics is being developed in the *Tractatus*? It might be suggested that the characterization offered above suggests some sort of phenomenalism or transcendental idealism. Nevertheless, I believe that this approach is just as problematic as associating Wittgenstein with realism. Wittgenstein is presenting the structure of pictures and reality that must exist. This structure stands regardless of the metaphysical premises one defends (Williams 2004, 22). Professing a certain metaphysical view (e.g. realism, idealism, transcendental idealism) is completely empty.

SOCIAL STRUCTURES, IDEOLOGY, AND BAD SEX

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This paper is concerned with providing an explanatory framework for thinking about a particular type of morally bad sex. I argue that much of the current literature on bad sex, which takes consent to be the lens through which bad sex should be viewed, is unable to adequately capture a myriad of instances of bad sex. These instances are interesting as it appears that something bad has happened, but it isn't obvious that those parties who play a direct causal role in the event have done anything wrong. I argue that we should make sense of what has gone wrong in these cases in terms of unjust social structures creating the conditions for bad events. Whilst my primary aim is to provide a framework for thinking about these cases in particular, I suggest that thinking about bad sex in terms of ideology and social structures provides a richer and more fruitful framework for thinking about morally bad sex at large.

IMPLICIT BIAS AND QUALIEFS

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Recently the phenomenon of implicit bias has gained increased interest among philosophers (see e.g. Brownstein and Saul 2016, Holroyd, Scaiffe & Stafford 2017). So, what is implicit bias? As a first approximation, we can say that the notion of "implicit bias" aims to capture implicit mental states that influence our behavior and attitudes when social categories (such as gender or race) are in play. This often leads to discriminatory behavior and to unfair judgments, for example about the qualification of a job applicant. The high relevance of these experimental findings concerning the consequences of implicit bias is obvious, and motivates a deeper analysis of the phenomenon.

In analyzing implicit bias, one key issue is to clarify its metaphysical nature. There is significant controversy about how best to characterize implicit bias. We can roughly discern two competing views on the issue: on the *associative* view, implicit bias is best characterized in terms of *associations*. Gendler's (2008) model of "*aliefs*" can be subsumed under the associative view as well, insofar as it invokes a single, sui generis mental state, consisting of

a tightly, associatively, connected triad of representational, associative and emotional aspects. In contrast, the alternative *propositional view* has it that implicit bias is best analyzed as beliefs or belief-like attitudes (e.g. Mandelbaum 2016). To clarify whether implicit bias has an associative or a propositional structure is important, since the competing views have different consequences for a deeper understanding of the phenomenon. For example, depending on which view we endorse, different methods for changing implicit bias appear promising. Accordingly, the goal of this talk is to clarify the metaphysical nature of implicit bias.

I will develop a novel account of implicit bias that accommodates both its phenomenal aspect and its propositional aspect. In the literature so far, these two aspects have been accounted for only separately—either by the propositional or by the associative models. The proposed model reconciles these aspects by pointing towards a propositional content, though represented in a special, phenomenal, way. In particular, I develop a model of implicit bias as belief-like states that involve a special usage of phenomenal concepts. I call mental states that draw upon a phenomenal experience of what an object or person seems like to attribute a property to this very object or person “qualiefs” (since these mental states constitutively involve *qualitative* properties and share some of the characteristics of proper *beliefs*). That means, a qualief has a propositional content that an object is *F*, but this content is presented in a very particular, phenomenal, way. Accordingly, qualiefs are hybrid mental states that fuse phenomenal and representational features.

Next, I argue that implicit bias is best analyzed as a specific instance of qualiefs—an instance of *generic qualiefs*. According to Leslie (2012), generic generalization is a basic and default cognitive mechanism, that picks up on striking properties and links them to a kind. I argue that this default cognitive mechanism can be easily triggered by experiences of members of a target group resulting in generic qualiefs. Generic qualiefs use an experience of an individual to attribute a property to the *class* this individual belongs. As a result, the phenomenal mode of presentation of a qualief—the experience of the individual seeming *F*—is introspectively accessible. However, its generic content—that *members of the target group are F*—is hard to access introspectively. Moreover, generic qualiefs underlying implicit bias are problematic since they have a particular etiology: the experience used in the qualief turns out to be shaped by the stereotype representations that we encounter in our culture.

Finally, I demonstrate that the qualief model of implicit bias is explanatorily powerful. First, qualiefs are partly constituted by phenomenal experiences—this feature explains why implicit bias is automatic, not under our control, and hard to regulate via cognitive means. Second, as a result of generic generalization, there is a shift via a between the phenomenal mode of presentation of a generic qualief and its content—this accounts for the implicitness of bias as well as the ignorance of a possible tension to explicit anti-discriminatory beliefs. Third, the qualief model does justice to the asymmetric inferential profile of implicit bias by showing how it can be insensitive to reasoning, but at the same time it can serve as propositional input to further mental states

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MUSICAL MEANING OF PURELY INSTRUMENTAL MUSIC: EXPRESSION AND REPRESENTATION

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The question about the meaning of purely instrumental music has generated prolific discussions in the philosophy of music. In contemporary debate, three neatly differentiated views stand out. Firstly, *formalist* accounts deny that instrumental music has meaning. According to Peter Kivy (1990, 2007), instrumental music is pure form that does not refer to anything extra-musical, i.e., pure musical syntax without content. Kivy acknowledges that instrumental music, in virtue of its musical form, can express certain basic emotions or feelings that listeners can grasp following the musical flow in a non-conceptual or linguistically describable way. Nonetheless, he rejects that we can properly speak of musical meaning. At best, when we sometimes vaguely ask about the meaning of a chord or a melody, we are really asking about the function that this chord or melody fulfils in the overall work's form.

A second view in this debate can be labelled as *moderate formalism*. According to Constantijn Koopman and Stephen Davies (2001), instrumental music has meaning, but of a merely formal nature. It consists in the coherence of the work's structure, obtained from the relationships of implication that hold between the different sonic elements of a work. Consequently, unlike linguistic meaning, musical meaning is not referential. Rather, it is to be understood in terms of implication between the elements constituting the musical form. Musical meaning is grasped in the aural experience of the dynamics and progressions of the work's form. It is a non-intellectual, non-conceptual, but experiential grasping, in which we empathise with the dynamic flow of the musical form similarly to the way in which we empathise with persons. This empathy with the work's form enables music to express certain feelings.

In the third place, anti-formalist accounts stand on the opposite pole. According to James Young (2014), instrumental music can provide a profound insight about human emotions. Young's main thesis is that instrumental music can be a source of this sort of knowledge because it represents –is about– emotions by means of expressing and arousing them. Young distinguishes between two kinds of representation: semantic representation, in which the assignation of the referents depends on semantic conventions; and illustrative representation, in which the illustration's experience conveys knowledge in virtue of being similar to the experience of the represented object. Illustrations do not provide statements, but experiences in which knowledge can be obtained. Music adjusts to this second model of

representation insofar it is illustrative of emotion. A work represents sadness because, by means of expressing and arousing sadness when heard, its aural experience is similar to the experience of sadness.

It will be shown that the abovementioned views oversimplify the phenomenon of musical meaning. The thesis we defend is twofold: first, that both expression and representational meaning can take jointly place in instrumental music, and secondly, that the distinction between both phenomena provides us with a good analytical tool to approach the complexity of musical meaning. Inspired by Wittgenstein (1953), we argue that there can be cases of expression without figuration, as well as cases of simultaneous expression and figuration – i.e., we can find musical extracts whose function is purely expressive, while other passages have a mixed function: expressive and figurative.

In support of this thesis, different examples of musical quotations in purely instrumental works will be provided. For instance, Valentí Miserachs' *Pucciniana* is an orchestral piece in a post-impressionist aesthetics aiming to express sadness, drama and passion. Nonetheless, this work starts with the initial cell of the instrumental intermezzo of Puccini's opera *Manon Lescaut*, in an attempt of making reference to Puccini's style and praising his skills as a symphonist. *Pucciniana*, apart from expressing certain feelings and emotions, aims to offer an exalted view of Puccini's style from a merely instrumental point of view. This sense of representation is analogous to the one taking place, for instance, in the *Portrait of Louis XIV*. Rigaud, locating the king in a particular perspective, in a certain surround and with a proper game of lights, aims to exalt and make reference to the monarch's absolute power. Other sort of musical quotations are those carried out by nationalistic composers. They introduce folk music and musical colours characteristic of a particular region to make reference to its culture and artistic richness. This is the case of Charles Ives' *Symphony No. 2*, in which the quotation of "Turkey in the Straw", the song of a rural dance, makes reference to the American countryside, moving the listener to this scenario. Other kind of quotations is achieved by means of the instrumentation and formal structure of the work. Ligeti's *Trio for Horn, Violin and Piano*, which makes reference to Brahms' trio for the same ensemble, illustrates this phenomenon.

On the basis of these examples, the thesis defended here presents explanatory advantages regarding pure formalism, which only acknowledges musical expression, denying any sort of figurative meaning. In turn, it has advantages regarding moderate formalism, noting that the relationships between musical elements do not occur only in terms of implication. Finally, it also appears superior with respect to Young's anti-formalist position. The idea that music represents emotions requires assuming a realist thesis about a work's expressive properties. This assumption is too strong insofar the judgments about the emotions represented by a work would be factual ones, and disagreements involving them would imply that at least one of the parties is mistaken. Nonetheless, faultless disagreements between critics and professional musicians about the emotion expressed by a work are plausible. This aspect contrasts sharply with disagreements about the referential nature of music. A person is said to be wrong if she denies that Charles Ives' *Symphony No. 2* does not refer to the American countryside, and we have ways to show why the speaker is wrong. The proposal defended here about the musical meaning reflects in a better way than the previous accounts the difference between these two phenomena.

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FUNDAMENTAL YET GROUNDED

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The notion of *fundamentality* conveys the idea that there is something basic, or primitive in the reality that we inhabit. Metaphorically speaking, the fundamental entities are those that God would have to create in order to bring into being everything else that exists. Fundamentality plays a crucial role in metaphysical inquiry as well as scientific investigation. For example, Jonathan Schaffer argues that metaphysics "is about what is fundamental, and what derives from it" (2009: 379). Moreover, it is widely held that physicists aspire to give us an account of the fundamental constituents of reality. Despite its claimed importance, however, there is no consensus on how to characterise the fundamental. The legitimacy of this notion in our theorising hangs on the possibility of formulating a metaphysically as well as empirically adequate conception.

A number of metaphysicians have attempted to elucidate fundamentality and regiment its use in terms of *grounding*. This is a form of non-causal and explanatory dependence that captures the idea that certain entities, typically facts, obtain *because/in virtue of* others. More precisely, we can say that for some entities A and B, if A grounds B, then B obtains because/in virtue of A. Albeit contentious, it is standardly held that grounding claims have an explanatory import: if A grounds B, then A *explains* or *account for* B. For instance, if the fact that an electron *e* has elementary charge grounds that the fact that *e* produces an electromagnetic field, then the latter obtains because/in virtue of the former. The fact that *e* has elementary charges explains the fact that *e* produces an electromagnetic field.

The orthodoxy's view about grounding holds that the fundamental entities are those that are *ungrounded*. Namely, they are those that do not obtain in virtue of anything else. Accordingly, they are unexplained. To use the previous example, if the fact that *e* has elementary charge were ungrounded, then it would be fundamental. This view captures the intuitive idea that to be fundamental is to be independent, in some metaphysically relevant sense. However, it has been recently argued that grounding orthodoxy evangelises a false doctrine: it is possible that there are fundamental and yet mutually grounded entities (Wilson 2014, 2016, forthcoming; Tahko 2018; cf. Barnes 2018). Call **Heresy** the possibility of fundamental and yet mutually grounded entities. Proponents of the previous objection

contend that the **Heresy** forces us to adopt two doctrines, which can be formulated as follows: **Primitivism** and **Separation**.

Primitivism. Fundamentality cannot be characterised adequately in terms of grounding or other notions of metaphysical dependence (Cf. Wilson 2014: 560).

Separation. The link between fundamentality and grounding should be excised (Cf. Barnes 2018: 69).

My aim is to show that the **Heresy** entails neither **Primitivism** nor **Separation**. Thus we are not compelled to renounce the project of characterising fundamentality in terms of grounding. To accomplish this aim, I will defend a *non-symmetric* conception of grounding. On this view, it is possible that some entities A and B are such that A grounds B *and* B grounds A. Drawing on Karen Bennett's account of *building* (2017), I will propose to reformulate the definition of fundamentality as follows:

Reformed Ungroundedness. An entity X is fundamental if and only if for every entity Y, if X is grounded in Y, then Y is grounded in X.

As I will explain, **Reformed Ungroundedness** accommodates the **Heresy** for it permits the possibility that an entity is fundamental and yet grounded in some other ones. Therefore, we can deny **Separation** and, consequently, **Primitivism**. A toy example will illustrate. Consider a possible world in which only A and B obtain. Suppose also that A and B ground each other, namely A grounds B and B grounds A. In such a world, A is fundamental for the conditional **Reformed Ungroundedness** is true. By parity of reasoning, also B is fundamental.

The proposed approach has three important advantages over grounding orthodoxy. First, it is ideologically more parsimonious. In order to account for the **Heresy**, the grounding orthodox must invoke a distinct notion of fundamentality in addition to that of ungroundedness. By contrast, **Reformed Ungroundedness** serves this purpose well while preserving the link between grounding and fundamentality. Second, **Reformed Ungroundedness** permits cases of symmetric grounding and yet maintains the original sense of ungroundedness. If there is no Y, then it is vacuously true that X is fundamental.

The proposed non-symmetric conception of grounding does not rule out that some fundamental entities can be ungrounded.

Lastly, **Reformed Ungroundedness** evades *brute fundamentalism*, the view that the fundamental entities are unexplained (McKenzie 2017). Arguably, grounding orthodoxy entails brute fundamentalism. If the fundamental entities are ungrounded, they do not obtain in virtue of anything else. Thus they are unexplained. It is fair to say that brute fundamentalism is the received view in metaphysics. However, it clashes with the ambitions of physicists who do not aim just to offer an inventory of what the fundamentalia are but also to explain why they are fundamental. By adopting **Reformed Ungroundedness**, some fundamental entities can be grounded and therefore amenable to explanation.

Unfortunately, **Reformed Ungroundedness** is not immune to objections. Jessica Wilson (2019) argues that formulations in its ballpark raise two objections: first, they fail to accommodate fundamental and yet strongly emergent entities second, they fail to discriminate between mutually dependent entities that are fundamental and non-fundamental ones. While they have some teeth, I will argue for a strategy to resist these objections.

My plan is as follows. First, I will stress the relevance of fundamentality in both metaphysics and science. After presenting grounding orthodoxy, I will discuss the **Heresy** and its claimed consequences: **Primitivism** and **Separation**. To accommodate the **Heresy**, I will argue for a non-symmetric conception of grounding. By defending the adoption of **Reformed Ungroundedness**, I will show that we are forced to endorse neither **Primitivism** nor **Separation**. I will conclude by illustrating the merits that **Reformed Ungroundedness** brings us and showing that Wilson's objections do not represent a serious threat to the proposed account.

COMPLEX SYNTAX, SIMPLE SEMANTICS: A TRADITIONAL ACCOUNT OF COMPLEX DEMONSTRATIVES

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Complex demonstratives are often seen as a source of trouble for the idea that demonstratives are directly referential. For instance, King (2001 and much subsequent work) and Nowak (2014) provide an array of cases in which complex demonstratives just can't be treated as devices of direct reference, since they could hardly be considered rigid designators. They argue for an alternative account in which they are treated as quantifiers. In this paper I argue that classical theories (i.e., inspired by Kaplan 1977 and subsequent work) do indeed predict those non-referential uses of complex demonstratives, as that these are not essentially different from demonstratives of other types, contrary to King's claims. The first kind of counterevidence comes from '*quantification in*' uses ('QI' for short), which occur when the complex demonstrative contains some pronoun bound by an external quantifier:

(1) Every queen cherishes that cleric who crowned her

A second kind of counterevidence comes from what King calls '*narrow scope readings*' (from now on 'NS'). In these uses, the complex demonstratives contains a quantifier, and if this quantifier takes wide scope over the demonstrative, then the latter becomes non-directly referential:

(2) That professor who brought in the biggest grant in each division will be honored

The third kind of counterevidence are cases in which the speaker demonstrates nothing and intends to refer to no particular object, which is why Kings calls them '*no demonstration no speaker reference readings* (NDNS)'. Here, the complex demonstrative does not designate rigidly the same individual across possible worlds; i.e., it does not express a singular proposition:

(3) That student who scored one hundred on the exam is a genius

(4) If Simone had won the election, she would definitely have embraced that elector who cast the deciding vote

Another kind of counterevidence comes from variants of Bach-Peters sentences:

(5) Every friend of yours who studied for it passed that exam she was dreading

Finally, King also cites evidence from anaphoric uses of complex demonstratives:

(6) A student₁ was sitting in the library. Another student₂ who had an iPod was sitting across from her₁. That student₂ had a logic book.

I shall argue that none of these alleged counterexamples shows that complex demonstratives should be treated as quantifiers. Any theory treating them as singular terms can accommodate all of them.

Counterevidence coming from QI can be easily accommodated if we assume that natural language contains operators on character – what Kaplan (1977) called ‘*monsters*’. In (1), the character of ‘that cleric who crowned her’ is supposed to be given by the descriptive material appended to the demonstrative (‘cleric who crowned her’), and this material is being quantified on by an external operator (the binder of ‘her’). This means that this external quantifier is an operator on character. Monsters pose a threat to the idea that indexicals are directly referential, but this threat is no greater when it comes to complex demonstratives than it was for the simple ones: after all, variable binders are monsters (Rabern 2013), and they prevent simple demonstratives from being directly referential. The situation is not different when it comes to sentences like (1):

[Every queen] $\lambda 1$. t_1 cherishes *dthat* (cleric who crowned her $_1$)

The character of the complex demonstrative is supposed to be given by the descriptive content appended to it, and this descriptive content is being quantified on by a variable binder. On the standard Kaplanian theory this is yet not enough, because the complex demonstrative is anchored to the actual world instead of being dependent on other worlds, but this problem vanishes if we adopt an extensional system with full object-language quantification over worlds and times, as it is also standard (although usually omitted for simplicity’s sake).

NS uses can be handled similarly, the only difference being that in QI cases what is bound is a pronoun whereas in NS uses it is a trace:

NS reading: [Each division] $\lambda 1$. [the biggest grant in g_1] $\lambda 2$. *dthat* (professor who $_3$ g_3 brought in g_2) will be honored

The case is not different with sentences like (4), only that what we need in this case is quantification over possible worlds, as in a standard Lewis-Stalnaker semantics for subjunctive conditionals. This is made clear if we adopt an extensional system in which tense and mood are treated as indexicals:

(6) [$\forall w$: w is among the closest-to- c_w -worlds in which Simone wins the election)] (w she $_1$ embraces *dthat* (w elector who $_2$ [the deciding vote] $\lambda 3$. g_2 casts g_3)

As for Bach-Peters sentences and anaphoric uses, they are easily accommodated once we admit the existence of E-type pronouns (Evans 1977), i.e., pronouns anaphoric on a quantifier that does not c-command them, and whose semantic value is retrieved by means of a definite description obtained from that very quantifier:

(6a) **A student** was sitting in the library. Another student who had an iPod was sitting across from **the student who was sitting in the library**. **The student who had an iPod and was sitting across from the student who was sitting in the library** had a logic book.

(7a) [Every friend of yours who $_1$ g_1 studied for **the exam she $_1$ was dreading**] $\lambda 2$. g_2 passed that exam she $_2$ was dreading.

The existence of E-type anaphora could be seen as a threat to direct reference, but, again, this threat is no greater when it comes to complex demonstratives than it was for simple ones.

Finally, cases like (3), in which the speaker employs a complex demonstrative without having any particular individual in mind, can be reproduced for simple demonstratives too. I shall argue that they are just variants of Frege's problem.

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IS THERE A GOOD MORAL ARGUMENT AGAINST MORAL REALISM?

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Moral realism is often defended with moral arguments. Only realism, it is argued, can make good on commitments that we hold most dear, e.g. that genocide is wrong no matter what anyone thinks about it. However, some philosophers (Blackburn 1993, Erdur 2016, Hayward 2019, Bedke 2019) have argued that there is something morally objectionable about realism itself: for instance, according to realism, we are justified in believing that genocide is wrong *only if* a certain moral fact obtains. But it is objectionable to hold our moral commitments hostage to metaphysical inquiry in this way. Or so the argument goes.

In this paper, I argue that no version of this moral argument against realism is likely to succeed. More precisely, minimal realism (the kind of realism defended by Kramer 2009, Dworkin 2011, and Scanlon 2014, on which realist theses are understood as internal to moral discourse) is immune to this challenge, while robust non-naturalist realists might have good answers to all versions of the argument as well.

First, the moral argument against realism might be stated in *counterfactual* terms: according to realism, if the normative facts were different or inexistent, then, e.g., genocide would not be wrong, and this is an objectionable belief to hold.

This argument poses no problem for minimal realists. Given their deflationary approach to metaphysics, a claim such as "If there were no objective fact that genocide is wrong, then genocide would not be wrong" is equivalent to "If genocide was not wrong, it would not be wrong", which is trivially true, rather than a substantive claim to which moral objections can be raised.

Robust realists can also reject this argument by appealing to the metaphysical necessity of normative facts, which makes the relevant counterfactuals trivially true as well.

Another version of the argument (Erdur 2016) focuses on *moral explanations*: e.g., for realists, genocide is wrong ultimately because there is an objective reality that makes it

wrong. However, genocide is wrong primarily because of the pain and suffering and loss that it involves, and not due to the existence of an objective moral reality.

Minimal realists face no challenge here either: they need not claim that moral explanations bottom out in claims about objective facts. They do embrace moral objectivity, but typically as the *result* of substantive moral theorizing, rather than its starting point.

As for robust realists, they could try to explain away the intuitions driving Erdur's argument by distinguishing between moral and metaphysical explanations. For instance, perhaps the existence of an objective moral reality is the wrong kind of *explanans* in a first-order moral explanation of why genocide is wrong, but once we go *beyond* moral theorizing and look for a deeper explanation of morality, such realists might argue, it is appropriate to appeal to moral facts and properties in a fundamental explanatory role.

The moral argument can also be stated in terms of *epistemic possibility* (Hayward 2019, Bedke 2019): realism objectionably entails that we should abandon our moral commitments if it turns out that the moral facts are different or inexistent.

Minimal realists again have an easy response: on their view, to discover, say, that there is no fact that makes it the case that genocide is wrong is simply to discover that genocide is not wrong. Such a discovery should indeed make one abandon the belief that genocide is wrong, as a matter of basic epistemic rationality.

Robust realists might be tempted to point out that accepting realism does not entail being disposed to abandon one's moral beliefs in light of certain metaphysical discoveries: if they came to believe that the moral facts were different, they could still hold on to their moral commitments, and reject instead the idea that such commitments need a metaphysical foundation. However, the fact that one could preserve one's moral probity by abandoning realism in certain circumstances does not sound like a vindication of realism itself.

A more promising option for robust realists is to adopt a certain methodological stance on the right way to form metaphysical beliefs about moral facts. The metaphysical discovery that there is no fact that makes it the case that genocide is wrong, they might argue, could only be supported by the same kind of evidence that would support believing that genocide is not wrong, namely first-order moral evidence together with other evidence that is relevant in forming and revising moral beliefs, e.g. higher-order evidence about one's beliefs, or the simplicity and explanatory power of one's views. So, if our beliefs are formed through the right kind of process, it is not epistemically possible for the moral facts to substantially diverge from our moral commitments.

Robust realists can also offer this response when facing the *methodological* version of the moral argument (Bedke 2019). According to this argument, robust realism entails that there is some purely non-moral way of reasoning that would support believing in different metaphysical facts, and thus undermine our moral commitments, but this would be an objectionable way of forming moral beliefs.

Once again, robust realists can deny that their view has such consequences: the only evidence relevant for settling metaphysical disputes about moral facts might be the same type of evidence that we legitimately use in forming moral beliefs.

In conclusion, both minimal and robust realists can address all versions of the moral argument, at least if robust realists adopt a certain stance on how we should form metaphysical beliefs in the moral domain. This discussion also reveals something important about the dispute between minimal and robust realism: this divide becomes even more elusive and intractable than it already was, if minimal and robust realists agree not only on

the existence of objective moral facts and our reliable access to such facts, but also on what kind of evidence can support or undermine realist theses, and only disagree about the metaphysical weight of their shared commitments.

MULTI-TRACK EPISTEMIC VIRTUES AND DISPOSITIONAL REALISM

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In *Judgment and Agency*, Sosa (2015) develops his account of knowledge as cognitive success due to competence into an analysis of how competences, understood as dispositions to succeed, are constituted. As Sosa sees it, cognitive competences have — when complete— a triple-S structure that includes the innermost (seat) competence of the agent, her overall intrinsic state (shape), and the external circumstances for the manifestation of cognitive success to occur (situation). It is also important to notice that a range of *normal* circumstances set a threshold below which S would not count as relevantly competent. Thus, Sosa's analysis is able to capture finer structures of potentiality. Those structures are *context-sensitive*. As thus, they take into account both temporal dispositions that would mask the agent's more stable innermost ability, and external factors relevant to provide the right opportunity to exercise it.

Context-sensitivity is instrumental in making sense of how the attribution of competence to the same agent in the same situation (one that is unpropitious) may with equal right be held true or false. If we are focusing on the innermost competence, the attribution may be true independently of how things stand in the vicinity of the agent. If, however, we also take into consideration her overall shape and the availability of external conditions suitable for the successful exercise of the competence, the agent might count as having the innermost competence while lacking the relevant, fine-grained, complete competence.

Context-sensitivity, however, needs to be managed with care. Firstly, it may well suggest an ontological distinction between *intrinsic* and *extrinsic* dispositions so that complete competences would be classified as being part of the latter variety —properties that the subject acquires and loses without undergoing any intrinsic change. This claim would be at odds with one of the paradigm marks of dispositionality: *intrinsicity*. Second, context-sensitivity could easily be associated with the *success thesis*, namely with the claim that, since S exercises an ability to F only if the action to which the ability is directed is successfully performed, S would lack an ability to F if the situation or shape were not suitable for cognitive success due to the agent's relevant competence. One problem with the success thesis is that it flies in the face of common sense intuitions that seem to conceive abilities as *portable properties*. A second source of trouble comes from the single manifestation-type conception of abilities to which this view seems committed. This conception and the 'hub-and-spokes' model that many power theorists propose do not go together well.

Finally, if we shift from competences to successful events such as knowledge, the context-sensitivity of knowledge could be developed into an account that conceives the modality inherent to knowledge as the modality of subjunctive conditionals and easy possibilities, and that, thus sees knowledge as *not being fully anchored* in the cognitive

powers of the subject. Supporters of anti-luck virtue epistemology (ALVE, for short) take this route. There are, then, two problems. One is a question about the *nature* of competences, which revolves around whether and to what extent they are dependent on external factors. Also, there is the question about the context-sensitivity of *successful events*, which ties in with the issue of whether those events are *manifestations* of powers of the actual world or whether they are a matter of what happens in modally close possible worlds. On the latter view, the property of being safe as instantiated by a belief does *not* supervene on cognitive features of the believer, and knowledge is only partially grounded in actuality.

The first objective of this paper is thus to meet the challenge of ALVE while sharing with its advocates the view that competences are modally robust across contexts.

As a second objective, this paper aims at providing an *ontological background* for the context-sensitivity of epistemic competences such that context-sensitivity would be compatible with the following three theses: (i) cognitive competences are intrinsic properties, (ii) competences (generally) are multi-track dispositions whose powerful nature is not exhausted by a single-track manifestation-type, and (iii) the modal nature of epistemic virtues is that of potentiality.

As I see it, the question is about how to provide a thicker ontological base than meagre potentiality for pragmatic mechanisms to pick out dispositions. It is thus an issue of how to be realistic about the truth-makers of fine-tuned dispositional terms without mapping dispositions according to the context-sensitivity that permeates our language about powers. Context-dependence is an artefact of language. There are, however, ontological features of dispositions that make it possible to bridge the gap between bare potentiality and pragmatic regimentation. The scope of a dispositional term may well be pragmatically selected. However, even so, the *proportional nature* and the *conditions built into the competence for its proper manifestation* are objective features.

In section 1, I will present the epistemic Twin Earth argument against Sosa's robust virtue epistemology which was recently proposed by Jesper Kallestrup and Duncan Pritchard (2016). In section 2, it is explained how ALVE is unable to avoid the problem of finks and provide the appropriate *ordering source* to capture the modal force of knowledge. This failure of anti-luck virtue epistemology to accommodate cognitive competences and thus, to offer a satisfactory account of knowledge, serves as a foil to flesh out my proposal. On this alternative account, *gradability* and *reciprocity* being the intrinsic features that lay bare the right ordering source for abilities and their manifestations, they offer a non-contextual ontological base for context-sensitivity. Finally, in section 3, I will deal with the problem of the individuation of cognitive powers. My aim here is to defend a model according to which multi-track powers are invariant across possible cases and scenarios, as well as to offer a diagnosis of why intuitions on this topic are often fluctuating and conflicting. This paper thus aims at making explicit the *ontological underpinnings of knowledge* in a way that it is consistent with Sosa's fully dispositional virtue epistemology.

NO NORM FOR (NON-ASSERTED) IMPLICATURES

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Several authors argue that there is a constitutive norm of assertion, for instance a knowledge norm (e.g. Williamson 2000). An interesting question is whether there is also a constitutive norm for the act of communicating contents indirectly, in particular as Gricean implicatures. Green (2017) has recently proposed that there is such a norm for implicatures, although it sets a weaker epistemic standard than the norm of assertion. In this paper, I argue against this type of proposal. My claim is that there are no constitutive norms governing the communication of contents in indirect ways, when such contents are not asserted. I will grant that, as happens in general with intentional actions, these indirect communicative acts may be subject to normative assessment on different levels (for instance, regarding their moral or prudential appropriateness, or their politeness). However, the norms underlying such assessments are not distinctive and constitutive of this type of indirect, non-assertoric communicative act.

I start by distinguishing indirect assertions from non-assertoric acts in which some content is intended to be communicated indirectly to an audience. Following García-Carpintero (forthcoming), I say that an assertion of p is indirect when it is not made by uttering the type of declarative sentence that by default, in standard contexts, expresses such a proposition. I will allow that Gricean conversational implicatures can sometimes count as indirectly asserted. However, not all propositional contents communicated indirectly should be seen as asserted. I will argue that a communicative act counts as assertoric only if it gets recorded in the conversational scoreboard as a proposal to add some proposition to the common ground of the conversation. There can be contents that are successfully communicated, in the sense that the members of the audience adopt the relevant attitudes by virtue of recognizing the communicative intentions of the speaker, but do not get registered in the conversational scoreboard.

Following Camp (2006), I propose that whether a content communicated indirectly gets to be recorded in the public conversational scoreboard, and thereby may count as asserted, depends on the cooperativeness of the participants in the conversation. In cooperative contexts, participants may be disposed to register as asserted contents far beyond the literal meaning of the sentence used (for instance metaphors or Gricean implicatures). By contrast, in more adversarial scenarios, it may happen that the audience or the speaker are only willing to acknowledge contents directly asserted (that is, contents closely related to the conventional meaning of the sentence uttered).

On the view I will defend, assertion is constitutively subject to a social norm, that is a norm sustained by the sanctioning behavior of the participants in the practice (Fricker 2017). As a result of this norm, asserters become committed to their audience to the truth of what is asserted. Thus, if a speaker makes a false assertion, the audience becomes entitled to complain, feel wronged and even demand that the speaker retracts her assertion. This commitment is not directly dependent on moral or prudential considerations, and is undertaken even when there is no expectation that the speaker's audience will believe what she says (e.g. in bald-faced lies).

I will argue that the norm of assertion governs public assertoric updates to the conversational scoreboard, in which contents are proposed to be added to the

conversational common ground. Therefore, assertoric commitments are acquired only when the speaker's communicative act is recorded in the scoreboard of the conversation. Speakers, however, may manage to get across some content indirectly while avoiding its being registered in the public score of the conversation and its being recognized as asserted. When speakers do so, they do not undertake the commitments associated with asserting, thereby escaping the jurisdiction of the norm of assertion. If a speaker is attributed a commitment to the truth of a content that has not been recorded in the conversational scoreboard, she can disavow such an attribution by claiming to be committed only to those contents she counts as endorsing according to the public score of the conversation. Typically, it will be difficult for speakers to disavow a commitment to contents close to the literal, conventional meaning of the sentence uttered, without retracting their original speech act (Camp 2006). However, if the commitment attributed is to a content expressed indirectly, the speaker will often be in a position to complain successfully against having such a content on the record as asserted by her.

To be sure, speakers who communicate contents indirectly without asserting them can still be subject to normative evaluation and criticism, for instance on moral grounds. Nevertheless, these evaluations will not derive from the constitutive norm of assertion, and the audience will not be in a position to criticize the speaker's communicative act as defective qua assertion. It is useful here to compare assertions with legal contracts (or promises). If an agent signs a contract to the effect that she will bring about some outcome, she undertakes a legal commitment to do so. The other signatories will be entitled to complain legally in case she does not honor the contract. This does not need to happen if an agent generates intentionally certain expectations in her addressee without becoming contractually bound to fulfill them. In these cases, the addressee is not entitled to the same type of complaint and redress as when her expectations are backed by a contract (regardless of whether the agent is morally blameworthy for having created misleading expectations).

My contention is that the norm of assertion works like a contract in that it makes the asserter publicly bound by a commitment to her targeted audience. Indirect, non-assertoric communication provides a way for speakers to get across contents to their audience without undertaking the public commitments generated by assertions. Of course, such non-asserted contents will not be added to the common ground of the conversation, but it may be that the speaker's main goal is only to get the audience to adopt certain attitudes, even if they are not reflected in the conversational common ground.

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COMMON SENSE EPISTEMOLOGY AS A GENERATIVIST META-PHILOSOPHY

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In recent decades, many epistemologists have found some inspiration in Thomas Reid and the “common sense tradition” of epistemology, and many philosophers have held the view that a correct meta-philosophy should have a certain degree of “respect” for common sense (see e.g. Lewis 1986, sect. 2.8). But the common sense tradition contains a variety of arguments, in which the notion of “common sense” plays very different roles. Common Sense beliefs are sometimes conceived as highly intuitive beliefs, sometimes as universal, or natural, or epistemically basic, or chronologically prior, or known to be known, etc.

The line of argument I want to develop here is the conception of Common Sense as the system of beliefs which constitutes, chronologically speaking, the starting point of all philosophical enquiry. According to Reid, this chronological antecedence gives common sense beliefs a “jus quaesitum, or a right of ancient possession, which ought to stand good till it be overturned” (Reid 1788 IV, 6). This chronological strategy hasn’t been defended by recent epistemologists. My intention is to develop a modernized version of this line of argument, using the resources of contemporary dynamic epistemology.

The revised argument offers an original and modest meta-philosophy of common sense according to which every philosophical system must be conceived as ultimately derivable from the common sense (i.e. the original) system through a finite series of justified belief revisions.

In the first part of the presentation, I will set in place the basic concepts of dynamic epistemology that are needed for the argument. Here, I draw on Isaac Levi’s work (Levi 1980), which draws attention to revisions of beliefs. A belief revision is a process by which the agent moves from one system of beliefs S_n (what Levi calls a “corpus”) to another system S_{n+1} . And, as Levi notes, a belief revision can be justified or unjustified in a sense which has nothing to do with the traditional synchronic (or foundationalist) notion of justification. To distinguish clearly between synchronic justification and diachronic justification, I call the former support and the latter motivation:

- a belief state can be supported by another belief (by inference) and maybe also basically by some experiences (like perceptual experiences)
- a revision of one’s system of belief S_n can be motivated by an inconsistency or an incoherence within S_n .

In dynamic epistemology, the central question is not whether a given belief is supported or not, within the agent’s system of beliefs S_n . The central question is whether the move from S_{n-1} to S_n was (or was not) motivated. This approach is also very close to what Harman develops under the label: “the coherence theory of belief revision” (Harman 1986, 32).

An important difference with Isaac Levi’s (and other dynamic epistemic logicians’) approach is that I don’t take systems of beliefs to be closed under deduction, because I want to leave open the possibility that the agent possesses (unbeknownst to her) sets of inconsistent beliefs: this is important in order to account for philosophical arguments which have the form of trilemmas for instance (where the argument shows to the agent that she has three inconsistent beliefs, and the inconsistency in itself constitutes a motivation – in our technical sense – to adopt a revised system of belief).

One important feature that I keep from Levi's work is the demand that a revision of system S_n to S_{n+1} must be motivated by a principle which is present in S_n itself. (I call this the "principle of internal motivation").

In the second part, I will apply this framework to the idea of Common Sense as a first or original system of beliefs S_0 .

Suppose an agent starts with the belief system S_0 , then any system S_1 (successor of S_0) can only be motivated by principles within S_0 (and some internal tension – inconsistency or incoherence – within S_0). And more generally any later belief system S_n can be ultimately well motivated only if it is derivable, through a finite series of motivated revisions, from the principles of the original system S_0 .

It is important to note here that this strategy is not strongly "conservative": S_n may differ a lot from S_0 , and indeed may have abandoned all of S_0 's beliefs. The requisite is only that it should be derivable from S_0 through a series of motivated revisions.

What I call "Common Sense" is the prephilosophical system of belief S_{cs} that everyone starts from. (Of course, it would probably require a high degree of idealisation to suppose that everyone starts with the same set of beliefs. So, in a less idealized version, S_{cs} is defined as the subset that is the intersection of all S_0 s.) I introduce the idea that generally a philosopher who proposes an argument tries (or should try) to make it in principle relevant to everyone: this means, in our framework, that generally, philosophers propose arguments which "appeal to common sense", or in other words, arguments which should be derivable through a finite series of motivated steps from the subset S_{cs} of everyone's S_0 .

This set up gives the basics of a conception of philosophical method (a common sense meta-philosophy): every philosophical argument should be presented as derived, through a finite series of motivated revisions, from a set of beliefs that are part of common sense. In reference to Chomsky's Universal Grammar hypothesis, I call this meta-philosophy a generativist meta-philosophy.

This meta-philosophy is different from Richard Double's (1996) highly conservative definition of a common sense meta-philosophy (according to which the only purpose of philosophical activity would be to preserve common sense beliefs, come what may, and provide underpinnings for them). In my common sense meta-philosophy, common sense beliefs can be revised; the constraint is only that any revision of common sense must be ultimately "generated from" (or "traced back to") principles of common sense itself, through a series of motivated revisions.

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PRAGMATICS, LEVELS OF MEANING, AND SPEAKER COMMITMENT

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What a speaker directly communicates or ‘says’, as opposed to implicates, is widely held to go beyond Grice’s notion of ‘what is said’, which was equated with the linguistically encoded meaning of the utterance after reference assignment and disambiguation. This has led many theorists (e.g. Sperber & Wilson 1995, Carston 2002, Recanati 2004), referred to here as ‘contextualists’, to posit that this level of utterance meaning is a hybrid of linguistically encoded meaning and both linguistically- and pragmatically-mandated pragmatically recovered meaning.

The main arguments for the contextualist view that what is said is the result of extensive enrichment of linguistic meaning are (a) that truth-value judgments depend on this enriched meaning (henceforth ‘explicature’) rather than any more minimal meaning, and (b) that more minimal meanings (the Gricean what is said, or the minimal propositions posited by Minimalists such as Borg 2004 and Cappelen & Lepore 2005) are explanatorily redundant, whereas explicature has a role to play in the explanation of how we derive the overall speaker’s meaning, in that it provides the inferential warrant for implicatures.

The use of truth-value judgments as a method of individuating explicatures has been criticised recently by Borg (2016). She argues that the truth-value judgment does not uncover the explicature; instead, it is the process of making the truth-value judgment that creates the putative explicature. That is, the literal meaning is enriched not as part of the process of utterance comprehension, but only subsequently, in order to judge whether the utterance is true or false.

Borg (2017), Michaelson (2016), Weissman and Terkourafi (2019), and others, argue that the lying-misleading distinction tracks the saying-implicating distinction better than truth-value judgment tasks do. The idea is that saying something false with the intention to deceive is lying, whereas implicating it is misleading. Borg (2016, 2017) claims that people’s intuitions about whether a speaker has lied or merely misled generally favour the more minimal proposition over explicature as the correct notion of what is said. If this is correct, these judgments are evidence of an explanatory role for minimal content.

We argue that the lying-misleading test shares essentially the same flaw as truth-value judgments: the process of judging whether the speaker lied does not uncover communicated content, but instead encourages the judge to extract the minimal content recoverable by linguistic decoding (plus the linguistically-mandated processes of reference assignment and disambiguation), because this minimal content, being largely free of pragmatic inference, is what the judge is in a position to indisputably hold the speaker responsible for. In fact, the problem may be more likely to arise in judgments of lying vs. misleading, as opposed to mere truth vs. falsity, because, as Weissman and Terkourafi (2019: 223) point out: “precisely because accusations of lying are consequential and not to be made lightly, people may be driven to sharpen their intuitions regarding whether some material is part of an utterance’s truth-conditional content when asked whether a speaker who asserted this material has lied.”

Given the doubts expressed above about whether truth-value or lying/misleading judgments are singling out any level of content that is entertained by the hearer as part of the utterance comprehension process (as opposed to being recovered upon subsequent reflection on whether the speaker was being truthful), we argue instead for a more indirect

method of gauging what hearers entertain as having been 'said'. Using uncontroversial examples of saying (that is, cases that do not involve pragmatic enrichment), presupposing, and implicating, Mazzarella et al (2018) measured the reputational costs incurred by speakers who deliberately conveyed something false, finding that, all else being equal, people are "significantly more likely to selectively trust the speaker who implicated p than the speaker who asserted [= 'said'] or presupposed p ".

We present the results of a study comparing explicature to the Gricean what is said and to implicatures, using examples such as (1):

1. a. You have time.
1. b. You have time to organise a focus group.
1. c. A focus group is a good idea.

(1c) implicates that the recipient has time to organise a focus group; in (a) this is part of explicature; in (b), it is said in the Gricean sense. Participants read a story that established a high-stakes context, then saw two testimonies – e.g. (1a) and (1c) – then answered a question to gauge their trust in each speaker. In line with contextualism, we predicted that pragmatically inferred but explicated material, as in (a), would be treated by participants as being committed to by the sender to a similar degree as is characteristic of content that is linguistically encoded, or involves only reference assignment and disambiguation, as in (b). We also predicted that the sender will be treated as significantly less committed to implicatures, as in (c). Both predictions were borne out. We discuss the implications for the debate between contextualists and minimalists about what levels of meaning feature in the comprehension process.

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THE CONTINGENT VALUE OF RATIONALITY

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There is an ongoing debate on the normativity of rationality that has been significantly enriched in the last years. Many authors both in epistemology as well as in ethics assume that rationality ought to be necessarily normative. That is, that we have to be rational regardless of the effects rational behavior may have on us and our relation to our environment. This seems to conflict with the intuition that any vindicative explanation of the

normativity of rationality should rely on claims about what is promoted by rationality and the ways in which it does so. I will call this the 'practical value' of rationality.

As Cowie (2014) has pointed out, there is an initial presumption in favor of explaining the normativity of rationality in purely practical terms. After all, most authors acknowledge that rationality has practical value. On the one hand, claims about the valuable properties in rationality that are detached from practical value seem to overdetermine its normative nature. The appeal to practical value seems enough to explain why rationality is normative. Adding other considerations seems unjustified. On the other hand, postulating normative properties fully detached from practical value leads to an odd overlap: since the advocate of the intrinsic value detached from any practical value acknowledges that rationality has practical value, he is forced to admit that practical and intrinsic value overlap on rational conduct in a mysterious way as both run parallel to one another but we cannot explain the appearance of one in terms of the other.

In order to defend that rationality is normative regardless of its practical value, some authors have stacked to the intuition that there is something valuable in behaving rationally even in those hypothetical contexts of radical skepticism in which, *ex hypothesis*, rationality has no practical value at all. Recently Sylvan (forthcoming) has presented an interesting view that takes this path. Following Hurka's (2003) value theory, he claims that manifesting respect for truth is valuable because it is the appropriate way of relating to truth. Manifestations of respect for truth come in degrees, where the highest would involve forming true beliefs by procedures that manifest respect for truth. However, even if the subject fails to manifest respect for truth in this way, there are degraded forms of respect such as believing rationally. Thus, according to Sylvan, we have to be rational regardless of its practical value (and therefore also in contexts of radical skepticism) because irrationality involves a form of disrespect to truth.

My goal is that of showing that the claim that rationality retains its worth in skeptic contexts is way less plausible than what it seems at first view. Instead, I will argue that its plausibility relies on not distinguishing between cases in which the agent fails to obtain the goods that are usually provided by rationality (epistemic and practical success) because one is facing an anomalous situation that provides him with an excuse, from a very different type of cases in which reason (understood as a set of psychological dispositions) is so disconnected from the environment that it is systematically unfitted to bring about epistemic or practical success.

In order to illustrate this I will consider the following example: Let us suppose that, as some theist philosophers and theologians (Plantinga and Calvin among them) have argued, human

beings enjoy a faculty called 'sensus divinitatis' which involves a set of powers that allow us to communicate with God. If God exists and we can relate to him in this way then we obviously have very strong reasons in favor of cultivating and protecting our employment of *sensus divinitatis*. This can explain why we still see something valuable in our commitment to the appropriate use of *sensus divinitatis* in cases in which we fail to make good use of it because of factors that we cannot control.

However, does manifesting respect for God by cultivating *sensus divinitatis* have any real value in a godless world? It does not seem so. We can excuse the reasonable theist who believes to be manifesting respect for God by cultivating *sensus divinitatis*, but there is a sense in which it is obvious that there is nothing good, even less mandatory, in the believer's

behavior. To claim that *sensus divinitatis* retains worth in such world implies a form of fetishism, by which value is placed on an object in such a way that it is not beneficial for anyone.

My claim is that rationality operates in an analogous way in worlds of radical skepticism. If the connection between rationality and epistemic and practical success is merely apparent, then there cannot be anything genuinely valuable in being rational in that world. The set of dispositions that play valuable functions for the agent in his environment are unable to perform such a role in skeptic worlds. In those worlds behaving rationally is not a good way to interact with the environment and thus to consider it normative is fetishistic.

If this is so then the normativity of rationality is a contingent fact: the psychological dispositions we characterize as rational are valuable only in those worlds in which they retain practical value. Why are they valuable in our world even if they sometimes lead us to error? Because, according to Graham's etiological account of functions, it is in virtue of the proliferation of normal circumstances in non-skeptic worlds, and therefore the tendency of rationality to produce valuable outcomes, what explains the perseverance of rational dispositions of rational dispositions, both at psycho-biological and at socio-cultural levels. An explanation that would not be available for skeptic worlds but nevertheless helps us elaborate a vindicative history of rationality.

I will conclude then that the intrinsic value of rationality cannot be vindicated without appealing to its practical value. We ought to search for a teleological theory of rationality that explains why it is normative in terms of how, given our constitution and environment, it contributes to the goods of human life.

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ON COGNITIVE AFFORDANCES

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Affordances are opportunities for action presented to an organism in a certain environment and they are always relative to the organism's abilities (Gibson 1979)—a tree is climbable to an organism capable of climbing, a teapot is graspable to someone capable of grasping it, etc. It is a theoretical concept that can be cashed out linguistically by the structure [verb]—able: a stone is perceived as throw—able, or an apple as eat—able. The notion of affordance has received a great deal of interest and has functioned as a key concept in

ecological psychology, cognitive psychology and neuroscience, as well as in music and industrial design.

Research on affordances has been strictly developed in the domain of *perceptual* experiences and *bodily* actions, thus somehow assuming that there are no affordances in other domains. It is the aim of this paper to attempt to make the case that this assumption need not be maintained and so there is room for arguing that this notion can be extended to thinking or cognition in useful ways. First, I make the case for cognitive affordances and, second, I argue that they function as motivating reasons for action, thus playing a relevant rational role in our cognitive life. The fact that they present this role also gives an argument for thinking that cognitive affordances are experienced.

Let's consider these two examples:

CALCULATION: a subject entertains the thought that she should arrive at 8am at the train station and she is inclined to calculate the time at which she should leave home in order to achieve that aim.

MIND-WANDERING: a subject is engaged in mind-wandering and at a certain moment a pattern of thoughts produces a new idea that "calls" for being reflected upon.

The common structure underlying these two cases is the following: x affords φ -ing, where x is a cognitive element and φ is a certain mental action. In CALCULATION, x is the thought *I should arrive at 8am at the station* and φ is the mental action of *calculating* the time at which I should leave home in order to get to the station. In MIND-WANDERING, x is an idea and φ the mental action of *reflecting* on it. The x can involve different elements of the mind insofar they afford a certain kind of action, and these elements can be characterised as *cognitive affordances*. Cognitive affordances, thus described, involve mental elements being opportunities for mental action.

In contrast with the perceptual domain, mental actions are not constrained in the same way by the environment of the subject and so the question arises as to what can provide constraints in the affordance-structure of cognition. I explore the question of *why* certain affordances are salient and not others for a certain subject, and argue that there are cases in which the previous intention of the subject explains this salience, whereas there are other cases (as in creative thinking), where the affordance "spontaneously" demands a certain course of action.

In contrast with other similar attempts to extend the notion of affordances (Scarantino 2003, Matthen 2005, McClelland 2014, 2019), my approach doesn't restrict affordances to *perceived* affordances but rather claims that cognitive affordances are *experienced* elements, that is, something the subject experiences but not necessarily of a perceptual nature. I provide an argument to the conclusion that cognitive affordances are experienced based on a rational role they play in our minds. Roughly, the argument goes as follows. When rationalizing an action, the afforded preceding episode can function as a *reason* the subject adduces for which she acted as she did. In the case of CALCULATION: why did the subject calculate the time? Because (she thinks) she should arrive at the station at 8. In the case of MIND-WANDERING: why did the subject reflect on an idea? Because an idea called her attention. The reasons contained in these answers are usually called *motivating reasons*, that is, reasons that the agent takes to favor her action, and in light of which she acts. Motivating reasons are distinct from normative reasons and explanatory reasons (Alvarez

2010). Normative reasons justify someone's ϕ -ing, while explanatory reasons explain why someone ϕ -ed. Cognitive affordances can play the role of motivating reasons precisely because they are part of what is offered as a response to the question why the subject did the action she did. In the two cases presented, there is a reason for the subject to act in this way (motivating reason) given the fact that this action was presented to her as possible within her abilities (cognitive affordance). For one to be motivated to act in certain way, "the reason must be something the agent is at some level aware of." (Alvarez 2010: 129). I further clarify the kind of awareness involved here, discuss possible general objections and conclude with some implications of the cognitive affordance hypothesis.

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THE MIRROR THESIS OF CONSENT

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When we consent to something (e.g. a medical procedure, sex, a tattoo), we permit people to act in ways that would otherwise be legally or morally impermissible. However, in order for consent to be valid, certain conditions must be met. In this presentation, I discuss the condition that consent needs to be *voluntary*, i.e. that a person give his consent free of pressure, coercion, or any other seriously controlling influence. More specifically, I will address the question as to which influences on a potential consentor's decision-making coerce or control him in a way so as to vitiate his consent. I will answer that influences vitiate consent only if exerting the influence shares three features with the wrong committed when, for instance, a physician performs surgery on a competent patient without that patient's consent. I will call this claim the *Mirror Thesis* because it states that the features of the wrong required to vitiate consent, e.g. blackmail, mirror certain features of the wrong of performing a certain act without consent, e.g. assault.

TOO QUEER? ASEXUALITY MEETS SEX POSITIVITY

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Broadly, the term ‘asexual’ refers to persons who do not experience sexual arousal or who, despite sexual arousal, choose not to engage in sexual activity. These people may or may not experience romantic feelings for others. Asexuality remains a relatively unknown, and perhaps worse, a largely misunderstood phenomenon. Some typical misconceptions include the notion that an asexual is someone who is a “closeted” homosexual or a person who “has yet to find the right person.” More radically, asexual persons can be wrongly associated with the recent uprising of “incels” or “involuntary celibates” (persons desiring, but unable to secure sexual or romantic partners). “Inceldom” is often characterized by misogyny, resentment, a sense of entitlement to sex, and the endorsement of violence against people who are sexually active. Recent media coverage of violent incel cases includes the 2014 US shooting massacre undertaken by Elliot Rodger, for example. Scholarship pertaining to asexuality is therefore not only of importance to the natural or social sciences, but is also of moral importance; constraints and enablements are placed on individuals who are, or who are taken to be, asexual. When asexual persons are misunderstood, constraints placed upon them can be not only epistemically unwarranted, but unethical and oppressive.

Perhaps best described in the works of Foucault, Western society emphasizes “compulsory sexuality” – the idea that human beings are “naturally sexual.” Certainly, “normal” bodies are not just “for sex,” but sex is part of what a “normal” body desires or engages in. In turn, an asexual person may wonder, “What is my body for? What am I for?” Others too may wonder of a declared or taken to be asexual person, “What is their body for?” or more radically, “What is an asexual “for”? What do they do? What do I do with them? How am I to behave around them?” Compulsory sexuality coupled with the current trend of “sex positivity” (at least in the West) and its accompanying proliferation of ways to understand or identify one’s sexuality (i.e., as “pansexual,” “demisexual,” etc.), while considered emancipatory by some, can serve to reinforce the notion that there is something *wrong* with asexual people. Further scholarship pertaining to asexuality is therefore not only of importance to the natural or social sciences, but is also of moral importance since, to use Ásta’s language from *Categories We Live By* (2018), constraints and enablements are placed on individuals who are, or who are taken to be, asexual. When asexual persons are misunderstood, constraints placed upon them can be not only be epistemically unwarranted, but unethical and oppressive.

Empirical and psychological investigations are but one dimension of capturing the meaning and the constraints and enablements that follow from “being asexual” or “being asexually embodied.” In Ian Hacking’s terms, asexual people are also subject to the looping effect. Being characterized as asexual by oneself or by others, an individual has some capacity to negotiate the meaning of that characterization - to accept, reject, or alter it. Using Beauvoir’s analysis of “frigidity” in *The Second Sex* (1949) is useful in providing a lens through which to reconceptualize asexuality by means of ideology critique. Beauvoir reconstructs frigidity as an active resistance to one’s embodied social situation rather than an intrinsic passive pathology, though asexuality may characterize both cases. I hope to further underscore Beauvoir’s important rearticulation of frigidity by applying her analysis to asexuality. I also buttress Beauvoir’s reading with Catherine MacKinnon’s work on

pornography and Sally Haslanger's work in *Resisting Reality* (2012) on ameliorative social constructionist programs (programs that ask what do "we" want the concept of, in this case, "asexual" to represent or do?).

THINKING THE IMPERCEIVABLE: THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS IN PHILOSOPHY OF AUDITORY PERCEPTION

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The thought experiment, as a device for thinking about counterfactual scenarios that are not necessarily testable, has been employed in philosophy since the antiquity. In *De Rerum Natura* (1.951–987) Lucretius provides one of the most intriguing example of the ancient age deploying it to support his vision about the infiniteness of space. In the history of philosophy and certain sciences (like physics), thought experiments have played a central role. These little stories have become well-known independently of the main arguments that they are meant to support. For example, Schrödinger's cat or Maxwell's demon are now popular also among people who are not specialists in quantum physic or in thermodynamics.

The widespread use of thought experiments in the philosophical and scientific literatures during the centuries has lead many researchers to think about their roles, functions and their argumentative and scientific value. In the last years, a vast debate has bloomed about them and their various aspects. The one of the goals of these disquisitions is to understand if they can tell us something about the real world and, if they can, how they achieve this.

Presenting the main positions displayed in the literature about thought experiments, Brown and Fehige (2014) observe that that debate on this topic is closely related to the one on the role of intuitions. Indeed, usually authors employ counterfactual scenarios with the conviction that univocal reactions to them can constitute an argument against or in favour a certain position. Some philosophers, like Wilkes (1988), have suggested that disciplines like psychology can furnish a great variety of real cases that are suitable to test our intuitions, without the need of creating nonassessable stories. However, real situations often are too peculiar and complex to allow philosophers to work only on one specific aspect at a time and to develop a general theory. Thought experiments are valuable instrument to create an occasion to reflect on particular questions and to generalise the conclusions. This seems particularly true if we focus in particular on the study of perception, a kind of experience that involves first-hand impressions. In cases in which we are working on the phenomenology of something, even the impossibility to have a clear image of the scenario expressed in the thought experiment can lead us to a very promising conclusions.

The aim of my talk is to outline the specific role that thought experiments have in the study of auditory perception. I will employ a bottom-up approach, on the basis of the study of two peculiar thought experiments. I will argue that these cases offer a challenging but promising starting point for discussions in the philosophy of perception and metaphilosophy.

The first case that I want to analyse is the case of a world without any spatial dimensions presented by Strawson in the second chapter of *Individuals* (1959). This thought experiment was created to clarify metaphysical issues, and in particular, to bring on considerations related to the identification of individual entities. Instead, it marked the beginning of the

contemporary interest in the world of sounds. Against Hacking (1993) suggestion that thought experiments have only one purpose, Strawson's TE had a peculiar historical role raising a debate about perception that did not exist before and that was not the target of his original creator. While Strawson's view on individual sounds went on to involve Swanson (1967) and Evans (1980), who took the thought experiment as a given, I want to argue that Strawson's non-spatial world suggests us to consider an imperceivable situation that cannot be imagined. I want to a) explore the notion of the impossible imagination relevant in this context and b) suggest that it was the consideration of this impossibility that led to the flourishing of spatial theories in the debate on sounds as Casati and Dokic (2014) reconstructed. Mutatis mutandis Strawson's non-spatial world seems to have the same problems as Chalmers' (1996) zombie TE. What matters here is the relation between the notion of "being conceivable" and "being imaginable". On the one side, I want to point out that even in cases in which the thought experiments highlight problems related to some type of impossibility they are still conducing us to promising results. On the other side, I want to suggest that in the peculiar context of the philosophy of perception a good criterion for identifying good scenarios where it is possible to test our perceptual intuition should be grounded in the notion of perceptual imaginability.

The second case that I want to present is the TE of sounds in a vacuum. It was introduced for the first time in Berkeley's *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous in opposition to Sceptics and Atheists* (1713), but it was re-elaborated and introduced in the contemporary debate on the metaphysics of sounds by Casati and Dokic in their *La philosophie du son* (1994, 2014). Also in that case, the thought experiment was created to find an answer to a metaphysical issue but shifted to become the main point of the discussion between Casati and Dokic and O'Callaghan (2007). These authors wanted to know if the presence of a medium is a necessary condition for the existence of a sound, or in other words, if a sound is a relational event that included some sort of vibrating substance. They soon realised that the thought experiment cannot provide a certain answer to this question, but it can test properly our intuition on the way in which our perception works (Bregman 1990). This idea is confirmed by the associations that Casati and Dokic drew between the auditory case presented and the real cases of visual tunnel effects. The unexpected reactions to this scenario led these philosophers to suggest other reasons to support their theories, abandoning one of the historically most used argument in the debate on sounds. However, I will argue that the thought experiment leads us to explore more deeply the relation between metaphysics and perception in the case of audition.

RADICAL ENACTIVISM, PRIMITIVE INTENTIONALITY AND BIOLOGICAL NORMATIVITY

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Two main pillars of radical enactivism (RE hereinafter) are (1) to be radical, *i.e.*, to dissociate intentionality, mentality and cognition from representation. (2) To be enactivist, *i.e.*, to endorse the view according to which motion, action, agency, activity or dynamics is constitutive of intentionality, mentality and cognition. It is not difficult to discover a close

linkage between the two tenets. After all, one crucial way to argue against representational theories of mind is to state that cognitive agents are dynamic -not symbolic- systems (see van Gelder and Port, 1995 and Chemero, 2013). There is also an important divergence that worth pursuing. On the one hand, in attempting to reject the equivalence between intentionality and representation, RE theorists assume that there is a kind of primitive intentionality or directionality that does not require the attribution of contents or correctness conditions. On the other, the attempt to explain cognitive agents as dynamic systems let to the following impasse: even assuming that being representational is not the mark of cognition, mentality and intentionality, there still should be a characteristic feature that distinguish it from other dynamical systems, even if the difference is a matter of grades and not of levels. After all, although maybe all cognitive systems are dynamic, for sure not all (physical, biological or computational) dynamic systems are cognitive. One way to state that characteristic feature -without using directly the notion of representation- is to point out that cognition is intrinsically a normative phenomenon. If that story is approximately true, RE theorists would confront the following issue: they urge us to admit that there is a kind of directionality that does not entail the attribution of correctness conditions and to admit that to be in a cognitive state requires to be in a state that is normative, *i.e.*, to be in a state that can be corrected by how the world is.

Fortunately, there are some routes out of the previous dilemma. A way out will be to stay very radical. That is, to maintain that neither cognition nor intentionality nor mentality are intrinsically normative phenomena. That denial either implies to endorse a strict equivalence between dynamic and cognitive systems and to eliminate the notion of intentionality from the vocabulary of cognitive science, or demands to point to other features in order to demark the limits. Since RE theorists do not stay as radical as to deny a role for the notion of normativity, I wont pursue this nihilist path either.

Another way out will be to argue that there is a kind of normativity whose structure is not characterized in terms of correctness conditions. So for example, Hutto and Myin (2017) relay on Millikan's naturalistic approach to distinguish between semantic and biological normativity. They avoid Millikan's target -that is, to provide an account of mental representation- but endorse her theoretical apparatus and use it to explain a putative primitive contentless directionality. Millikan's account focuses on consumer devices as interpreters that -under normal conditions- perform proper functions determined by its phylogenetic record. Proper functions are not specified by determining what the consumer devices actually or dispositionally do, but to what they are supposed to do accordingly to biological norms given some normal conditions of covariance. Even if those devices don't actually or dispositionally perform its function- they still have a proper function that should or are supposed to perform. A "should" with a normative force, but a natural "should".

Another example is Schlicht (2018), according to him: Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1991) autopoietic enactivism entails the notion of biological purposes. Briefly, an organism is *directed* towards features in its environment in virtue of self-sustaining processes (self-organization, self-production, self-repairmen) that sustain the satisfaction of its biological needs. Those needs acquire a biological meaning or value for the organism survival.

In order to maintain the dissociation between intentionality and representation without denying its normative distinctive aspect, Schlicht, Hutto and Myin seems to claim then, that it is plausible to assume that some mechanisms have evolved for some purposes in the service of survival, so that the states of those mechanisms exhibit *intentionality* in the sense

of biological directedness. A kind of pointing not in the sense of representing nor in the sense of detecting, but in the sense of having the function to satisfy a natural target valuable for adaptation and evolution.

Now, it is worth remembering that the leading motivation to endorse the main pillars outlined above is to provide an account of how mental ascriptions fit within a natural description of the world. That is, to naturalize intentionality. It is worth remembering also that, as Fodor (1987) would say, the naturalistic project requires providing an account “in non-intentional, non-semantic, non-teleological, and in general, non-question-begging vocabulary”.

The objective of my presentation is to evaluate if the assumption of biological normativity is question begging. I will proceed developing the following argument: (1) one of the advantages of evolution theory is to avoid accounts in terms of putative purposes reducing them to accounts in terms of causes historically exhibited in the phylogenetic record. What an organism is supposed to do is explained in terms of what it historically did when functioned appropriately, not the other way, so that it is unnecessary to introduce attributions of values, meanings and purposes in the descriptions of natural history. (2) Biological norms, conceived as nomological clauses stated from a biological theory, are fully propositional statements subject to counterfactual evaluation. As Putnam (1992) has pointed out, counterfactual evaluations involve criteria of relevance based on intensional ascriptions of content. So then, using evolutionary theory to explain primitive intentionality either entails to excise attributions of values and meanings or presuppose attributions of content.

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VARIETIES OF DEEP DISAGREEMENT

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The notion of deep disagreement was introduced by Fogelin (1985) in his seminal paper and gained increasing attention in epistemology in the last years. Intuitively, deep disagreement arises if two parties fail to reach agreement about certain target propositions due to disagreement about fundamental “hinge” propositions and/or framework propositions about rules or conditions of rational argumentation.

Concerning deep disagreement, two questions are central. (1) What is deep disagreement, i.e. how can deep disagreement be characterized? (2) Is deep disagreement

really unresolvable? There are different views on the market about the nature of deep disagreement. Fogelin (1985, 8f) argues that deep disagreement “proceeds from a clash in underlying principles” and that it is disagreement about “a whole system of mutually supporting propositions (and paradigms, models, styles of acting and thinking) that constitute [...] a form of life.” Ranalli (forthcoming) distinguishes between a Wittgensteinian theory or hinge theory of disagreement, which Fogelin endorses, and a fundamental epistemic principle theory. Lynch (2010) defends a version of deep disagreement that arises from epistemic circularity. Aikin (forthcoming) stresses the analogy between deep disagreement and regress problems and the problem of the criterion.

Moreover, there is disagreement about whether deep disagreement is unresolvable or not. Fogelin (1985) was pessimistic and claims that “deep disagreements cannot be resolved through the use of argument, for they undercut the conditions essential to arguing.” Lynch (2010, 273) argues similarly: “Where there is deep epistemic disagreement over some fundamental principle, the disagreement has hit bedrock, the spade has turned.” Feldman (2005) in contrast argues that deep disagreement can be resolved in that both disagreeing parties suspend judgment about the target propositions.

This paper will clarify these two central questions concerning deep disagreement. First, it will elucidate the nature of deep disagreement by providing a taxonomy of various versions of deep disagreement, including deep disagreement relying on disagreement about the reliability of sources, on disagreement about premises of arguments, and on disagreement about the rationality (or cogency) of arguments. Second, it provides arguments for why these versions of deep disagreement cannot be resolved via argumentation, which are based on reinterpretations of skeptical arguments.

Typically, epistemologists identify two desiderata concerning skeptical arguments, first, to explain how the skeptical intuition arises, and second to argue why the skeptical argument is unsound (or why it is sound). Most epistemologists do not regard skeptical arguments as convincing and reject them as arguments about the limits of knowledge. Approaches to skeptical problems usually stop at this point due to the strong focus on knowledge in epistemology. This knowledge-centered approach ignores a further desideratum. Even if the skeptical conclusion can be reasonably rejected, skeptical arguments need not be entirely abandoned. As I will show, they can teach us a philosophically significant lesson, not about the limits of knowledge, but about the limits of persuasive argumentation and resolving disagreement. Here is the core idea of this paper:

The core idea

Problems and limitations of reasoning stressed by skeptical arguments do not affect our capacities to know but our capacities to persuasively argue and to resolve disagreement. Properly understood, these arguments do not teach a lesson concerning the limits of knowledge but concerning the limits of persuasive argumentation and of resolving disagreement.

Hence central skeptical arguments are unsound as arguments about the extent of knowledge but properly reinterpreted they are sound arguments about the limits of persuasive argumentation. Here are the versions of skeptical arguments reformulated as arguments about argumentation and disagreement and the crucial conclusions that can be drawn for deep disagreement:

Argument 1:

A speaker cannot convince a hearer via argumentation that is infinite, or circular, or stops at an arbitrary point.

Consequence: Persuasive argumentation requires that speaker and hearer agree about some premises or that the hearer trusts the speaker concerning some premises prior to engaging in argumentation.

Argument 2:

We cannot persuade via argumentation that involves infinite meta-regresses.

Consequence: Agreement about the rationality of arguments cannot be established via argumentation. Persuasion via argumentation requires agreement about rationality of arguments prior to engaging in argumentation.

Argument 3:

Bootstrapping is not a way of persuasively arguing that a source is reliable.

Consequence: Persuasion via argumentation requires agreement about the reliability of some sources prior to engaging in argumentation.

Summary: In this paper, I show that we have to distinguish at least three forms of deep disagreement. For each of these versions there is a reinterpretation of a skeptical argument that shows why this version of deep disagreement cannot be resolved via argumentation.

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THE POLITICAL ASPECT OF A RELATIONAL APPROACH TO AUTONOMY

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Personal autonomy can be defined in a number of ways, such as, leading a life that is authentic to our values and commitments, as an ideal of self-authorship concerning our lives, or as exercising self-government over our desires and goals. Nonetheless, the varied approaches to personal autonomy seem to share a tendency to separate their concerns about oppressive circumstances in the political sphere, from the conditions required for personal autonomy. Most accounts consider the political aspect of autonomy as part of a separate concept, namely, political autonomy. Similarly, academic discussions about democracy, do not usually explore the connection between every citizen's involvement in the political sphere, and their enjoyment of personal autonomy. Instead, they increasingly focus

on the analysis of, the electorate's capacities and interest to be involved in political decision-making, and the experts' role in those processes. Such debates address ideas like technocracy, epistocracy, and deliberative democracy.

This little attention to the connection between personal autonomy and the political has two problematic consequences. First, it obscures the effect over our lives of the limited involvement we experience in current democracies, especially for minorities. Secondly, it reduces the political sphere's capacity to foster our personal autonomy, given that it is where some of the most important collective decisions are made. Hence, I suggest we shift the focus of our debates in both areas to analyse the value and impact of the relations we hold in the political sphere over our personal autonomy.

The thesis I want to put forward is that personal autonomy has a political aspect. I argue that the relations we hold in the political sphere are partially constitutive of our personal autonomy. Therefore, the political sphere is a domain in which we should enjoy autonomy enhancing relations. I identify these as *relations of mutual recognition*, constituted by our enjoyment of non-domination and control.

In order to advance this view, I will show that if we acknowledge that social relations are important to our autonomy; our interactions within the political sphere can be no exception. Relational theories of autonomy are the most capable to stress this point because they recognise both the impact of our political standing for autonomy, and the relevance of the relations we engage in. Catriona Mackenzie's relational account is especially well suited to address the political aspect of autonomy.

Mackenzie argues that enjoying structural conditions that recognise our equal standing as authoritative agents is central to our development of autonomy. Still, relational views in general, and Mackenzie in particular, does not focus on the relations we want to promote in the political sphere. Even though she points out specific conditions to guarantee rights and liberties, her view seems unable to identify political conditions directed at improving the kind of *political relations* we experience. My proposal seeks to address this shortcoming.

The paper structure is as follows; I introduce the relational character of my view, locate Mackenzie's approach amongst other relational theories, and track the centrality of our political relations for her view. I move on to analyse her account's strengths and shortcomings to envisage political conditions for personal autonomy. I conclude by describing what I understand as relations of mutual recognition and their constitutive character.

Accordingly, I begin by presenting an overview of different relational theories of autonomy. Exploring their central features allows me to both, characterise this perspective, and to situate Mackenzie's account within the broader group. However, I will not compare the virtues of each account, either against each other, or when faced with other non-relational views. Instead, I want to show that relational approaches, Mackenzie's in particular, are capable of addressing the importance of our political standing for our autonomy. The latter, added to their understanding of autonomy's connection to the relations we hold in every domain, makes them able to unravel problems associated to oppressive political contexts, even if they do not focus on developing specific political conditions for autonomy.

My analysis of Mackenzie's view suggests that by distinguishing separate dimensions, she draws attention to gender-based structural inequalities and other forms of oppression. She shows how they impair our abilities to be self-determining by restricting our freedom and opportunities, and how they are internalised, constraining the agent's psychological freedom

and agency. However, her view seems to characterise the political sphere as a domain that can either harm or contribute to the development of our autonomy, but not as an area where we actually experience relations. I will discuss the features of Mackenzie's account that contribute to an analysis of those relations and ways of improving the political structure. More specifically, I will explore her political conditions for autonomy, whilst at the same time, pointing out the limitations of her view in that respect. The idea is to identify the areas where my approach to our political relations can elucidate political conditions for our autonomy. This, allows us to focus, not only on the political background of our social interactions, but precisely on developing the sort of political relations that can qualify as appropriate for our personal autonomy.

The final section of this paper will address the manner in which I take Mackenzie's understanding of recognition as key to characterise the kind of political relations required for our development and enjoyment of personal autonomy. I explain the importance of recognition for our political relations, and what amounts to *mutual recognition*. Finally, I introduce what I identify as the two conditions for establishing relations of mutual recognition, namely, non-domination and control.

Including the political aspect, offers a novel approach to autonomy that shows the importance of enjoying autonomy enhancing political relations. Likewise, having a clearer notion of the kind of political relations required for our autonomy can illuminate many of the issues regarding the justification of political authority, and the relevance of a democratic division of labour in the political sphere, which are part of my broader project.

INFALLIBILISM AND INQUIRY

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In this paper I show that, given that knowledge is the end of inquiry, infallibilism is true. My argument, in brief, is as follows. Suppose that knowledge is the end of inquiry. In this case, one successfully completes inquiry if and only if one comes to have knowledge. Furthermore, once one has knowledge, one acts incoherently if they continue to inquire (one can compare this to looking for what one has already found). But if one only has non-conclusive grounds for their beliefs, one can always continue to inquire without acting incoherently. Thus, to have knowledge one must have conclusive grounds for believing what they believe.

HOW TO TELL IF ANIMALS CAN UNDERSTAND DEATH

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It is generally assumed that humans are the only animals who can possess a concept of death. The prevalence of this idea is exemplified by the debate on the ethics of killing nonhuman animals (hereafter 'animals'). Within this debate, much of the discussion revolves

around whether the fact that animals cannot understand death affects the extent to which death harms them (see e.g. Meijboom & Stassen [Eds.], 2015; Višak & Garner [Eds.], 2015). However, neither side of the debate questions the very idea that animals lack a concept of death. This premise is usually offered without any empirical justification by one side, and has remained largely unquestioned by the other. This is surprising, given that there are at least two *prima facie* reasons for thinking that some animals may understand death (Allen & Hauser, 1991): the ubiquity of death in nature and the evolutionary advantages that would come from understanding death, especially for animals living in fission-fusion groups, which require a constant renegotiation of relationships and keeping track of competitors and allies (Piel & Stewart, 2015). In this paper, however, I do not want to settle this issue from the armchair. My intention is to examine how we could go *about empirically determining whether animals can have a concept of death*.

In order to empirically determine whether animals can possess a concept of death, the first thing that needs to be clarified is what it means to possess a concept. Taking as my starting point the discussion on concept possession among philosophers of animal minds, I argue that the possession of a concept of death will require more than the mere capacity to *discriminate* dead individuals. What is necessary is an ability to *classify* individuals as dead with relative *independence of perceptual cues* and a grasp of the *intensional* features of the property of being dead. With this in mind, and taking into account that the concept of death will be neither binary nor universal, I defend the following account of the minimal concept of death:

A creature can be credited with a minimal concept of death once she classifies some dead individuals as dead with some reliability, where 'dead' is understood as a property that pertains to beings who:

- (a) are expected to have the cluster of functions characteristic of living beings, but*
- (b) lack the cluster of functions characteristic of living beings, and*
- (c) cannot recover the cluster of functions characteristic of living beings.*

This definition has several important features. First, it presupposes a concept of life, which allows one to distinguish dead individuals from inanimate entities. Further, possession of a minimal concept of death entails classification, rather than mere discriminatory capacities, so the emphasis is not placed on the animal's capacity to recognise dead beings, but on her capacity to recognise them as dead. Thus, full reliability in the discrimination of dead individuals is not required. An animal can sometimes mistake beings that are asleep or in a coma for dead beings and still possess a concept of death. And lastly, this definition leaves room for variation across species, across individuals, and across time, so it allows for the existence of different concepts of death. With this definition in mind, I turn to specifying how to empirically determine whether animals can understand death. I argue that observational studies should be on the lookout for the following behaviours, all of which are potential indications of a capacity to understand death:

1. Varied behaviour towards corpses
2. Unhygienic/maladaptive behaviour towards corpses
3. Different treatment of corpses vs asleep individuals
4. Investigative behaviour towards corpses
5. Aggressive behaviour towards corpses
6. Caring behaviour towards beings with limited functionality

7. Mourning behaviour towards corpses
8. Eventual ignoring or abandoning of a corpse
9. Age- or experience-relative difference in behaviour towards corpses

If all or most of these behaviours are observed in a single species, this amounts to quite good evidence of their capacity to understand death. However, one must concede that observational evidence is especially difficult to interpret. Therefore, as a final step in my argument, I offer some recommendations on how to experimentally test for a concept of death. Given that it is important to maintain ethical standards in our dealings with animals, my proposal is for the test not to contain actual dead individuals, but to test animals with the use of artefacts. The idea would be to develop a mechanism of some sort that the animal has to utilise in a certain way in order to obtain a reward. In the test condition, the mechanism would break or shut down; it would lose its functionality. Moreover, it would do so in a way that would be irreversible, and this irreversibility would be clearly visible to anyone who understood the functions of the mechanism. At this point, if the animal wants to access the reward, she has to realise that she cannot do so any longer with this particular artefact, and must either make use of another one or find some other alternative. This doesn't give us *direct* evidence of an understanding of death. However, if an animal passes the test, it shows us that she has the *necessary cognitive requirements* to understand death. It shows us that she can *process the crucial sub-components of a minimal concept of death*. Thus, it gives *indirect* evidence of her capacity to understand death. Coupled with observational reports of the behaviours detailed above in the same species, this would amount to enough evidence to question the common assumption that animals cannot acquire a concept of death.

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BEYOND THE CONVERSATION: A NON-PROPOSITIONAL ACCOUNT OF SLURS

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The aim of this paper is to offer an account of slurs that accommodates certain phenomena that we think should be accommodated. The first one is the pervasiveness of their pejorative character, i.e. the fact that the ability of slurs to derogate is manifested in all contexts in which these terms are uttered. The second one is their special behaviour with respect to retraction-like phenomena, which makes them more akin to expressions of pain, for instance, than to ordinary descriptive discourse.

Our approach consists of three parts. The first one concerns the normalizing potential of a slur. Any utterance of a slur, i.e., the mere *occurrence* of the word, makes it more natural for the word to appear again in successive contexts. We can just mention a slur, or dispose the context in such a way that, for instance, it is common ground among the participants in the conversation that a particular use of a slur is ironic and not intended to carry derogatory content. In these situations, the slur has no derogatory content. Let us call these kinds of contexts “controlled contexts”. Still, no matter how carefully we dispose the present context to make sure that the utterance of a slur does not have the kind of semantic effect that we want to avoid, it will facilitate ulterior occurrences of the term. In particular, it will make the slur more likely to appear in what we may call “uncontrolled contexts”, that is, contexts in which the utterance of the slur does have derogatory content.

The second step in our proposal concerns their derogatory content, the postulation of which has in many cases been used to explain the pejorative character of slurs. We can then discuss the level of meaning to which such content belongs; however, whether asserted, implicated or presupposed, derogatory content is always taken to be propositional, since only propositions can be asserted, implicated or presupposed. One point of connection between content-based theories and our proposal is that we all assume that there is such a thing as derogatory content. A further one between our approach and proposals such as Hom’s (2008) is that we believe that this content is part of what is said. However, what distances us from these positions is our view that derogatory content is not propositional. In the spirit of dynamic semantics, we identify the content of an utterance with its impact on the common ground. Propositional content is that of an utterance that serves to eliminate possible worlds from the common ground; however, since utterances can have a variety of different kinds of impacts on the common ground, not all content is propositional. In particular, the pejorative character of slurs is due to the fact that they at least partially serve to order the possible worlds of the common ground. One way to implement the idea that the contribution of slurs isn’t propositional can be found in Stanley’s (2015) account of derogatory speech in general. According to Stanley, some derogatory speech might be seen as ordering those worlds in which one socializes with members of the derogated group as less preferable than those in which one doesn’t (Stanley 2015: 144). Inasmuch as derogatory speech understood in this way doesn’t eliminate possible worlds from the common ground, its contribution isn’t propositional (Stanley 2015: 145). Our point is that slurs, as a specific form of derogatory speech, behave in this way too.

Finally, we claim that when slurs have derogatory content they have effects that go beyond the context of the conversation, which is the third part of our explanation. In

uncontrolled contexts, the world-ordering modifies the socionormative space. Here, we understand the socionormative space as a structure that situates each agent in a node characterized by the range of actions that agent can perform in relation to other agents. In particular, we choose to focus on one way in which agents can see the range of actions that are available to them diminished: what Ayala (2016: 883) calls “speech capacity”. Ayala defines speech capacity in terms of speech affordances, which she in turn defines as relations between speaker and environment that account for the range of things the former can do with words (Ayala 2016: 881). Once speech affordances have been defined, we can define speech capacity as the range of speech affordances that are available to a speaker (Ayala 2016: 882). Thus, the social position of the person who has been derogated by a slur changes in such a way that the derogated group can no longer perform certain speech acts, that is, it limits their speech capacity. Once the derogated group has seen their range of available actions diminished, it is not available for the speaker to give them the power they have lost back. This is why slurs behave as they do with respect to retraction.

The normalizing potential of slurs does not depend on their being used—they always facilitate ulterior occurrences of such terms, even if at the present context they are only mentioned. Once the slur reaches an uncontrolled context, that is, a context in which it in fact orders the possible worlds in the common ground in a certain way, this leads to changes in the socionormative space that restrain the range of things the derogated group can do and that can’t be taken back. Together, these three steps explain both the pervasiveness of the pejorative character of slurs and their particular behavior with respect to retraction. Our proposal has consequences for philosophical practice as we know it too. Our point is that uttering a slur always comes at a moral cost, and it is the responsibility of the philosopher who writes a paper on slurs to assess such cost and decide whether it is worth it to give one more example of a slur in a paper addressed to an audience that is assumed to know what slurs are.

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DOXASTIC OWNERSHIP AND EPISTEMIC AUTONOMY

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There are many things that we do, which are attributable to us in a minimal sense, and could even be explained by our desires and intentions, but that we do not fully recognise as our own deeds. We did those things—and in that sense they are our *activity*, not just mere occurrences—but we failed to play the role in them that would have made them fully ours. Such *practical ownership* seems to be required for fully autonomous action.

By the same token, there are many beliefs that we have, but we fail to recognise as fully ours. Some of those beliefs may perfectly be true, and even come from sources that are reliable. That is not the worry, but that, although we *do* believe those things, and they are ours in that minimal sense, those beliefs merely *happened* in us. We lack what may be called *doxastic ownership* of them. And it seems that such ownership is an essential part of epistemic autonomy in the sense that, in so far as one does not fully own one's beliefs, one may not be an epistemically self-governed agent.

In this paper I motivate the claim that doxastic ownership is earned by engaging in doxastic deliberation, which is constituted by the goal of *full* knowledge. Doxastic deliberation is the process by which rational agents make up their minds regarding what to believe—a process to be distinguished from other forms of belief-formation, such as indoctrination, self-deception or arbitrary endorsement. The central claim of this paper is that doxastic deliberation *consists in* aiming at knowledge. When one struggles to figure out what to believe, if one is actually engaged in doxastic deliberation at all, then one must aim at *knowing* the proposition in question, being thus sensible to any feature of one's cognitive performance that could imperil a proper attribution of knowledge.

The thesis of this paper may be contrasted with two weaker alternatives. First: one may hold that the constitutive goal of doxastic deliberation is something less demanding than knowledge like, for instance, true belief, justified belief, well-grounded opinion or reliable belief. Each of these weaker theses is implied by the one that we will here endorse.

Second: one may hold that doxastic deliberation is merely regulated by the goal of knowledge, but not constituted by it. A constitutive goal defines what the activity in question *is*, whereas a regulative claim points to a better way in which the activity may be performed according to some standard of quality. A weaker regulative claim would hold that agents who deliberate doxastically may contingently aspire at the ideal of knowledge. In the paper, such regulative view will be exemplified by higher-order epistemic theories, where a higher-order stance may allow the agent regulate according to a more demanding goal (knowledge) something that, in the lower order, is constituted by a less demanding goal (apt belief). In contrast, our view is that doxastic deliberation is constituted—and not merely regulated—by the goal of knowledge: in so far as one does not aim at knowing while making up one's mind about what to believe, one is not even engaged in doxastic deliberation.

But more than by contrast with its weaker alternatives, our thesis may be better exposed against an overt *antithesis*, namely that we own our beliefs when we form them by ourselves, independently of the influences of others, as an authentic manifestation of our own identity and the kind of person that we are. We hold that a proper understanding of the link between epistemic autonomy and doxastic ownership will show that epistemic autonomy is not to be identified with epistemic *independence*, as the capacity to believe by oneself. In fact, a proper understanding of ownership and its relation to autonomy shows that epistemic autonomy may be in conflict with the demands of absolute epistemic independence.

Regarding the argument, it draws an analogy between two debates that originated independently in action theory and epistemology. In a nutshell, the idea is that *what Velleman told Frankfurt (in action theory) may be told to Sosa (in epistemology)*.

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WHAT'S BETTER FOR YOU: FUTURE-BIAS OR TEMPORAL NEUTRALITY?

Quan Nguyen, St Andrews & Stirling

Time-biases are preference patterns that govern our attitudes towards events based on their temporal location. If you are time-biased, you care not only how good or bad an event as such is, but also about when it happens. There are two forms of time-biases: Near-bias and future-bias.

Near-Bias: If you are biased towards the near, you prefer good events to be closer to the present rather than being further away, or bad events to be in the far rather than the near future.

Future-Bias: If you are biased towards the future, you'd prefer good events to be future rather than past, and bad events to be past rather than future.

Some authors (Brink 2010, Sullivan 2017, Greene/Sullivan 2015, Dougherty 2010) have argued that time-biases are irrational on the basis of them being bad for you – if you are time-biased, you will make decisions leaving yourself worse off. You should instead be temporally neutral:

Temporal Neutrality: You should not prefer an event over another solely based on its temporal location.

The proponents of temporal neutrality rule out both near-bias and future-bias as irrational on the basis that temporally neutral behaviour avoids the bad decisions time-biases would lead you to. Especially Greene/Sullivan and Dougherty have used creative and wonderful arguments to show that future-bias leads to bad decisions if you're both future-biased and risk-averse (Dougherty) or future-biased and regret-averse (Greene/Sullivan). Dougherty's and Greene/Sullivan's argument goes like this:

- x. Risk-Aversion/Regret-Aversion is rationally permissible.
- xi. A rational agent prefers her life to go forward as well as possible.
- xii. If you are risk-averse and future-biased, you will choose lesser future goods over greater past goods just because they are in the past.
- xiii. Your life would go better if you chose the greater good over the lesser good.
- xiv. Therefore, a rational agent would not be future-biased.

This paper will defend the rationality of future-bias against Dougherty and Greene/Sullivan. I will not question the soundness of their arguments, as others have done before (see Dorsey 2016 for an attack of (1), as well as Scheffler forthcoming), but rather explore why their

arguments, even if successful, do not change my credence in believing future-bias to be rational.

I first outline how both their arguments are structurally diachronic versions of classic Dutch book arguments. Dutch book arguments aim to show that holding inconsistent beliefs can be exploited and lead to pragmatic costs – however, the diachronic Dutch books by Dougherty and Greene/Sullivan only show pragmatic costs of two attitudes held together (Future-bias and risk- or regret-aversion), not an inconsistency as such between them. This leads to the Diachronic Dutch book losing its argumentative force (see Christensen 1991) and leaves the arguments at risk of overgeneralising to the combination of all sorts of attitudes leading to pragmatic costs. Hence, even if Dougherty’s and Greene/ Sullivan’s arguments are valid, they still fail to establish the rational impermissibility of future-bias.

I secondly argue that a challenge similar to diachronic dutch books can be mounted against temporal neutrality – if you’re temporally neutral, you will accept a preference pattern that can lead to bad choices leaving you worse off. The examples I provide resemble basic sunk cost fallacies, and I show that a proponent of temporal neutrality is committed to them, while a future-biased person can avoid them.

Sunk Cost Argument against Temporal Neutrality:

- (5) In absence of independent reasons against it, changing preferences is rationally permissible.
- (6) A rational agent wants her life to go forward as best as possible.
- (7) Your life will be worse off overall if you give equal concern to your past as to your present and future and at the same time change your preferences
- (8) Giving equal concern to your past as to your present and future leaves your life worse off overall.
- (9) Hence, a rational agent would not give equal concern to her past as to her present and future.

I do not take this to be a knock-down argument against temporal neutrality, for the same reasons that I think that Dougherty’s and Sullivan’s arguments aren’t: This does not show an actual inconsistency between preference-change and temporal neutrality, merely that both can be exploited and lead to pragmatic loss – but that does not show the general impermissibility of temporal neutrality. However, while Dougherty’s and Greene/Sullivan’s cases border on the absurd and will therefore almost certainly never happen, sunk-cost fallacies happen all the time and are well-evidenced in psychology and economic research. Hence, future-bias is better for us than temporal neutrality - our focus should be to avoid sunk cost fallacies, and future-bias may be a good insurance against them.

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INCLOSURE AND INTOLERANCE

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Graham Priest has influentially claimed that the Sorites paradox is an Inclosure paradox, concluding that his favoured dialethic solution to the Inclosure paradoxes should be extended to the Sorites paradox. We argue that, given Priest's dialethic solution to the Sorites paradox, the argument for the conclusion that that paradox is an inclosure is invalid.

COMMUNICATION AS COORDINATION

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What is it to communicate successfully? More specifically, under what conditions does a hearer understand a simple declarative utterance of the form *a is F*? Here is a straightforward answer:

Reference Identity (RI): A hearer *H* who accepts an utterance *u* produced by speaker *S* understands *u* iff the belief that *S* expresses through *u* and the belief that *H* forms as a result of *u* ascribe the same property to the same object.

In simpler terms: assuming that hearer *H* accepts the utterance and understands its predicate, communication succeeds as long as *H* identifies the object to which the speaker is referring.

It follows from RI that, if speaker and hearer ascribe the same property to the same object, then the hearer has understood, no matter how she thinks of the object. However, in 'The Semantics of Singular Terms' (1976), Brian Loar famously proposed a case which shows this consequence to be unacceptable (I will refer to the case as 'Stockbroker'):

Stockbroker: Suppose that Smith and Jones are unaware that the man being interviewed on television is someone they see on the train every morning and about whom, in that latter role, they have just been talking. Smith says 'He is a stockbroker', intending to refer to the man on television; Jones takes Smith to be referring to the man on the train. Now Jones, as it happens, has correctly identified Smith's referent, since the man on television is the man on the train; but he has failed to understand Smith's utterance. (Loar 1976, p. 357)

Loar draws the following conclusion from his case:

It would seem that, as Frege held, some 'manner of presentation' of the referent is ... essential to what is being communicated. (Loar 1976, p. 357)

Building on this idea, various authors (Loar, Bezuidenhout, Recanati) have proposed accounts where communication requires thinking about the same object in similar ways:

Similar Ways of Thinking (SW): A hearer *H* who accepts an utterance *u* produced by speaker *S* understands *u* iff:

1. The belief that *S* expresses through *u* and the belief that *H* forms as a result of *u* ascribe the same property to the same object.
2. *H*'s way of thinking about the object is sufficiently similar to *S*'s way of thinking about the object.

Ways of thinking have been characterized in various ways – for instance, on some accounts they can be identified with definite descriptions. Regardless of how we construe ways of thinking, however, SW remains an extremely influential model of communication, both within the discussion of Loar cases and within other philosophical contexts. Indeed, SW seems to provide a straightforward explanation of *Stockbroker*. Smith intends to refer to the man on television, so he thinks of the referent as *the man on television*. On the contrary, Jones thinks Smith intends to refer to the man on the train, so he thinks of the referent as *the man on the train*. Since speaker and hearer think of the referent in radically different ways, SW's second condition for successful communication is not satisfied. It thus follows from SW that Jones does not understand, which is the correct prediction.

In the first part of my talk, I will argue that this popular model is mistaken – SW does not provide an adequate account of Loar cases, for it yields incorrect predictions. Consider for instance:

Writer: Rudolf Lingens writes novels under the pseudonym 'Leo Peter.' Not realizing that Lingens is Peter, Gustav Lauben asks Lingens if he can deliver a message to Peter. Desiring to keep his other identity secret, Lingens accepts and waits for Lauben to write the message. While waiting, he suffers from a bout of amnesia, forgetting that he is Peter, the writer, and that Lauben will give him a message for Peter. So, when Lauben gives him the message 'You are a great writer,' Lingens thinks 'This message is for me. I am a great writer.'

Just as in *Stockbroker*, the hearer (Lingens/Peter) does not seem to have understood. This time, however, we cannot explain his misunderstanding by appealing to ways of thinking. Of course, speaker and hearer do think of the referent (Lingens/Peter) in different ways – Lauben thinks of him as *the person I am addressing*, while Lingens thinks of the referent in a first-person way. However, the same happens in *any* case of *successful* indexical communication: if Paula says to Charlotte 'You are tall', Charlotte will (correctly) think of the referent in a first-person way, while Paula will not. So SW's explanation of *Writer* predicts communication failure in any ordinary exchange involving indexicals. Obviously, this is not what we want.

In the second part of the talk, I will propose an alternative account of Loar cases and communication. I will explain Loar cases as cases of 'luck' analogous to Gettier cases. Analogous suggestions have been briefly made in the literature, but we still lack a developed account of such cases, one that explains what 'communicative luck' exactly amounts to and why it is instantiated in Loar cases. I will analyze communicative luck as involving two mistakes that cancel each other out, thus resulting in a correct (but lucky) identification of the referent. I will then conclude by showing what is at stake in the debate. Underlying SW is a picture of communication as *simulation*: to achieve understanding, the hearer must enter a mental state that is identical or similar to the one expressed by the speaker. Building on Lewis's classic work *Convention* (1969), I propose an alternative picture. Successful communication requires achieving a state of *coordination*, which does not generally require 'doing the same thing'. As the case of indexical communication clearly shows, what we seek

is not identity or similarity in how we think of the referent, but non-lucky convergence on the right object. The ultimate goal of my talk, then, is to show how the debate on Loar cases can lead us to rethink the very nature of communication.

DENOTATION AND QUANTIFICATION IN COPREDICATIVE SENTENCES

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Copredicative sentences -see examples in (1)- have been used to attack the notion of reference that traditional truth-theoretical semantics works with (Chomsky 2000).

- (1)
- a. The school was in the party when it caught fire.
 - b. The book is interesting but too thick.
 - c. The city has 500,000 inhabitants and outlawed smoking in bars last year (Asher 2011).

The main point of the argument is that there is nothing in the world that can be the referent of the word *school* when someone asserts (1a). A plausible response is that copredicative terms like *school*, *book* and *city* in (1) refer to mereological objects formed by the sum of aspects/parts. My claim is that copredicative nouns do not denote mereological sums, but simple entities.

According to mereological proposals, in (1) the word *school* denotes something that is partly a building and partly a group of people; the word *book* denotes the sum content+physical object and the word *city* denotes the sum population+council. The first issue is that intuitively we should not get an acceptable whole just by summing any two parts without any relevant reason. Arapinis and Vieu (2015) give some conditions that the parts have to fulfill in order to be constitutive parts of a whole: they have to be linked by some constant existential dependency relation that explains that the parts are in agential coincidental relations.

A second objection is that the persistence conditions of the constitutive sums of parts are unclear (see Ortega-Andrés and Vicente 2019). Consider (2):

- (2) London is so unhappy, ugly, and polluted that it should be destroyed and rebuilt 100 miles away(Chomsky 2000).

Intuitively, the whole should not exist when only one of its constitutive parts persist. For example, the statue *David* is constituted by a marble stone and the art-piece. If we destroy the marble stone, *David* would not persist; and, if we destroy the art piece (imagine a non-art-world where people do not have any beliefs, feelings or thoughts about art), then *David* would not persist either. However, it is not so clear that this conclusion follows in the case of London. Moreover, if all Londoners and the London institutions decide not to move to the new location, we could say that London is wherever the Londoners and the institutions are. So, even if accept that London can persist with the persistence of any of its parts, and parts can persist independently from each other, then we would have too many Londons.

A third issue is the counting puzzle (see Asher 2011): imagine that I have three copies of the same volume that contains two different novels. In that case, we could count the books either informationally or physically. Depending on that, the following sentences would be true or false:

- (3) a. There are three heavy books on the shelf.
 b. There are three interesting books.
 c. There are three interesting and heavy books.

If we count books physically, (3a) would be true. If we count books informationally, (3b) would be false. In (3c), depending on which criterion we use for counting books, it will be true or false: if we count the books physically, then it would be true, but if we count books informationally, it would be false. According to traditional mereological theories of the denotation of copredicative words, we have to count books as sums of parts. So, there would be six books (physical+info). However, this conclusion does not seem very intuitive. We do not normally think that I have six books when I have three volumes with two contents each.

Ortega-Andrés and Vicente (2019) propose that the word *London* -remember (2)- is a compilatory term that binds, in the psychological sense, various different aspects of the concept associated with the term. Each aspect/sense of the copredicative word has its own denotation. The truth conditions of the original sentence derive from a process of de-compilation and the assignment of each predicate to its respective denotation. Copredicative sentences hide more complex sentences. For example, sentences in (1) could be paraphrased as (4):

- (4) a. The school (group of people) was in the party when it (the building) caught fire.
 b. The book (info) is interesting but its physical realization is too thick.
 c. The city (population) has 500,000 inhabitants and the council outlawed smoking in bars last year

The counting puzzle is solved because in (3) we count different sets of entities. The predicate *there are three books* is ambiguous. In (3a) we count physical books, because the adjective *heavy* selects the sense “physical object”. In (3b) we count informational books, because the adjective *interesting* selects the aspect “informational content”, so it has to be false. In (3c) we count either physical books that contain informational books, either informational books that are realized by physical books. The denotation of the word *book* in (3c) is double: it refers to a set of informational contents and a set of physical objects. Depending on the context, (3c) would be understood as (3c₁) or (3c₂). (3c₁) would be false and (3c₂) would be true:

(3c₁) There are three interesting books (info) and their physical realizations are heavy.

(3c₂) There are three heavy books (physical objects) and their informational content are interesting.

In conclusion, there are reasons for denying that the denotation of copredicative nouns are mereological compounds. The proposal given by Ortega-Andrés and Vicente (2019) about copredicative nouns understood as compilatory terms solves the ontological puzzles that mereological compounds generate.

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A NON SUBJECTIVIST ACCOUNT OF THE "NECESSITIES OF LOVE" AND EUDAIMONIA

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Although our loves come in personal and non personal varieties, the possibility of symmetrical reciprocity speaks, *prima facie*, in favor of the greater significance of personal loves in our lives. The effects of such loves in people are anything short of shallow. When immersed in romantic love or friendship or in another type of interpersonal love, persons undergo a process of mutual drawing guided by the devices of direction (through the interests and concerns of the lovers and the beloved ones) and interpretation (through their not being impervious to revise their self-conceptions as a result of the suggestions of the lovers and the beloved ones).

Personal loves prompt delight and enjoyment in us, but they use to bring about the involvement of hard work as well. The delicacies of being attached to our beloved ones go hand in hand with the troubles we find, at least from time to time, not only in promoting their thriving but in trying to further our loving relationship.

Let me illustrate that demanding side of love with an example. Last night, in the intimacy of a dinner in their favourite restaurant, Harry declared to Mary, "You're the only one for me". She corresponded taking his hands and kissing his lips after saying, "Oh, Harry! You took these words out of my mouth". Notwithstanding the sincerity and the strength of what Harry and Mary wanted to communicate to each other, can it be actually assured that their words and gestures do mirror all the truth of the matter?

Harry loves Mary, sure, but he also loves his friends, his parents, his work as a paediatrician, not to talk of his non personal loves. And what about Mary? Besides loving her charming Harry, she loves her sister as well and her parents and her two intimate friends since Primary School and of course, her profession as a classic piano player.

It can be presumed that each one of these loves demands from Harry and Mary attention and dedication, and likewise that each one of them does not incline Harry and Mary in the same direction. A way to explain that situation relies on the fact that the already mentioned drawing process experienced by Harry and Mary because of each one of those loves of them, does not accord.

On pain of suffering the consequences of intractable conflicts in their lives, Harry and Mary will sooner or later engage themselves in the task of harmonizing all their personal loves. They will prioritize some of them with respect to others. As a result, the characters of my example will display a particular hierarchy of loves (*ordo amoris*).

Due to the non negligible meaning of our personal loves, such a hierarchy, though not fixed once and for ever, supplies the core of our “stable motivational structures”. To order (the from time to time conflicting requirements of) our loves is actually a work which is never definitively done. Nevertheless, we cannot but be occupied in evaluating and revisiting our hierarchies of loves or our “necessities of love”, in Harry Frankfurt’s apt phrase, since our happiness (eudaimonia) heavily relies on its fulfilment.

Is it possible to identify the traits of an adequate or appropriate hierarchy of loves, which should form part of the objective conditions of eudaimonia? An answer to this demand comes from an incremental perspective about love. Indeed, our loving experiences disclose that some of our loves bring about our progressive improvement and that another ones give rise to our decline. Furthermore, this proposal constitutes a non subjectivist way to understand that the necessities of love are more than liberating.

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HIGHER-ORDER COUNTER EVIDENCE: THE AGENCY-FIRST VIEW

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Introduction. One acquires *higher-order misleading counterevidence* (henceforth MHOE) when one receives misleading about that makes one uncertain about one’s first-order evidence bearing on a proposition p . This phenomenon plays a starring role on current epistemological debates about epistemic rationality.

Most authors frame and understand debates about the alleged epistemic significance of MHOE in terms of its power to provide one with higher-order *defeating* evidence (HODE) for the rationality of one’s belief. That is, most parties to these debates subscribe to:

Defeating Account: MHOE is epistemically significant because it is HODE.

Accounts of the defeating mechanisms of HODE (e.g. González de Prado forthcoming, Rosenkranz and Schulz 2015) result in the view that since the rationality of one’s belief is defeated, one is rationally permitted to suspend judgement only. I argue that this is too austere a result, especially if we think of cases of systematic peer disagreement (e.g. about philosophy, morality, and the like). This provides the motivation for exploring an alternative *agency-first* account.

The Agency-First Account. The view I defend is the following:

Agency-First Account: MHOE is epistemically significant because it requires of one to *re-open the question whether a given proposition p is true.*

To re-open the question whether p amounts to going over the shared body of evidence by re-evaluating its extension, re-assess its probative force, double-check the reasoning from evidence to belief, ascertain that one's general epistemic and cognitive conditions were normal.

Importantly, re-opening the question of the truth of p is an *epistemic-cognitive* way of addressing the rational doubt raised by the acquisition of MHOE. I argue for this point by addressing some possible misgivings about the epistemic nature of this cognitive activity, its practical feasibility, and its compliance with the 'ought' implies 'can' principle.

Agency-First Account: Doxastic Implications. The Agency-First Account of MHOE prompts the following question: If higher-order counterevidence does not defeat the rationality of one's original belief that p , does it follow that one is rationally permitted to retain one's original beliefs while re-opening the question whether p ? If this question were to be answered in the affirmative, we would then have redeemed the possibility of rational disagreement by fine-tuning traditional steadfast approaches by stripping their dogmatic flavor off.

Unfortunately for the supporter of traditional steadfast approaches, though, I believe that the foregoing question has to be answered in the negative. To see why, I shall first introduce the notion of *taking the question whether p to be settled*. I shall then bring out the normative connections among re-opening the question whether p , retaining one's belief that p , and *taking the question whether p to be settled*. From these connections, it follows that the requirement to re-open the question whether p and the permission to retain one's belief that p lead to an inconsistency.

The notion of taking the question whether p to be settled can be understood in relation to the notion of re-opening the question whether p . Plausibly, one way to fall short of re-opening the question whether p is to take the question whether p to be settled. (Another way is to simply stop considering the question of p 's truth-value and focus on something else.) Thus, just like one re-opens the question whether p relative to one's own epistemic position vis-à-vis p , one takes the question whether p to be settled relative to one's own position at. That is to say, one takes the question whether p to be settled in the affirmative or in the negative given the evidence, epistemic facts and reasoning powers available to one. To illustrate this further, suppose that one's body of evidence at t is such that it rationalises p . Surely, it seems that one can, in a psychological sense, close the inquiry into the question whether p by believing that p . This means that taking the question whether p to be settled neither entails that one knows the answer to the question, nor does it entail that the question is indeed settled. Obviously, should one later acquire new counterevidence, one would (if rational) re-open the question, or perhaps taking the question to be settled in a different way.

Having clarified this, I lay out the normative connections among re-opening the question whether p , taking the question whether p to be settled, and belief retention. Here they are:

PR1: If one ought to re-open the question whether p , then one ought not take the question whether p to be settled.

PR2: If one is permitted to retain one's belief that p , then one is permitted to take the question whether p to be settled.

I argue for PR1 and PR2 and I show that these two principles generate an inconsistency with the requirement to re-open the question and the permission to retain one's belief while re-opening.

So, the first doxastic consequence of the Agency-First Account is that rational belief is not allowed as a response to MHOE.

However, on closer inspection, the Agency-First Account does not issue the prediction that whenever we receive MHOE the only rational response to it is to suspend judgement. So, the Agency-First Account crucially differs from subscribers to the Defeating Account insofar one is rationally permitted to hold different types of doxastic attitudes, such as "acceptance", "hypothesis", and the like, while being under the requirement to re-open the question.

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CONCEPCIONES FILOSÓFICAS SOBRE LA DELIMITACIÓN DE LO CÓMICO

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Esta comunicación contiene algunas reflexiones sobre la comicidad. Su ámbito temático específico es, por tanto, la filosofía del humor (uso los conceptos de cómico y humorístico – y sus derivados– conforme a los sentidos en que son equivalentes). Pero mencionaré primero ciertas conexiones entre ese ámbito y otras dos áreas cercanas: la filosofía de los valores y la filosofía de la mente. Después, destacaré los inconvenientes de aquellas teorías filosóficas que se proponen definir la comicidad. Finalmente, esbozaré muy brevemente una propuesta alternativa: la teoría del perjuicio (desarrollada con mayor detalle, y defendida ante aparentes contraejemplos, en Pérez Otero 2018).

La comicidad tiene una faceta evaluable o "normativa" (por usar el término más frecuente) desde una perspectiva doble:

- (i) Intrínsecamente, evaluamos como mejor o peor un determinado efecto cómico.
- (ii) También sería plausible sostener (aunque dista de ser obvio) que la comicidad de las situaciones en una obra de ficción –literaria, teatral o cinematográfica– contribuye a la calidad artística o estética de dicha obra, contribuyendo por consiguiente al valor de la misma. No es algo obvio, pues aunque sí parece evidente que los elementos cómicos en una obra suelen dotarla de mayor atractivo, no se sigue que dicha atracción sea estrictamente de carácter artístico y/o estético. También otros factores (la excitación sexual que pueda provocarnos ver una película, por ejemplo) nos atraen, sin que eso implique que tales factores son siempre artística y/o estéticamente relevantes. De todos modos, no resulta muy arriesgado suponer que –en efecto– los elementos cómicos en un relato de Kafka, o en una película de Charlot o de Tati poseen ese tipo de relevancia. Si es así, la

teorización del humor (o una parte de la misma) se incluye en la teorización sobre el arte; el humor (o algunos aspectos del humor) es objeto de estudio no sólo de la filosofía de los valores en general, sino también de la estética y/o la teoría de las artes.

Con frecuencia, la literatura filosófica contemporánea aborda lo humorístico rastreando sus conexiones con la respuesta característica que tiende a provocar: el estado mental de divertimento o regocijo cómico [comic amusement]. (Se lo considera un estado mental; pero hay controversia, por ejemplo, sobre si es o no una emoción.) Por ello, el estudio del humor es también relevante en otro campo: la filosofía de la mente. Me referiré a la persona que experimenta ese divertimento como el apreciador; es quien aprecia o siente como cómico algo.

Es común clasificar las principales concepciones filosóficas sobre el humor propuestas a lo largo de la historia dividiéndolas en tres categorías: teorías de la superioridad, teorías de la incongruencia y teorías del alivio [relief]. Conforme a las teorías de la superioridad (cuyo principal exponente es Hobbes), el apreciador encuentra cómicas situaciones que involucran personas que sufren algún infortunio y ante las cuales experimenta un sentimiento de superioridad. Las teorías de la incongruencia (con precursores como Kant, Schopenhauer y Bergson) proponen que el apreciador encuentra cómicas situaciones en las cuales reconoce falta de congruencia entre dos elementos. Para los defensores de las teorías del alivio [relief] (Freud, paradigmáticamente), el divertimento cómico desempeña en nuestro sistema nervioso una función similar a la de una válvula de escape.

Todas esas concepciones son problemáticas, incluyendo las versiones contemporáneas más sofisticadas de las teorías de la incongruencia, desarrolladas por Raskin (1984), Morreall (2009), Carroll (2014) y los textos de Clark (1970) y Martin (1983) reimpresos en Morreall (1987). Así, respecto a las teorías del alivio, no están bien descritas las conexiones entre alivio y comicidad; y, además, identificar esa supuesta función del divertimento cómico no clarifica qué situaciones nos parecen cómicas. Por otra parte, las teorías de la superioridad y las teorías de la incongruencia afrontan inconvenientes derivados de su pretensión de ofrecer una definición de lo cómico; es decir, su pretensión de ofrecer condiciones necesarias y conjuntamente suficientes de la comicidad. Hay sentimientos de superioridad sin divertimento cómico; y viceversa. En relación con la falta de congruencia, ésta no siempre resulta cómica. Y cuando la incongruencia no es cómica, no necesariamente (contra la posición de Carroll) provoca algún efecto negativo (dolor, ira, miedo, tristeza, etc.); hay casos de incongruencia “neutra” (ni cómicos ni negativos).

Un enfoque menos ambicioso postularía condiciones necesarias (no triviales) para la comicidad, sin aspirar a que sean también conjuntamente suficientes. La teoría del perjuicio ejemplifica ese enfoque. Su versión débil establece que el apreciador reconoce o detecta un perjuicio en sujetos intencionales. Habría también una versión fuerte: la tesis débil es el caso y además la comicidad que provoca el divertimento deriva –al menos en parte– de dicho perjuicio; es ese perjuicio aquello que, cuando se combina con otros factores, el apreciador encuentra cómico.

Dicha teoría se vincula con las teorías de la incongruencia, pues todo perjuicio es un caso de incongruencia (aunque no a la inversa). Se relaciona –asimismo– con las teorías de la superioridad: una consecuencia de estas teorías (que al experimentar divertimento cómico el apreciador manifiesta cierto grado de malicia) es implicada por la teoría del perjuicio. Así, la teoría del perjuicio explicaría el atractivo de las teorías de la superioridad en lo que respecta a esa consecuencia (pero sin compartir los inconveniente de tales teorías).

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WHAT DOES DECISION THEORY HAVE TO DO WITH WANTING?

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Decision theory and folk psychology both purport to represent the same phenomena: our belief-like states and desire- and preference-like states. They also purport to do the same work with these representations: explain and predict our actions. You might expect, then, that the concepts of decision theory and those of folk psychology could be accounted for in terms of the other. Can they be?

There is much at stake in this question. If its answer were no, we’d have a dubious dualism: two competing representations and systems of prediction and explanation. This dualism would tempt many to reject one of the two pictures. Yet neither can be let go lightly. Folk psychology structures daily life: we understand each other in large part on the basis of folk-psychological notions such as believing and wanting. These notions have also proven fruitful for studying the mind (e.g. Davidson (1963)) and ethics (e.g. Smith (1994)). Decision theory is similarly significant. It’s pervasive in the social sciences, especially economics, and widely used in other disciplines, too, like neuroscience and philosophy.

My interest is giving a decision-theoretic account of believing and wanting, two key concepts that decision theory omits. Many have studied whether there are necessary and sufficient conditions, stated in terms of credence, for belief (e.g. Buchak (2014)). (The Lockean Thesis says there are such conditions.) The parallel question for wanting has received less attention. In this paper, I give decision-theoretic necessary and sufficient conditions for wanting.

I dispel the orthodox accounts—what I call *What’s-best Accounts*—that connect wanting to decision theory, and to preference more generally (e.g. Stalnaker (1984), Lewis (1986)). They say that you want what’s best (in your eyes), given certain alternatives. Below is such an account, stated decision-theoretically:

What's-best Account. S wants p iff S assigns a higher expected value to p than to any of certain alternatives.

Being best, though, is neither necessary nor sufficient for being wanted.

It's not sufficient because sometimes we want none of the options we're faced with, even the best one. Imagine that you have been kidnapped and must make an awful choice: either shoot one of the two people in front of you, or do nothing and both will be shot. You neither want to shoot, nor do you want to refrain from shooting and have the two be shot! Nonetheless, you prefer shooting the one to not shooting the one and having both be shot. Shooting is best, but you don't want it.

Being best isn't necessary for being wanted because sometimes we want many things, even ones that aren't best. Imagine that you're going out to dinner. The options are the pizzeria, the ramen shop, and the hot dog stand, and while hot dogs sound bad tonight, the other two options sound good. The pizzeria would be best. You say, 'I want to go to the ramen shop, and I want to go to the pizzeria even more.' You want to go to the ramen shop, but you disprefer it to one of the other alternatives. You want to go to the ramen shop, but it's not best.

An alternative to What's-best Accounts are what I call What's-good-enough Accounts. What's-good-enough Accounts claim that you want what's good enough (in your eyes). This corrects the mistakes of What's-best Accounts. You want neither to shoot the one nor refrain from shooting with the other two ending up shot. Why is it that you can want neither of the two things (even though one of them is best)? Intuitively, because neither is good enough. Either would result in something truly awful. You want to go to the ramen shop and want to go to the pizzeria more. Why is it that you can want two things (even though one of them isn't best)? Intuitively, because both are good enough. You'd be happy going to the pizzeria and happy going to the ramen shop.

I propose the following. What's good enough is represented by a threshold, a real number.

What's-good-enough Account. S wants p iff the expected value S assigns to p meets a certain threshold.

(Compare to a version of the Lockean Thesis: S believes p iff the credence S assigns to p meets a certain threshold.)

You neither want to shoot the one nor refrain from shooting. The account can make sense of both facts by saying that neither the expected value that you assign to shooting nor the expected value you assign to not shooting meets the threshold. You want to go to the ramen shop and you want to go to the pizzeria, and the account can accommodate both of these facts, too, this time by saying that each option meets the threshold.

What's-good-enough Accounts also make simple sense of the commonplace but theoretically puzzling (e.g. Jackson (1985)) phenomena of conflicting desires—wanting p and wanting not-p. Do you want to donate this month's pay check to charity? You do (lives could be saved) and you don't (there are bills to pay). How is that? Both donating and not are good enough; both are wanted. More generally, both p and not-p can be good enough; both can be wanted.

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ON WHY WE CAN BE GLAD TO BE ALIVE

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If our existing in the way we do is better for us than our never having existed at all, then we have good reason to be glad to exist in the way we do. If the same evaluative comparison holds not only for our actual life but also for a wide variety of other lives we can imagine to live or to have lived, then we have good reason to be glad to be alive. But can we compare our existing (in some way or other) to our never having existed at all?

Bernard Williams said that we cannot think egotistically about our own non-existence. In a sense, he is right. If I did not exist, nothing would be good or bad (or neutral) for me. John Broome argues against the possibility of existence/non-existence comparisons in the following way. If our existence would be better for us than our non-existence, then, by the logic of such comparisons, our non-existence would be worse for us. But this can't be true: our non-existence could not be worse for us as there would be no us for whom it could be worse. I call Broome's argument the no-nonsense challenge to existence/non-existence comparisons.

This paper has two aims. First, it tries to answer this challenge. If successful, this shows that the relevant comparisons are possible, i.e. they do not violate principles which are obviously correct, like the principle that my never having existed at all would be neither good nor bad nor neutral for me. Secondly, I try to show how, despite accepting the idea that one's non-existence fails to register on a scale of personal value, we can nevertheless make positive comparisons. The guiding idea is that what is good for us is better for us than something that fails to be good for us. Parfit, I will argue, has been attracted by the same idea (although his official doctrine of non-comparative existential harms and benefits points in a different direction). I show that those of us who are glad to be alive have good reason to be so.

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SCIENTIFIC REPRESENTATION, METROLOGY, AND THE EXPLANATORY GAP

ARGUMENT: A RESPONSE TO SCHEELE

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According to Levine's (1983) explanatory gap argument, there is an important difference between normal scientific identity statements and psycho-physical identity statements. Normal scientific identity statements, such as, "heat is the motion of molecules," are fully explanatory. Identifying heat with molecular motion allows us to exhaustively explain the concept of heat. In contrast, psycho-physical identity statements, such as, "pain is the firing of C-fibers," have explanatory gaps. That pain is identical to the firing of C-fibers cannot explain the phenomenal character of pain. We cannot understand why C-fibers firing feel painful rather than itchy. This leads to the intuition that possibly, pain is not the firing of C-fibers. However, as we learned from Kripke (1980), this intuition implies that "pain is the firing of C-fibers" is necessarily false and, *ipso facto*, actually false. If psycho-physical identity statements are false, then physicalism is probably false. Therefore, the explanatory gaps in psycho-physical identity statements are problematic for physicalism.

Physicalists (for example, Nagel 1998) sometimes grant that psycho-physical identity statements have explanatory gaps. They further claim, however, that science can close this gap in the future. If these physicalists are right, then the explanatory gaps in psycho-physical identity statements are not problematic in principle. However, merely hoping that future science can solve current problems for physicalism does not seem satisfactory.

Marcel Scheele (2002) provides a stronger response to the explanatory gap argument. Scheele claims, contra Levine, that we should not take explanatory gaps in psycho-physical identity statements as evidence against physicalism. He argues that normal scientific identity statements have explanatory gaps that are analogous to the purported $\bar{E}_K = \frac{3}{2} k T$ gaps in psycho-physical identity statements. Scheele uses, as a case study, the statement, where \bar{E}_K denotes the mean kinetic energy of the molecules in Joules; T is the temperature in Kelvin; and k is the Boltzmann constant, 1.38×10^{-23} J/K. I refer to this as the "Joules-Kelvin equation." Scheele claims that we should use this (kind of) statement when evaluating whether normal scientific identity statements have explanatory gaps. The explanatory gap in the Joules-Kelvin equation arises from our inability to understand why temperature *must* be multiplied by the Boltzmann constant (instead of some other number) in order to get kinetic energy. Scheele then argues that since purported explanatory gaps are not problematic for the Joules-Kelvin equation, so they are not problematic for psycho-physical identity statements. As far as I know, Scheele is the only one to have given this kind of response to the explanatory gap argument.

This paper defends Levine's explanatory gap argument from Scheele's objection. It is argued that there is a crucial difference between "pain is the firing of C-fibers" and the

Joules-Kelvin equation. The former is a statement about the bare phenomena of pain and the firing of C-fibers. The latter is a statement about the representations we use to measure temperature and kinetic energy. It is not just about the relationship between heat and kinetic energy, but the relationship between heat *as measured in Kelvin* and kinetic energy *as measured in Joules*. If we take seriously the fact that heat is *identical* to molecular motion, then the Joules-Kelvin equation is just a statement that we use to convert between two different methods of measuring the same thing. For this reason, it is argued, we can close the purported explanatory gap in the Joules-Kelvin equation by understanding the natures of the representations, and how they are used in science.

It is argued that the explanatory gap in the Joules-Kelvin equation can be closed by understanding two kinds of facts. First, facts about the decisions made by scientists to 1) use the expansion properties of ideal gases to represent temperature, 2) define temperature as being directly proportional to the product of pressure and volume of ideal gases, and 3) define the temperature of the triple-point of water as 273.16 K. Second, facts about the natural invariances used as a point of reference in the Kelvin scale and the Joule, e.g. the triple-point of water. It is argued that once we understand the decisions made by scientists in defining thermometry, and the natural invariances used, we can fully understand the Joules-Kelvin equation. That is, we understand why temperature (in Kelvin) has to be multiplied by the Boltzmann constant, instead of some other number, in order to get kinetic energy (in Joules).

Finally, it is argued that “pain is the firing of C-fibers” is a statement that concerns certain phenomena, apart from our representations of them. Therefore, the methods employed in closing the purported explanatory gap in $E_K = \frac{3}{2}kT$ does not apply to “pain is the firing of C-fibers,” and this dispels Scheele’s objection against the explanatory gap argument.

Scheele’s response is more promising than the response of hoping in future science to vindicate physicalism. If it can be shown that normal scientific identity statements have explanatory gaps just like the purported gaps in psycho-physical identity statements, that would significantly weaken the explanatory gap argument. However, the particular case study that Scheele uses fails to demonstrate that the two types of statements are analogous. To build the kind of argument Scheele envisions, he needs an identity statement about scientific phenomena that has explanatory gaps similar to the gaps in psycho-physical identity statements. The gaps in such a statement cannot be closed by reflecting on the nature of scientific representation, as the statement is not about scientific representation. If Scheele can find such a statement, he may have a successful response to the explanatory gap argument.

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ON MEANING ASCRIPTIONS

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In ordinary communication, we specify the meanings of linguistic expressions by employing the predicate ‘means’ followed by expressions of our own language: for instance, we say that ‘neige’ (in French) means *snow*, and that ‘little by little’ means *gradually*. My aim is to discuss and reject two *prima facie* plausible theories of the logical form of these *meaning ascriptions*.

In the **first section**, I illustrate the theories. Consider (1):

(1) ‘Neige’ (in French) means *snow*.

Harman writes: “‘means’ abbreviates a relational predicate ‘S’ together with a pair of quotation marks surrounding what follows [...] ‘S’ is such that for every expression ‘e’, ‘e’ S ‘e’ is true” (1999: 265). He then suggests that ‘S’ might be interpreted as ‘is synonymous with’. Similarly, Field (2017) contends that ‘means’ expresses the relation of sameness of meaning holding between ‘neige’ and ‘snow’. They support the *Quotational Theory*: two expressions figure in the logical form of an ascription, and they are said to mean the same.

One can interpret ‘meaning the same’ in accordance with their conception of meaning; I opt for the Kaplanian interpretation, according to which sameness of meaning is cashed out as sameness of *Kaplanian content* (nothing in my arguments depend on this choice). This version of the theory analyzes (1) as:

(1_{QT}) There is a content C such that (a) ‘neige’ has C in French, and (b) ‘snow’ has C in English.

According to another theory (embraced by Horwich 1998 and Abbott 2003), ‘means’ triggers a linguistic context in which expressions refer to their customary contents: ‘snow’ in (1) functions simply as a *tag* for a content – hence the name *Tag Theory*. I employ this notation: the result of appending *square brackets* to an expression ‘e’ is the tag ‘[e]’, a singular term whose character is the rule that, given a context c, ‘[e]’ (directly) refers to the content of ‘e’ in c. Hence, the Tag Theory analyzes (1) as:

(1_{TT}) There is a content C such that (a) ‘neige’ has C in French, and (b) C = [snow].

The two theories differ in the way they conceive of *how* we can refer to meanings. The Quotational Theory implies that we can refer to them via *definite descriptions* mentioning particular expressions. The Tag Theory maintains that we can use ordinary expressions as *genuine names* for their meanings.

In the **second section**, I provide an argument against the Quotational Theory. If the Quotational Theory is correct, (1) is analyzed as (1_{QT}); if so, then (1) and (1_{QT}) convey the same piece of information. The Italian translations of (1) and (1_{QT}) are (2) and (2_{QT}), respectively:

(2) ‘Neige’ (in francese) significa *neve*.

(2_{QT}) C’è un contenuto C tale che (a) ‘neige’ ha C in francese, e (b) ‘snow’ ha C in inglese.

If (1) is analyzed as (1_{QT}), then (2) conveys the same piece of information as (2_{QT}). The consequent of this conditional is false. By two applications of *modus tollens*, we conclude that (2) is not analyzed as (2_{QT}), and that the Quotational Theory is incorrect.

I discuss two objections. The first one stresses that *analysans* and *analysandum* need not convey the same piece of information: hence, there is no reason to maintain that the translation of the *analysans* of (1) must convey the same piece of information as the translation of the *analysandum*. I reply that this objection assumes a misleading notion of analysis that has problematic consequences as regards the explanatory role of analysis itself.

According to the second objection, *actual* translators do not rely on the notion of translation employed in the argument. However, actual translations attempt to preserve *pragmatic* features of sentences; therefore, they are irrelevant with respect to an argument that aims at showing something about the *semantics* of (1).

In the **third section**, I formulate an argument against the Tag Theory. This argument concerns *homophonic* ascriptions, like (3):

(3) ‘Snow’ (in English) means *snow*.

Homophonic ascriptions are *empirically infeasible*: we cannot discover that they are false (Harrison 1998, Field 2017). Firstly, I discuss why they have this epistemic status, and I distinguish it from the status of *necessarily true* sentences. Afterwards, I argue that the supporter of the Tag Theory does not have the resources to account for the empirical infeasibility of (3). This suggests that the theory is strongly defective.

The advocate of the Quotational Theory can draw on her analysis of (3) to show that the ascription expresses a *conceptual truth*. This might explain its empirical infeasibility – assuming that conceptual truths are empirically infeasible. I show why the latter strategy is not available for the supporter of the Tag Theory.

In the **fourth section**, I discuss a problem that affects both theories. Firstly, developing Recanati’s (2000) remarks, I provide an argument to the effect that a meaning ascription is *iconic* with respect to its complement expression. That is, the proposition expressed by an ascription depends (in part) on the content of its complement expression. This *Principle of Iconicity* represents a semantic explanation of this fact: it is impossible to understand (1) without understanding its complement expression.

Then, I contend that both theories do not satisfy this principle. As regards the Quotational Theory, the content of ‘snow’ does not figure in the proposition expressed by (1): ‘snow’ occurs as the *quoted* material of a pure quotation (see (1_{QT})), and this material is semantically inert.

As far as the Tag Theory, the content referred to by ‘[snow]’ figures as an *object* in the proposition expressed by (1) (see (1_{TT})); but what this proposition must contain in order for the Principle of Iconicity to be satisfied is not the content of ‘snow’ considered as an object (i.e., the semantic value of a tag), but rather the content of ‘snow’ considered as the semantic value (i.e., the content) of ‘snow’.

In the conclusive remarks, I argue that reference to meaning turns out to be a more complex phenomenon than we might have expected. I also show some connections with problems discussed by Frege, Russell, and Mates.

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SEEING OPAQUE OBJECTS AND SEEING SURFACES

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The contemporary debate in the philosophy of perception is dominated by the distinction between "direct" and "indirect" realism: traditionally, naïve realists and intentionalists are taken as examples of the former group, sense-data theorists of the latter. While direct realists believe that perception relates us with (or makes us aware of) "external" objects (spatiotemporal, three-dimensional objects), indirect realists believe that any contact with such objects is mediated by different entities (whether they are "mental" or "physical" objects), which are, in turn, perceived "directly".

In relationship with this debate, I will raise a question about the significance of the (alleged) fact that, at a time, one can only see part of the surface of opaque objects (ordinary, non-transparent objects). According to some philosophers, this entails that opaque objects are only seen "indirectly": there is a process starting with the visual perception of a part of the surface of the object and ending with the perception of the object. This claim challenges the naïve realist's contention that perception relates us with opaque objects, since we would be (at best) related to some parts of them.

During my presentation, I will present and criticise a different view, which I will call the "easy answer": that to see a part of the surface of an opaque object *is* what seeing an opaque object amounts to (and, thus, that being perceptually related with a part of an opaque object *is* to be related with the opaque object).

In the first part of my presentation, I will develop this view by relying on Jackson's distinction between "mediate" and "immediate" objects of perception (Jackson, 1977).

First, Jackson defines what he calls "in virtue of" relation as capturing those situations in which the fact that something has a certain property can be analysed in terms of something else having the same property (i.e. living in Spain in virtue of living in Valencia).

Second, he defines what a "mediate" object of perception is: "X is a mediate object of (visual) perception (for S at *t*) iff S sees *x* at *t*, and there is an *y* such that ($x \neq y$ and) S sees *x* in virtue of seeing *y*" (1977: 19-20). An "immediate" object of perception is an object which is not mediate. According to this definition, an opaque object is a mediate object of perception, as it is perceived in virtue of perceiving a part of it.

Finally, he argues (with Bermudez, 2000) that the mediate/immediate distinction should be distinguished from the direct/indirect one. He claims that his view is not a "two-meanings" (according to which "seeing" means something different when applied to opaque objects or part of their surface), but an "analytical expansion" one: as there is nothing indirect in the fact

that I live in Spain if I live in Spain in virtue of living in Valencia, there is nothing indirect in the fact that I see an object if I see it in virtue of seeing a part of its surface.


The *easy answer* can thus be reformulated as follows: to see an opaque object is to see it in virtue of seeing a part of it.

In the second part, I will criticise this account by considering how we apply “seeing” to opaque objects in ordinary language. By following Clarke (1964), I will analyse a puzzle composed of three situations (S1, S2 and S3 below) showing that there is a difference between our use of “seeing” in S1 (before noting the “fact” that we can only see a part of an opaque object) and in S2 (after noting the fact).

I will then illustrate Clarke’s contextual solution to the puzzle: “to see” is a *unit concept*, which only applies to objects regarded as units (and in this case, there is no amount of the object to which “seeing” applies). If the object is a compound of units, “seeing” does not apply to it, but it applies to an amount of it. Therefore, it is true that the subject sees the object in S1, but false in S2, when the object is a compound of units. Hence, as opposed to the *easy answer*, noting the “alleged fact” above changes the context, producing a new situation in which it is true that the subject sees only part of the opaque object, but which is different from the context in which we normally use “to see”. It is then false that when we say that we see an opaque object (S1) we mean that we see it in virtue of seeing a part of its surface.

In the last part, I will defend Clarke’s solution from an objection raised by Bermudez. According to Bermudez (2000), Clarke’s account conflates the concepts of “seeing” and “attention”, since one could only claim to “see” a part of an opaque object when one selectively attends to it. But since there is empirical evidence that the content of perception is wider than the content of attention, we must conclude that we see more than what we pay attention to.

I will show that this is not an issue for Clarke’s account by considering some insights from Husserl’s early phenomenology of perception. Trying to make sense of the fact that we can experience constant properties even if our experience changes (for instance, when we perceive an object as uniformly coloured even if some parts of it are shaded differently), Husserl distinguishes between the concepts of “perceiving” and “apprehending”. This difference allows arguing that we have a visual experience of (we “apprehend”) more than what we perceive, and that part of the difference is played precisely by attention: by switching the attentive focus, one can perceive different things without any change in the field of apprehension. By applying this phenomenological distinction to Clarke’s account, I will show that there is no problem in arguing that one only sees what one pays attention too, although being visually aware of more than that. Moreover, I will argue that Husserl’s approach can provide an account of the different roles played by the front and the rear side of a perceived object, which is something missing from Clarke’s one.



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REALISM AND THE A PRIORI: REASONS FOR PLURALISM

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A thriving proposal in scientific theories' conceptual analysis (physics particularly) has been introduced by Michael Friedman (2001). According to him, scientific theories possess elements that play a constitutive role resembling Kant's synthetic a priori; but unlike the latter, Friedman's constitutive principles are theory-specific and substitute in times of scientific revolutions. Constitutive elements such as the mathematical structure for calculus or some especially fundamental principles within a theory are necessary presuppositions of all further empirical meaning. This view was anticipated in Reichenbach's early work (1920) and has been coined as "the relative a priori".

Defenders of the relative a priori have focused on scientific theories' conceptual structure, and sometimes on scientific rationality across subsequent theories. But this characterization should be complemented by an account of the nature of scientific knowledge and its relation to reality. For admitting that theories' constitutive elements set semantic and epistemic (and ontological?) limits and that such limits are modified when the theory is abandoned in such a way that incompatibilities show up very often is irreconcilable with standard or orthodox realism. I take it to be surprising that these considerations have not been carefully addressed thus far. To this respect, my goal is to defend three tenets.

In the first place, I aim to show that every account of the relative a priori implies scientific pluralism. Although I will stay on Friedman's static account (thus rejecting his dynamic), I will defend that alternative proposals such as Chang's or Stump's also imply pluralism. I will illustrate what I understand by pluralism on the basis of Ruphy's (2017) recent work, trying to defend that the relative a priori meets epistemological and even metaphysical pluralism.

Secondly, I will attempt to show that a pluralist account of science does not conflict with scientific realism. As a matter of fact, this is not quite innovative tenet. I will delve on two particularly traditional versions of realism that fit nicely a pluralist framework: Worrall's and Ladyman's structural realism and Kitcher's real realism. The novelty of my argument stems from the fact that weather structural and real realism are considered indeed consistent with pluralism, I will defend that they are not consistent with an aprioristic account of scientific theories.

And thirdly, to overcome this situation, I will stress that in spite of both versions of realism's strengths, scientific theories understood as sets of constitutive elements are better connected to Giere's perspectival realism (2006). Perspectival realism aims at reconciling realists and antirealists by claiming, for the former, that scientific theories aim at successfully representing a mind-independent world and that scientific knowledge is genuine knowledge; and for the latter, that objectivism and traditional conceptions of truth have to be substantially modified to properly define science. I will also argue that Giere's philosophical work grounds the possibility of a unified read of the relative a priori and perspectival realism. But I will show as well that this pursuit of harmony is not an enterprise out of controversy.

As I see it, there are three prospective sources of dissent. The first is that Giere endorses philosophical naturalism, and so is appropriate for other perspectivists. This might be challenging for traditionally naturalism is opposed to apriorism. I will nonetheless claim that Giere's naturalism only implies empiricism and rejects analyticity, not apriorism in its relative sense. The second objection highlights a difficulty in coordinating a statement-based account of scientific theories such as Friedman's and a model-based-account. Here I will subscribe to the complexity of scientific theories, defending that there is a place for both models and statements in the conceptual structure of theories, since models and statements play different roles, constitutive and non-constitutive. As for the third objection, it can be described as follows: how can an empirical statement be dependent upon a perspective and be simultaneously assertive regarding a mind-independent world? This issue is directed to perspectival realism's heart. As a defense, I will lay on Massimi's (2018) new conception of truth. I will conclude by proposing that truth, as understood by Massimi, composes a realist approach to truth and that Massimi's account of truth constitutes a very promising notion of truth that allows looking at the constitutive elements of scientific theories from a perspectival point of view.

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A DEFENCE OF EXPERIENTIALISM ABOUT THE SENSE OF BODILY OWNERSHIP

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Somatosensory experiences typically are mental states suitable to be reported in judgments that are *de se*, in that subjects endowed with a conceptual system or language would express them by qualifying the felt body with a first-person indexical. For instance, the following is a report of my current experience as of my bodily position: "I can feel that *my*

legs are crossed". Authors in the literature express this by saying that subjects have a *sense of bodily ownership* (SBO). In this paper, an account of the SBO is presented. The account proposed is an Experientialist Account: it assumes that there is something it is like to experience a body as one's own, and hence that the SBO does not solely consist in judgments of bodily self-attribution.

Let us call judgments in which somatosensory experiences are reported *judgments of somatosensation*. And let us grant that, when one sincerely asserts judgments of somatosensation that involve a first-person pronoun qualifying the felt body, one expresses awareness of the body one feels as being one's own. The notion of SBO captures this:

[SBO]: For one to have a sense of bodily ownership is for one to be aware of the body one feels in somatosensory experience as being one's own.

It is important to notice that somatosensory experiences typically are mental states suitable to be reported in judgments that are *de se* in yet another sense: subjects endowed with a conceptual system or language would express them by using a first-person indexical *in the subject position*. This feature is not exclusive of somatosensation. It is a fact about phenomenally conscious experiences in general that, may the subject that undergoes them have the capacity to make judgments in which she reports them, she will typically use the pronoun "I" in the subject position. I will call this phenomenon *sense of experience ownership* (SEO):

[SEO]: For one to have a sense of experience ownership is for one to be aware of the phenomenally conscious experience one undergoes as being one's own.

Succinctly, the view on the SBO defended here is the following: for a subject to have a SBO is for her to be aware of (A) the experience-dependency of the properties involved in the content of somatosensory experiences; and (B) the relevant experiences (namely somatosensory experiences) as being her own. Assuming that there is a SEO amounts to assuming (B). Hence, on my view, having a SBO for the body we feel in somatosensory experiences partly depends on having a SEO for the somatosensory experiences by which we feel it. The first goal of the paper is to articulate this proposal by spelling out (A). The second goal of the paper is to underpin the view by showing its explanatory potential.

In order to explicate (A), consider the following examples of what somatosensory experiences convey to their subjects: the Painfulness of an ankle, the Position of a hand, a finger being Depressed against an obstacle. Somatosensory experiences generally involve as part of their content a given property felt as instantiated in the body. I will henceforth use *Properties^S* as a placeholder for *properties as they are involved in somatosensory experiences*.

The central claims to be motivated in the defence of (A) are, on the one hand, that *Properties^S* are *experience-dependent*: they cannot be instantiated unless the token experience they are a content of is occurring (Dokic, 2003). Besides, on the other hand, that *Properties^S* are *experienced as experience-dependent*. I motivate these claims via the following reasoning: in sensory states, experience-dependent properties can be cashed out as properties of a sensory field. For a property of this sort to be *experienced as experience-dependent* means for it to be experienced as a property of a sensory field. Being aware of the experience-dependency of perceived properties thus means being aware of a sensory

field *as such*. My claim is that, in normal cases, somatosensory experiences are experiences in which a sensory field is apparent as such. I call this sensory field *bodily field*.

In order to specify this reasoning in support of the notion of bodily field, I borrow and adapt, on the one hand, some of Peacocke (2008)'s ideas about the visual field in his account of colour perception; and on the other hand, the observations about the phenomenology of bodily space to be found mainly in Martin (1995) and Bermúdez (2017). I close this first part of the paper by explaining how the notion of a bodily field, together with (B), makes for an account of the SBO.

There are some pathological cases relevant for the discussion on the SBO which, I contend, my proposal can accommodate. The first case worth mentioning is *somatoparaphrenia*. Somatoparaphrenic patients have somatosensory experiences involving a SEO, but not a SBO. This is compatible with the relation of dependence (of the SBO on the SEO) established by my view. I account for these cases as cases in which subjects are not aware of the experience-dependency of the properties involved in their somatosensory states. The second case is *depersonalisation*. Depersonalised patients also suffer from a lack of SBO. On my view, this can be explained as a function of their loss of a SEO.

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MENTAL CAUSATION AND QUALITATIVE PERSISTENCE

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In my talk, I intend to address a novel argument for the existence of enduring tropes that was put forward by Douglas Ehring. Ehring argues that previous deployment of tropes in solving various problems in metaphysics is dispensable in favour of exemplification of universals. In that sense, none of the previous arguments could be taken to favour the existence of tropes over universals. However, he offers a new argument that is supposed to do just that. Ehring argues that enduring tropes are needed to account for the phenomenon he calls 'qualitative persistence'. He invites us to imagine two machines, one of which destroys a particular quality of an object, while the other creates an exactly similar quality. When the two machines operate at the same time, even though the object they operate on does not

change with respect to the type of property it has, it does not exhibit qualitative continuity with respect to the property in question. When the machines do not operate, the object exhibits qualitative continuity. According to Ehring, only enduring tropes can account for the difference between the situation in which the machines are operating and the situation in which they are not, and so only enduring tropes can account for the phenomenon of qualitative persistence. The same is not true of the theory of universals, because the two situations have the same description in terms of the exemplification of universals.

In response to this, I will argue that being characterized by an enduring trope F is neither necessary nor sufficient for an object to exhibit qualitative persistence with respect to F. My argument for the claim that enduring tropes are not necessary for qualitative persistence is based on the assumption that there are no less than maximally specific or determinate tropes. This assumption is crucial in deploying tropes in order to solve the problem of mental causation, and is accepted by probably all authors working on the topic. I will give a rough sketch of why this assumption is important in order to give a trope theoretic solution to problems of mental causation. After that, I will argue that enduring tropes are not necessary for qualitative persistence by imagining a machine similar to Ehring's which can destroy a trope F, without disrupting qualitative persistence with respect to F. The upshot of the first part of my presentation is that we cannot give a trope theoretic account of qualitative persistence, while at the same time relying on tropes in order to solve problems of mental causation.

In the second part of my presentation, I will argue that enduring tropes are not sufficient for an object to exhibit qualitative persistence. My argument here will not rely on the assumption that there are no less than maximally determinate tropes. In that sense, it can appeal even to those authors who have a solution to problems of mental causation that is independent of accepting the ontology of tropes.

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THE HUMEAN PROPENSITY INTERPRETATION OF 'PROBABILITY'

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In this talk I propose an interpretation of 'single-case probability' or 'chance' in terms of Humean propensities. This interpretation is nothing more than a complementary reading of Lewis' Best System Analysis of 'chance', and Szabó's 'No chance' interpretation. I call this interpretation the 'Humean Propensity' because, as I claim, it captures the features of the hard propensity interpretations while avoiding their problems, and without deviating from the metaphysical doctrine of Humean Supervenience. Most importantly, it does not commit to the deterministic (or not) nature of physical reality. I raise some concerns with the tenability of the subjectivist guide to BSA chance assertions, and based on the operationalist philosophy of Bridgman, I introduce 'Bridgman's guide' to BSA chance assertions, which, as

I conclude, reveals that the truth-makers of BSA chance assertions must be the ordinary (non-modal), already known and well-defined physical quantities of Szabó.

FREGE ON PERCEPTION: A DILEMMA FROM DUMMETT AND TRAVIS?

Manuela Teles, Universidade do Porto (MLAG/IF)

Perception was not a theme of investigation for Gottlob Frege. However, there are several places in his writings where he has something to say about perception or from which something about perception can be said. This presentation will consider two of these sayings: Michael Dummett's conceptualist approach to perception and the anti-representationalist account of perception by Charles Travis. Dummett provides a conceptualist approach as an alternative to Frege's remarks on color-words in the *Grundlagen*. Travis builds an anti-representational account of perception grounded on Frege's characterization of thought in 'Der Gedanke' and elsewhere. So, both Dummett's conceptualism and Travis' anti-representationalism seem to be properly Fregean theories of perception. This is called into question by the map of debates within contemporary philosophy of perception. According to this map, conceptualism is a version of the so-called Content View, which takes perception to be representational, and anti-representationalism is a relationalist view of perception, which denies it any kind of representational content. Thus, on the map of the contemporary debates, Dummett and Travis' Fregean theories of perception appear as incompatible. This brings about an interpretative dilemma. If conceptualism and anti-representationalism are incompatible, then Dummett and Travis cannot both be right (although they can both be wrong) about Frege on perception. The aim of this presentation is to show that Dummett and Travis can be both right, so conceptualism and anti-representationalism are compatible. Using color-words as a case study, Dummett's conceptualist alternative to Frege is put under what is taken to be Travis' test to detect representations in perception. The result is that Dummett's conceptualism is not representational according to Travis' test. This points to a new direction on the map of contemporary philosophy of perception.

AN EXPRESSIVIST APPROACH FOR COVERT DOGWHISTLES

José Ramón Torices Vidal, Universidad de Granada; Manuel de Pinedo, Universidad de Granada

Covert dogwhistles are not really about sending a "coded message." Instead, they raise attitudes to salience, so people will act by them without realizing they are being moved towards them. Our key question in what follows is whether covert dogwhistles, either backing or subordinating, constitute a special form of implicit communication, or whether they can be reduced to already existing forms of implicit communication, such as presuppositions or implicatures. To carry out this task, we compare the features of each of the mentioned phenomena and analyse how they behave in the face of retraction. The thesis that we

defend is that covert dogwhistles are first-order predicables, and as such, they convey orientational, nonpropositional information. Their peculiarity, either because they are implicit first-order predicables instead of explicit, or for another reason, is that they do not contribute, unlike explicit first-order perspectival expressions, locational, propositional information. They do not add information that allows those involved in a conversation to situate the actual world in a particular region of the logical space, rather than another (Charlow 2014, Lewis 1979).

Republican Gingrich's following speech hides a covert dogwhistle:

Over here you have a policy which, with Reagan and me as speaker, created millions of jobs—it's called paychecks. Over [t]here you have the most successful *food stamp* president in American history, Barack Obama. (Newt Gingrich, quoted in Elliott 2012)

Let's take this case as an example for our analysis. Covert dogwhistles convey a kind of not-at-issue information (Tonhauser 2012, Stanley 2015), which is, as we have said, orientational. Commonly, presuppositions and implicatures are conceptual tools used to account for how different kinds of implicit communication or not-at-issue information work. Let's see then whether dogwhistles are reducible to some of them.

Gingrich's speech apparently suggests something like "African Americans are lazy and freeloader." Even so he can explicitly reject that "African Americans are lazy and freeloader" without obvious contradiction and without seemingly affecting the meaning of what he said. However, both presuppositions and conventional implicatures cannot be rejected without producing a certain oddity in the hearers. Besides, presuppositions and conventional implicatures are semantically linked to the meanings of the words in such a way that it is practically impossible for their contents to be aimed only by to selected part of the audience.

On the other hand, conversational implicatures are cancellable (although the price to be paid is to show oneself to the audience as being non cooperative) and can be rejected without affecting the main content asserted. It would perhaps because of this seem plausible to argue that Gingrich exploits conversational rules and contextual factors to influence a subset of his audience sending the conversationally implicated message that "African Americans are lazy and freeloader." Nevertheless, assuming by using the term "food stamp" Gingrich is suggesting that "African Americans are lazy and freeloader" is troubling. A notable feature of covert dogwhistles is their ability to affect a part of the audience without their awareness—that is, without the latter being aware that they are being moved for racist reasons, for instance. In the case of implicatures in general, speaker and hearer engage in a game of mutual recognition of intentions, without which the implicated content cannot be successfully captured by the hearer. In the case of covert dogwhistles, however, their success rests precisely in the fact that the hearer does not recognize the speaker's intention, yet is still mobilised for specific political purposes. The type of contribution that the speaker makes through a covert dogwhistle seems to produce a certain effect on the audience, rather than to communicate propositionally articulated content. One way to confirm this is by analysing the behaviour of an implicated content and an alleged "dogwhistled content" concerning retraction. Consider the following dialogues, the first is a case of retraction of a conversational implicature and the second is an alleged case of retraction of a covert dogwhistle:

- xv. A: Sam does not like to work.
B: Well, she is African American.
(**Implicature**: African Americans are lazy).

B: Wait, wait! Sorry, I was wrong, not all African Americans are lazy. That was very racist! (*B's retraction*)

A: Exactly.

xvi. A: Over here you have a policy which, with Reagan and me as speaker, created millions of jobs—it's called paychecks. Over there you have the most successful food stamp president in American history, Barack Obama. (**Dogwhistle:** African Americans are lazy)

B: Well, food stamp recipients are a tiny minority.

A: # It is true, I was wrong, not all African American are lazy and a freeloader. (*A's retraction*)

B: Wait, I did not know that your comment in addition to being explicitly classist, was also racist.

As we can see, in case (1) the retraction of B does not produce surprise to A, in case (2), however, the retraction of A does produce surprise to B, because A's retraction in (2) reveals to B something that had previously remained hidden. In fact, as Mendelberg (2001) and Saul (2019) show, when the covert dogwhistle becomes explicit the effect produced begins to change. Therefore, covert dogwhistle cannot be propositional because they lose their persuasive power when translated into a propositionally articulated statement. They cannot be retracted, as other claims can, because they cannot be translated into full propositional sentences. In this sense, they are *ineffable*. In A's speech act of retraction, he's not properly targeting the content of the dogwhistle, which is, by definition, implicit.

The fact that covert dogwhistles do not contribute with locational, propositional information. Covert dogwhistles, like the other of first-order predicables, have expressive meaning, they make partitions in the logical space and rank the subsets of possible worlds resulting according to a certain order. However, covert dogwhistles do not contribute locational information.

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THE EPISTEMIC VALUE OF INTELLECTUAL AUTONOMY

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Intellectual autonomy has been regarded as an ideal worth to pursued, as a virtue in a well-grounded intellectual character, and an objective particularly valuable. To become an intellectually autonomous being matters. But why does it matter? Does it epistemically matter? In this paper, I will argue that the epistemic value of intellectual autonomy is at most indirect, that is: a) there is no defense of the value of intellectual autonomy that can be couched in purely epistemic terms; b) intellectual autonomy has no value in virtue of how non-instrumentally contributes to achieve knowledge and/or understanding.

I will adopt a dual conception of intellectual autonomy. Being intellectually autonomous requires, first, to exhibit independence of thought and be free of undue interferences, and second, a certain capacity of self-governance and self-guidance in one's own cognitive conduct.

Leaving aside a possible instrumental value of being intellectually autonomous, I focus on how intellectual autonomy can be constitutive of certain epistemic achievements. Several authors have suggested that the epistemic value of intellectual autonomy is non-instrumental. Consider some versions of knowledge as an achievement, such as the credit view of knowledge. Knowledge is creditable true belief. Credit accrues to the agent from her contribution to the acquisition of the true belief. A central aspect of what constitutes the epistemic domain of evaluation is that true belief must be acquired through the exercise of an ability or the manifestation of a competence: this is what we take as fundamentally valuable insofar as we are concerned with the purely intellectual assessment of belief. We do value beliefs not just by being successful or accurate; we do value the attainment of success and we aim at it.

How well does intellectual autonomy fare in this conception? First, not as an ideal we strive for, but more as a condition for the exhibition of sufficient agency to deserve the status of knower. Second, not as a particular ability or competence whose exercise or manifestation constitutes the status of knowledge. It is not a virtue whose exercise constitutes knowledge. Nevertheless, it seems to be important in connection with the agential contribution of the knower to the normative domain. How so? The notion of autonomy that is here at stake is closer to some of the demands we put on personal autonomy, a sort of coherence and integration of attitudes we identify ourselves with, in this case applied to the intellectual domain. In order to exhibit the condition of an epistemic agent, one has to secure a certain cognitive integration in the workings of one's own abilities and competences. This requirement is not necessarily met by adding new abilities or competences; rather it points to the need that the epistemic agent be present, so to say, in the performance of the cognitive task, engaged in it. Autonomy refers to the quality of the agential engagement in cognitive tasks.

This line of reasoning in the defense of the value of intellectual autonomy faces the following dilemma:

- i) Either intellectual autonomy is just an aspect of the agential involvement in the constitution of the achievement characteristic of knowledge,
- ii) Or autonomy gives a distinctive value to a particular class of intellectual achievements

The first horn of the dilemma empties intellectual autonomy of much of its force as a trait that distinguishes admirable performances. The second horn gives some plausibility to the idea that many aspects of a good intellectual life do not depend on exhibiting intellectual autonomy, that we could even benefit from practices that do not preserve autonomy, and that we should sometimes rationally surrender our independence and self-reliance, even our self-governance.

Someone could argue that there is nothing problematic in embracing the first horn of the dilemma, besides the recognition that knowing entails autonomous belief, that is, belief that does not derive from undue interference and is under our control. I do not think that it is an easy task to establish when a belief is autonomous in this way; nonetheless, my worry is that, in a sense, only a being that is intellectually autonomous could be a full knower.

In this paper I am more interested in the second horn. Which sort of intellectual achievement can be constituted only by intellectually autonomous beings? Which epistemic (and maybe also ethical value) is lost if we surrender our intellectual autonomy? E. Sosa has given a version of this idea, in terms of reflective knowledge: "Why the pride of place for reflective knowledge? One answer is to be found in the special bearing of reflective knowledge on the understanding and coherence dear to intellectuals, and on the intellectual agency that we honor . . . No matter how much we value consultation, we are unwilling to yield our intellectual autonomy, which requires us to assess the place of consultation in the light of all our other relevant information and recognized desiderata . . . In the end reflection has a closer, more finally determinative influence on the beliefs we form, and the deliverances of consultation bear properly only through reflection's sifting and balancing". (Sosa, 2004: 291) And Pritchard has appealed to understanding, to an active intellectual grasping of how truths are interconnected: "I think it is clear that the overarching intellectual virtue at issue in seeing things for oneself, both perceptually and intellectually, is that of intellectual autonomy, and thus that they both promote the good of being intellectually autonomous" (Pritchard, 2013, 38).

I will argue in the paper that none of these conceptions can explain the value of intellectual autonomy in terms that refer to the epistemic value of their respective achievements. Both of them seem to emphasize a richer conception of intellectual autonomy that is rooted in a thicker conception of rational self-governance, according to which one should become the author of one's own intellectual world. And this notion cannot be accounted for in purely epistemic terms. Reflection, for instance, should contribute to create and develop what one could call an *epistemic identity* that involves the endorsement of certain values, the pursuit of certain goods, and the adoption of certain attitudes.

I will hold that intellectual autonomy is less a particular virtue than the condition that help us shaping our personal intellectual ethics, that is, those virtues and dispositions that involve a complex set of attitudes towards oneself and others, attitudes that reflect how we view ourselves and others when engaged in epistemic tasks.

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DYNAMIC CONCEPTS AND DISAGREEMENT

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Consider (1) and (2):

(1) There is a fire here.

(2) There is a fire there.

In central cases, coreferential utterances of (1) and (2) will involve the expression or grasp of the same thought even if there is, in principle, an obvious difference in the way of expressing or grasping it. Since David Kaplan's succinct but inspirational remarks (Kaplan 1989, 537-538 and fn. 64), this phenomenon goes by the name of 'cognitive dynamics' or 'dynamic thought'. Here I wish to approach dynamic thought from a thus far unexplored angle. Retention of thought, I suggest, is not the only case in which dynamic thought is put to work. Just as shift of the way in which we express or grasp a thought may be required in order to retain that thought, so too it may be required in order to retain or enable disagreement with respect to another thought. Consider (3):

(3) There is not a fire there.

In indefinitely many cases, utterances of (1) and (3) would involve the expression of genuine disagreement. This is what I call 'dynamic disagreement'. To a first approximation, dynamic disagreement is the kind of disagreement that arises by means of dynamic thought.

Three features of dynamic disagreement stand out. First, it requires providing an elucidation of the dynamics of thought for the interpersonal case and not merely the intrapersonal case. Dynamic disagreement shows that dynamic thought is not a phenomenon confined to or mainly concerned with subjects that think across contexts. Dynamic thought may also bridge the thoughts of subjects that occupy differing contexts. Second, and most obviously, dynamic disagreement brings out the need for an account of dynamic thought that grounds genuine disagreement. More precisely, the requirement is that subjects endorse conflicting attitudes or states. I will confine attention to those central cases in which the conflict is derived from exclusionary or contradictory propositional contents or thoughts. Finally, dynamic disagreement puts pressure on the account of dynamic thought to capture a notion of rationality and coherence that survives the potential cognitive mismatches originated by context shift. Since disagreement is a rational state or a state for which subjects are held rationally accountable, one should not be counted as delivering the right results if dynamic disagreement is reached via compromising the rationality of the subjects that enter into it.

In this paper, I set myself two tasks: (i) to show how these three features are challenging for mainstream accounts of dynamic thought; (ii) to set out, in reaction to this, approaches that recognise the existence of dynamic concepts, namely, concepts that display a number of ways of thinking in different contexts.

As regards (i), three main strands of research have been proposed. First, what we may dub 'Kaplanian' theories offer a two-dimensional framework where only elements at the level of reference or state of affairs count as the proper constituents of thought. On this account, the thoughts in different contexts are the same in spite of involving different ways of thinking (or characters) because ways of thinking are either not themselves parts of thought or only part of thought insofar as united by the same referential source. A second class of theories we may call 'Fregean'. These theories individuate dynamic thought at the level of sense or

cognitive value. Fregean theories in the sense I intend here do not however make room for a split of the notion of way of thinking and thought. A third kind of approach starts with a fine-grained notion of thought interpreted as constituted by files or indexical modes of presentation individuated by contextually articulated informational relations—what Recanati calls ‘epistemically rewarding’ relations. According to this view, while preservation of the target informational relations guarantee instantiation of the same thought, dynamic thought is achieved, beyond sameness of such relations, via operations on files (such as conversion or fusion) or coordination of files (Recanati 2017).

As for (ii), I am ready to argue that none of these types of theory, in spite of their many assets, can accommodate the three features of dynamic disagreement just highlighted. As an alternative to these views, I suggest that different subjects enter into the dynamics of disagreement just in case they employ distinct modes of presentation or ways of thinking that belong to one and the same concept or sense. I call concepts that comprise several ways of thinking in this sense, ‘dynamic concepts’. I call ways of thinking belonging to but not individuating a thought ‘perspectives’. By relying on previous material (Verdejo 2018, forthcoming), we may analyse the above case as involving one single dynamic concept—constituting a single dynamic thought—that displays a number of ways of thinking paradigmatically attached to ‘here’ and ‘there’.

We may flesh out the exact characterisation of dynamic concepts and its associated perspectives in more than one way. On my preferred interpretation, a dynamic concept is fully individuated by a fundamental reference rule (Peacocke 2014). The fundamental reference rule at stake in the above case is the one for a location-based indexical concept [place] such that for x to be the reference of [place] in an event e of thinking, x has to stand in the spatial relation R to the place of e . When the thinker draws on the information that x is the place of the event of thinking e , a ‘here’ perspective is active. A ‘there’ perspective is in force otherwise. This account generalises to other indexicals and demonstrative terms in ways that are promising to capture the fundamental features of thought that dynamically intervenes in disagreement.

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HOW I REALLY SAY WHAT YOU THINK

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The apparently obviously true doctrine of opacity has been thought to be inconsistent with the referentialist account of the semantics of proper names and indexicals. I discuss here

one of the most popular strategies for resolving the apparent inconsistency, namely Mark Richard's *translational theory* of the semantics of belief-ascribing sentences, and raise three problems for it. Finally, I propose an alternative theory of the semantics of belief ascriptions – the *indexical theory* – that clearly avoids the three problems that trouble Richard's theory, and motivate it as the best possible strategy for resolving the apparent inconsistency between the doctrine of opacity and referentialism.

TOWARDS A RIGHT TO MATERNAL TOUCH IN ANIMALS

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Insights from developmental psychology show that maternal touch is crucial for the normal socio-emotional development of social mammals. Yet, humans routinely deprive animals of maternal touch, e.g. in dairy farming or in the lab. We argue that these practices have ethical implications beyond the obvious welfare concerns: the causal connection between maternal touch and social development ultimately links the experience of being cared for to the capacity to care, which in turn points to the animal's integrity as a social being. This also brings in the harm done to the maternal animal, who may be capable of caring but is not allowed to. From an ethics of care perspective, care is not only a value in itself, but it is necessarily a practice. Accordingly, maternal touch deprivation may in fact prevent both infant and maternal animal from achieving a form of morality that would otherwise be accessible to them.